Consumers’ Appreciation of Regional Certification Labels: A Pan‐European Study

Successful regional products, such as Florida oranges, Idaho potatoes and Parma ham, often have to compete against products passing themselves off as the authentic product using the exact same name. This unfair competition misleads consumers, discourages small‐ and medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs) from marketing products based on their region of origin, and may end up hurting rural economies. To protect consumers, and support SMEs and rural economies, many countries around the world have introduced regulations enabling SMEs to legally protect the names of their regional products. The success of these regulations largely depends on consumers’ appreciation of regional certification labels that inform consumers that the name of the regional product is protected and that it denotes the authentic product. To gain an understanding about consumers’ appreciation of regional certification labels, this paper investigates consumers’ image of these labels and proposes a model that relates this image to consumers’ willingness to buy and pay for protected regional products. The model is tested based on Regulation No. 2081/92 that was introduced by the EEC allowing European SMEs to protect their regional products and market their products with a protected‐designation‐of‐origin (PDO) label. Structural equation modelling results suggest that consumers’ image of regional certification labels consists of a quality warranty dimension and an economic support dimension, which positively relate to consumers’ willingness to buy and pay for the protected regional product. Protecting regional products and marketing them with regional certification labels may be beneficial for SMEs producing and marketing regional products. Policy and managerial implications are discussed.     

When does incentive compensation motivate managerial behaviors? An experimental investigation of the fit between incentive compensation,executive core self-evaluation,and firm performance

We develop and test an integrative model that examines the fit between compensation schemes, executives' characteristics, and situational factors. We propose that a fit among all three factors is crucial to motivate desirable managerial behaviors. Using a specially designed management simulation, our study demonstrates that the effectiveness of incentive compensation to motivate managerial behaviors depends on executives' core self-evaluation and firm performance. Our results show that, relative to fixed salary compensation, executives with higher core self-evaluation respond to incentive compensation with greater perseverance, competitive strategy focus, ethical behavior, and strategic risk taking during organizational decline. However, these interaction effects are not present during organizational growth. Our theory and empirical evidence provide significant insights into the complex relationships among compensation schemes, executives' characteristics, firm performance, and managerial behaviors. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Corporate Insurance and Debt: The Case of China*

Finance theorists have long argued that corporate purchases of property insurance can reduce the probability and hence the expected costs of financial distress. And by so doing, the corporate use of insurance can reduce borrowing costs and/ or increase debt capacity, reduce the overall cost of capital, and increase firm value. This article attempts to apply this argument to the case of publicly traded companies in China, which provides a particularly interesting environment given the significant presence of both foreign direct investment and state shareholdings in its corporate sector. From their study of several hundred Chinese companies during the period 1997‐2003, the authors report the following conclusions: Companies with higher borrower costs tend to purchase more property insurance, which in turn has the effect of increasing their debt capacity. Smaller companies are more likely than larger firms both to insure their assets and to purchase more property insurance (as a percentage of assets), reflecting their greater vulnerability to financial shocks and larger potential benefit from insurers' real advisory services (such as loss prevention advice). Companies with more and larger growth opportunities are more likely to purchase insurance, reflecting their higher expected costs of financial distress (from possible underinvestment) than firms with limited growth opportunities. Companies with higher levels of state ownership tend to insure their assets to a greater extent, suggesting that the managers of such companies insure to protect their job security, particularly as the availability of state subsidies to the Chinese corporate sector has declined since market reforms were initiated in 1978.     

Motivation in project management: The project manager's perspective

Project motivation is a key aspect to a successful project, yet few studies exist that shed light on this important subject. This article reviews the current literature and theoretical aspects of motivation and provides an analysis of the data. A survey was conducted by soliciting project managers to tell how they perceive their ability to influence motivation. In total, 115 certified project managers responded to the survey. A discussion and suggestions for future research follow the data.     

Impacts of WTO restrictions on subsidized EU sugar exports

The study evaluates the impact of World Trade Organization (WTO) restrictions on the European Union (EU) sugar sector and the world sugar market. A small reduction in production quotas would be sufficient to satisfy the export subsidy limitations of the Uruguay Round agreement. Complete elimination of export subsidies by 2005 would require either a 10% reduction in production quotas or the combination of an 8% reduction in quotas and an 11% reduction in intervention prices. Higher world prices resulting from reduced EU exports would result in increased production of unsubsidized C‐sugar, with different impacts across EU member countries explained by differences in institutional pricing arrangements and marginal production costs.