The implied Sharpe ratio

In an incomplete market, including liquidly traded European options in an investment portfolio could potentially improve the expected terminal utility for a risk-averse investor. However, unlike the Sharpe ratio, which provides a concise measure of the relative investment attractiveness of different underlying risky assets, there is no such measure available to help investors choose among the different European options. We introduce a new concept—the implied Sharpe ratio—which allows investors to make such a comparison in an incomplete financial market. Specifically, when comparing various European options, it is the option with the highest implied Sharpe ratio that, if included in an investor's portfolio, will improve his expected utility the most. Through the method of Taylor series expansion of the state-dependent coefficients in a nonlinear partial differential equation, we also establish the behaviour of the implied Sharpe ratio with respect to an investor's risk-aversion parameter. In a series of numerical studies, we compare the investment attractiveness of different European options by studying their implied Sharpe ratio.     

Consumers’ Appreciation of Regional Certification Labels: A Pan‐European Study

Successful regional products, such as Florida oranges, Idaho potatoes and Parma ham, often have to compete against products passing themselves off as the authentic product using the exact same name. This unfair competition misleads consumers, discourages small‐ and medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs) from marketing products based on their region of origin, and may end up hurting rural economies. To protect consumers, and support SMEs and rural economies, many countries around the world have introduced regulations enabling SMEs to legally protect the names of their regional products. The success of these regulations largely depends on consumers’ appreciation of regional certification labels that inform consumers that the name of the regional product is protected and that it denotes the authentic product. To gain an understanding about consumers’ appreciation of regional certification labels, this paper investigates consumers’ image of these labels and proposes a model that relates this image to consumers’ willingness to buy and pay for protected regional products. The model is tested based on Regulation No. 2081/92 that was introduced by the EEC allowing European SMEs to protect their regional products and market their products with a protected‐designation‐of‐origin (PDO) label. Structural equation modelling results suggest that consumers’ image of regional certification labels consists of a quality warranty dimension and an economic support dimension, which positively relate to consumers’ willingness to buy and pay for the protected regional product. Protecting regional products and marketing them with regional certification labels may be beneficial for SMEs producing and marketing regional products. Policy and managerial implications are discussed.     

Synthesizing R&D planning and business strategy: some preliminary findings

The need for firms to compete in the longer run by offering superior products at competitive prices requires better integration of R&D, and technology in general, into business strategy development. A survey based on personal interviews of 40 respondents from “Fortune 500” U. S. industrial firms reveals that their shift in emphasis toward new product/process R&D is providing the impetus for placing R&D in a strategic context. However, R&D has not been fully integrated into the strategic planning process of many organizations. The results of the survey reveal that certain communication channels can be more fully utilized to meld R&D planning into business strategy. Specific suggestions to facilitate information exchange, dissemination of planning data, and integration of various R&D plans into a cohesive technology strategy are given.     

Bureaucratic Decision Costs and Endogenous Agency Expertise

This article analyzes the effect of the cost that an agencymust incur to adopt a new regulation (the "enactment cost")on the agency's incentive to invest in expertise. The effectof the enactment cost on agency expertise depends on whetherthe agency would regulate if it fails to acquire additionalinformation about the regulation's effects. If an uninformedagency would regulate, increasing enactment costs increasesagency expertise; if an uninformed agency would retain the statusquo, increasing enactment costs decreases agency expertise.These results may influence the behavior of an uninformed overseer,such as a court or legislature, that can manipulate the agency'senactment costs. Such an overseer must balance its interestin influencing agency policy preferences against its interestin increasing agency expertise. The article discusses the implicationsof these results for various topics in institutional design,including judicial and executive review of agency regulations,structure-and-process theories of congressional oversight, nationalsecurity, criminal procedure, and constitutional law.     

Network externalities and long-run market shares

We study a dynamic duopoly model with network externalities. The value of the product depends on the current and past network size. We compare the market outcome to a planner. With equal quality products, the market outcome may result in too little standardization (i.e. too many products active in the long run) but never too much. The potential inefficiency is non-monotonic in the strength of the network effect, being most likely for intermediate levels. When products differ in quality, an inferior product may dominate even when the planner would choose otherwise, but only if the discount factor is sufficiently large     

Medical insurance with rank-dependent utility

Summary. A well-known result in the medical insurance literature is that zero co-insurance is never second-best for insurance contracts subject to moral hazard. We replace the usual expected utility assumption with a version of the rank-dependent utility (RDU) model that has greater experimental support. When consumers exhibit such preferences, we show that zero co-insurance may in fact be optimal, especially for low-risk consumers. Indeed, it is even possible that the first-best and second-best contracts are identical. In this case, there is no “market failure”, despite the informational asymmetry. We argue that these RDU results are in better accord with the empirical evidence from US health insurance markets. Received: February 26, 2001; revised version: October 4, 2002 RID="*" ID="*"The authors would particularly like to thank Simon Grant, John Quiggin, Peter Wakker and an anonymous referee for valuable comments and suggestions on earlier drafts. The paper has also benefitted from the input of seminar audiences at The Australian National University, University of Auckland, University of Melbourne and University of Sydney. Ryan also gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the ARC, through Grant number A000000055. Correspondence to:R. Vaithianathan     

Does Advertising Overcome Brand Loyalty? Evidence from the Breakfast‐Cereals Market

In differentiated product markets where consumer preferences are characterized by brand loyalty, an important role for advertising may be to overcome brand loyalty by encouraging consumers to switch to less familiar brands. Using a scanner panel dataset of breakfast-cereal purchases, I find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that advertising counteracts the tendencies of brand loyalty toward repeat purchasing. Equivalently, advertising reduces switching costs in this market. Furthermore, counterfactual experiments demonstrate that in markets with brand loyalty, advertising is an attractive and effective option—relative to alternative promotional activities, such as price discounts—of stimulating demand for a brand .     

Supply chain finance schemes in the procurement of agricultural products

Product, information, and finance flows are all interrelated within the modern supply chain; thus, it is now more than ever of paramount importance for practitioners to integrate procurement and financial decisions. This challenge is exemplified in many agricultural supply chains, where operational risks are significant and access to capital differs sharply across firms. We study three management tactics that some large food/beverage manufacturers – situated downstream in these chains – have used to meet the challenge: ordinary fixed price contracts (or soft tolling) with direct suppliers, hard tolling and contract farming where the manufacturer intervenes upstream, providing capital, and coordinating procurement decisions. We place these upstream intervention schemes in the theoretical context of supply chain finance (SCF) and model their application to a three-echelon agricultural supply chain. We perform a numerical study in order to understand how the structure of capital constraints in the chain may influence the manufacturer's choice of SCF scheme. The numerical study is based on a business case that reflects the barley–malt supply chain of Heineken N.V. Despite greater coordination opportunities, we show that upstream intervention is not necessarily preferable for the manufacturer. Nevertheless, the preferred SCF scheme can be inferred on the basis of relatively simple characterization of the capital constraints in the supply chain.