Contractual Practice and Land Conflicts: The ‘Plant & Share’ Arrangement in Côte d'Ivoire

This paper tackles the broad issue of agrarian contracts, property rights and conflicts in the context of rural Côte d'Ivoire. Since the beginning of the 2000s, a new type of contractual arrangement has been developing rapidly: the ‘Plant & Share’ contract. Through such a contract, a landowner provides the land to a farmer who develops a perennial tree crop plantation; when production starts, the plantation, the plantation and the land, or the product is shared. The aim of the paper is to discuss the conflictive features of the arrangement. I argue that this contract, in spite of its potential for tensions and conflicts, constitutes an alternative to the much more conflictive land sales that currently dominate extra‐familial land transfers in the country.     

Ag econ angst crisis revisited

The present paper was inspired by and is a response to the Rola-Rubzen, Hardaker and Dillon paper 'Agricultural economists and world poverty: progress and prospects' (Rola-Rubzen et al. 2001). It is agreed that the position of agricultural economists in foreign aid and poverty programs has declined over recent decades. Such a feeling of guilt and remorse expressed by the above authors does indeed create considerable 'angst'. A major reason for this state of affairs lies in 'the flavour of the month' approach of the development agencies. These include women in development, gender-based farming systems research, household nutrition and food security, people participation, and targeting the poorest of the poor. These fads have driven disciplinary considerations to the wall and the more widely-defined objectives have reduced the drive for economic efficiency. We argue there is still a place for better designed and delivered assistance programs within the wider framework of assistance that has become fashionable. Greater application of institutional principles in both the political processes associated with assistance and the implementation agencies would improve the outcomes of many projects. Particular attention would need to be given to the interface between the development agencies and recipient governments. The present paper picks up on the market failure aspects of agriculture's rather poor contribution to development, and develops a wider perspective in terms of the new institutional economics and a continuing role for the agricultural economist.     

What drives stock market integration? An analysis using agribusiness stocks

This article explores the drivers of regional stock market integration with a focus on the agribusiness sector across relevant regional trade blocs around the world. We implement panel cointegration models to analyze the stock indices of agribusiness firms in the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), European Union (EU), Asia‐Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Based on the literature on market integration and stock return pricing, we identify nine possible determinants of stock market integration, which we separate into three categories: individual market performance, macroeconomic conditions, and agricultural trade. In our analysis, we account for agriculture‐specific factors to control for possible structural shifts in financial markets regimes by including the two main commodity price bubbles during last 20 years. Our results show that most of the variables included in our categories have been important factors in promoting regional stock market integration. Moreover, integration among regional stock markets was strengthened by the implementation of trade agreements. This effect is stronger in trade blocs with fewer members, such as NAFTA and MERCOSUR, compared with larger and more heterogeneous blocs, such as the EU and APEC.     

Regional Economic Disparity,Financial Disparity,and National Economic Growth: Evidence from China

The dynamic relations among national economic growth, economic disparity, and financial disparity in China are examined. Specifically, the focus is on whether economic disparity or financial disparity affects national economic growth. As measures of economic and financial disparity across regions and provinces, the Williamson coefficient of disparity is employed using both regional data (eastern, central, and western) and provincial data (from 31 provinces). Overall, it is found that both provincial financial disparity and, to a lesser degree, economic disparity have a negative effect on national economic growth. In addition, financial disparity appears to be exogenous, suggesting that financial disparity is not influenced by either economic disparity or national economic growth.     

PRICE DYNAMICS,FOREIGN EXCHANGE AND ANTICIPATED SHOCKS IN A TOURISM ECONOMY

Using a dynamic model of an open monetary economy, this paper examines the effects of tourism‐related anticipated shocks on goods prices and foreign exchange reserves. Foreign tourists consume mainly non‐traded goods in holiday destinations, converting them into exportable goods. This gives rise to a tourism terms‐of‐trade effect that affects the accumulation of foreign exchange. Announcements of anticipated events bring tourist visits forward, resulting in an initial under‐adjustment or an over‐adjustment in the prices of the non‐traded goods when the tourism terms‐of‐trade effect is positive or negative. This leads to an increase or a decrease in foreign reserves in the long run.     

Tax Havens,Growth, and Welfare

This paper develops an endogenous growth model featuring tax havens, and uses it to examine how the existence of tax havens affects the economic growth rate and social welfare in high‐tax countries. We show that the presence of tax havens generates two conflicting channels in determining the growth effect. First, the public investment effect states that tax havens may erode tax revenues and in turn decrease the government's infrastructure expenditure, thereby reducing growth. Second, the tax planning effect of tax havens reduces marginal cost of capital and hence encourages capital accumulation so as to spur economic growth. The overall growth effect is ambiguous and is determined by the extent of these two effects. The welfare analysis shows that tax havens are more likely to be welfare‐enhancing if the government expenditure share in production is low, or the initial income tax rate is high. Moreover, the welfare‐maximizing income tax rate is lower than the growth‐maximizing income tax rate if tax havens are present.     

Can Agents Be Better Off with Pay Caps?

A popular way to discipline the managers of companies or banks that got into trouble during the recent financial crisis has been to impose caps on managers' pay. Using a small extension of the standard principal–agent model, we argue that pay caps might serve the opposite purpose, because the agent might be better off with a pay cap. Specifically, we show that, given a fixed effort level to be implemented, the agent's expected utility can be decreasing in an upper bound for the agent's reward. The effect of pay caps on the general structure of optimal incentive contracts is also characterized. While an improvement of contracting information always helps the principal, it might increase or decrease the marginal cost of imposing pay caps.     

An Experimental Study on Dividing Gains through Politics

This article offers experimental evidence to examine an important case in politics where a monopolistic proposer seeks a majority's consent from competitive responders to split the gain. The unique subgame perfect equilibrium prediction is that the side of trade with a monopoly will exploit the side of trade with competition to reap almost all of the gain. Our experimental evidence reveals that while responders do compete with each other to race to the bottom (consistent with the prediction), the monopolistic proposer settles down to offer a ‘fair’ share of the pie to those from whom he or she seeks majority support (contrary to the prediction).     

Nesting Horizontal and Vertical Differentiation with Location Choices

This study solves a location‐then‐price game in which horizontal and vertical differentiation are combined using an asymmetric distribution of consumers’ taste. Boundary locations are robust when the taste disparity of the population is not large and out‐of‐market locations are not allowed. Firms may have incentives to move either inside or outside the market in other situations, so the equilibrium prices are never differentiated. The restrictions of vertical differentiation under this framework are further examined. A model with the entrance of a vertically differentiated product is also discussed.     

DISCRIMINATION IN A MODEL OF CONTESTS WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION ABOUT ABILITY

We study contests with private information and identical contestants, where contestants' efforts and innate abilities generate output of varying qualities. The designer's revenue depends on the quality of the output, and she offers a reward to the contestant achieving the highest quality. We characterize the equilibrium behavior, outcomes, and payoffs for both nondiscriminatory and discriminatory (where the reward is contestant‐dependent) contests. We derive conditions under which the designer obtains a larger payoff when using a discriminatory contest and describe settings, where these conditions are satisfied.