Bidding for surplus in network allocation problems

In this paper we study non-cooperative foundations of network allocation rules. We focus on three allocation rules: the Myerson value, the position value and the component-wise egalitarian solution. For any of these three rules we provide a characterization based on component efficiency and some balanced contribution property. Additionally, we present three mechanisms whose equilibrium payoffs are well defined and coincide with the three rules under consideration if the underlying value function is monotonic. Non-monotonic value functions are shown to deal with allocation rules applied to monotonic covers. The mechanisms are inspired by the implementation of the Shapley value by Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein [Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value, J. Econ. Theory 100 (2) (2001) 274-294].     

A note on comparative downside risk aversion

We provide comparative global conditions for downside risk aversion, which are similar to the ones studied by Ross for risk aversion. We define a coefficient of downside risk aversion, and study its local properties.     

Self-control in peer groups

Social influences on self-control underlie both self-help groups and many peer interactions among youths. To understand these phenomena, we analyze how observing each other's behavior affects individuals’ ability to deal with their own impulses. These endogenous informational spillovers lead to either a unique “good news” equilibrium that ameliorates behavior, a unique “bad news equilibrium” that worsens it, or to the coexistence of both. A welfare analysis shows that people will find social interactions valuable only when they have enough confidence in their own and others’ ability to resist temptation. The ideal partner, however, is someone with a slightly worse self-control problem than one's own: this makes his successes more encouraging, and his failures less discouraging.     

Choice, preference and rationalizability in pareto’s theory of economic behavior

Pareto initiated the shift of economic theory from utility/preference to choice in order to fill a gap between theoretical and empirical economics. His suggestions for an empirically-oriented theory of choice were to be developed decades later in the literature on revealed preference and on the conditions of equivalence between preference-based and choice-based axiomatic structures. In the process, however, substantial departures from Pareto’s implicit design of the situation of choice were introduced. In this paper, the conditions for the rationalizability of choice are re-defined so that they fit the type of situation that Pareto had in mind. The result is that the main consistency axioms of standard choice theory have to give way to a different combination of axioms that concern decisiveness as well as consistency. (JEL:B13, D01, D11).     

Government financing in an endogenous growth model with financial market restrictions

Summary. In this paper, we develop an endogenous growth model with market regulations on explicitly modeled financial intermediaries to examine the effects of alternative government financing schemes on growth, inflation, and welfare. In the presence of binding regulation, there is always a unique equilibrium. We perform four alternative policy experiments; a change in the seigniorage tax rate, a change in the seigniorage tax base, a change in the income tax and a change in the fiscal-monetary policy mix. We find that in the presence of binding legal reserve requirements, a marginal increase in government spending need not result in a reduction in the rate of economic growth if it is financed with an increase in the seigniorage tax rate. Raising the seigniorage tax base by means of an increase in the reserve requirement retards growth and it has an ambiguous effect on inflation. An increase in income tax financed government spending also suppresses growth and raises inflation although not to the extent that the required seigniorage tax rate alternative would. Switching from seigniorage to income taxation as a source of government finance is growth reducing but deflationary. From a welfare perspective, the least distortionary way of financing an increase in the government spending requirements is by means of a marginal increase in the seigniorage tax rate. Under the specification of logarithmic preferences, the optimal tax structure is indeterminate. Received: March 20, 2000; revised version: June 26, 2001     

委托-代理理论与国有企业经营者激励制度的构建

我国的国企改革走过了近三十年的风雨历程,如何建立行之有效的经营者激励制度一直是改革的热点问题.本文在全面阐述委托--代理理论的基础上,对我国国有企业经营者激励制度的演变进行分析,进而,就如何在委托--代理关系下的国有企业内建立有效的激励机制问题进行探讨.     

关于培育和弘扬人文精神的思考

人文的核心是精神。人文精神是一个地方独具特质的精神品格和精神理念,是一个地方的“魂”,是凝聚和团结人民实现奋斗目标的理想信念和共同追求,是实现社会和谐发展的精神动力。因此,加快建设文化名市,打造人文桐乡的重点,就是培育和弘扬良好的人文精神。一、培育和弘扬人文精神,必须正确审视人文精神一是经济视角。从经济层面看人文精神,文化的发展,特别是人文精神的培育,与经济的发展有着密切关联。两者相互作用,相得益彰,经济比较发达、社会事业全面繁荣、人民生活比较富裕、社会的发展氛围比较浓厚,就有利于文化的发展和人文精神的培育…     

The Effect of Disagreement on Noncooperative Bargaining

A seemingly mild assumption of the standard alternating offers bargaining model under risk is that the breakdown event is not strictly worse than the worst agreement. When this assumption is relaxed the structure of the equilibrium set of agreements changes in an interesting way. We analyse the effect of disagreement on equilibrium, and relate our result to a class of outside option models. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C78.     

浅析我国的国债风险

近年来，作为积极财政政策的一个重要组成部分的国债政策，为有效增加国内需求，拉动经济增长做出了很大贡献，但与此同时，我们必须关注我国国债规模过大可能带来的后果。通过对我国国债规模及结构等方面的系统分析认为：我国国债隐藏着很大的信用风险，并提出了化解和防范这些风险的措施。     

The Value of Chinese Online game industry

The online games didn＇t enter China for a long time, but its development speed surprised a lot of people. The data in the IDC＇s report shows that the market size of online game will reach 8.34 million RMB in 2006. Alone with the increase of market competition and the growth of original creation, the Chinese online game industry will suffer an intensive shock. At present, the online game operation is facing the problem of product life circle＇s reduction and revenue＇s drop. To solve these problems, online game companies has to find out the new game＇s increasing point of profit.