Optimal Collective Investment in Generic Advertising, Export Market Promotion and Cost-of-Production-Reducing Research

Optimal investment rules are developed for a producer agency investing in domestic-market generic advertising, export market promotion, and cost-of-production-reducing research. These rules are derived assuming either maximization of producers' surplus or social surplus. The form of the optimality rules differs according to which objective is pursued. Fixed producer agency budgets are also allowed by incorporating a constraint limiting total expenditure on the three activities. Addition of such a constraint substantially alters the structure of the optimal investment rules. Differences in these rules highlight the importance of accounting for the financing mechanism when modeling optimal checkoff fund investment decisions. Optimality rules are simulated using data for the Canadian beef sector. Results suggest historic underinvestment in domestic-market generic advertising but overinvestment in export market promotion. Sensitivity of simulation results underscores the difficulty in assessing optimality of historic producer investment in cost-of-production-reducing research.     

The Structural Relation Between Mortgage and Market Interest Rates

This paper analyzes the dynamic relationship between primary and secondary mortgage markets and the short-term and long-term market interest rates. Using a series of monthly data on fixed rate mortgage rates and GNMA rates, we explore the dependence and speed of adjustment in these primary and secondary mortgage rates to each other as well as to the long and short-term government rates. The results indicate that residential mortgage rates in general, appear to follow the long-term rate and are not very sensitive to movements in the short-term interest rate.     

Early evidence of an adverse selection death spiral? The case of Blue Cross and Blue Shield

This paper uses a unique data set from 1957 to examine whether or not Blue Cross and Blue Shield suffered from an adverse selection death spiral after for-profit commercial insurance companies entered the market for health insurance. Results suggest that moving to experience rating may have helped the Blues counteract adverse selection in the group health insurance market. Adverse selection posed a greater problem for the Blues in the market for individual health insurance, possibly because of differences in the way the Blues screened potential enrollees relative to commercial insurance companies.     

Protection versus Promotion: An Empirical Investigation

Using Turkish industry-level data from 1983 to 1990, we find that politically organized industries receive both higher protection and promotion than unorganized ones. Tariff rates are decreasing (increasing) in the import-penetration ratio and the absolute value of the import-demandelasticity for organized (unorganized) industries. Subsidy rates are decreasing (increasing) in the output-supply elasticity for organized (unorganized) industries. The results are consistent with the predictions of the Grossman–Helpman model and its extension in this paper. The mix of protection and promotion is inversely related to the ratio of their respective marginal deadweight cost measures.     

A note on price futures versus revenue futures contracts

Here we consider the hedging roles of a price futures contract versus a revenue futures contract. In the absence of idiosyncratic output risk, the revenue contract almost always dominates the price contract. Idiosyncratic output risk provides conditions under which the price contract should dominate. When production risk is largely idiosyncratic, a producer with an anticipated long actuals position might combine a long revenue futures position with a short price futures position. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 24:503–512, 2004     

The Falsification of Four Popular Hypotheses About the Asian Crisis

Various claims have been made about the causes of the Asian crisis and its spread. Here, we use data on the behaviour of capital flows during the crisis to test the strong forms of four such hypotheses, that portfolio investors and hedge funds played a dominant role in initiating and/or spreading the crisis; that moral hazard kept efficient markets from predicting the crisis; and, finally, the common lender hypothesis of Kaminsky and Reinhart. In the process we also test implications of the Calvo-Mendoza model of rational investor ignorance. All are falsified as monocausal explanations. For example, portfolio investments that could not have been subject to substantial moral hazard continued to flow into Asia until very shortly before the crisis. Likewise, banks were a much larger source of capital outflows during the crisis than were portfolio investors. While falsified in their strongest forms, several of these hypotheses in less strong forms should play a role in a more nuanced analysis. It is necessary to move past simple single-factor approaches in order to produce a more complete, synthetic explanation of this episode.     

SUPPLY CHAIN INFORMATION SHARING IN A VENDOR MANAGED INVENTORY PARTNERSHIP

Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI) involves the vendor making the replenishment decision for products supplied to a customer based on various inventory and supply chain policies. Information sharing between supply chain members is required in VMI. Sometimes VMI decisions are delayed and/or the information shared is inaccurate. This research examines the effects of information delay and accuracy, and the sharing of sales and forecast information in a VMI environment facing stationary and nonstationary demand. The simulation experiments show the impact of information delay, information inaccuracy, and information sharing on a variety of performance measures, including inventory levels and fill rates.