The New Growth Theory and Coasean economics: Institutions to capture externalities

The New Growth Theory and Coasean Economics: Institutions to Capture Externalities. — This paper presents the main theoretical arguments which lead many adherents of the New Growth Theory to the conclusion that externalities in research and development are important for economic growth and warrant government subsidies. In contrast, the authors point to private institutions like associations, company structures and industry clusters which can capture such externalities. An international comparison of private R&;D investment and special features of institutions in Switzerland and Japan are in line with this hypothesis. Thus, the argument for R&;D subsidies made by the New Growth Theory is considerably reduced.     

AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE IMPACT OF PROFIT SHARING SCHEMES OF EXECUTIVIES ON THE CONTENT OF CORPORATE SUBMISSIONS ON PROPOSED ACCOUNTING STANDARDS

This paper examines the comments submitted by UK companies on 20 proposed accounting standards to test the hypotheses that executives favor standards that increase, or dampen the variance of, accounting profit numbers on which their incentive remuneration is based. Test results were generally as hypothesised but only the profit variance outcomes were statistically significant. Allowing for political environment changes affected only the profit variance results. There was no evidence that the relative monetary size of bonus payments was a significant lobbying factor. No significant differences were found between the lobbying preferences of companies with or without executive incentive schemes.     

INDEPENDENT EXPERT'S REPORTS IN TAKEOVER BIDS

This paper reports an empirical examination of independent expert reports in takeover bids using the 170 reports that were issued in the 364 cash-based bids that occurred between January 1988 and December 1991. It was found that bid premia offered in takeover bids where an expert's report was issued were not significantly lower than bid premia in other bids. This may be attributable to independent experts acting as a countervailing influence on bidders holding a superior pre-bid bargaining position. Next, some dimensions of the “fair and reasonable” criterion that experts are required to use are examined. These are the single-test and dual-test interpretations of the phrase, the relation between offer price, market price and the expert's valuation of the target, the cost and length of expert's reports and, finally, the influence an expert has on the outcome of a bid.     

Estimating nonlinear time-series models using simulated vector autoregressions

This paper develops two new methods for conducting formal statistical inference in nonlinear dynamic economic models. The two methods require very little analytical tractability, relying instead on numerical simulation of the model's dynamic behaviour. Although one of the estimators is asymptotically more efficient than the other, a Monte Carlo study shows that, for a specific application, the less efficient estimator has smaller mean squared error in samples of the size typically encountered in macroeconomics. The estimator with superior small sample performance is used to estimate the parameters of a real business cycle model using observed US time-series data.     

Game theoretic derivations of competitive strategies in conjoint analysis

While conjoint analysis has been applied in a wide variety of different contexts in Marketing, most applications fail to explicitly consider retaliatory reactions from competitors. In this paper, a methodological extension is developed for conjoint analysis by explicitly modeling competition in a game theoretic context. The Nash equilibrium concept is employed to model competitive reactions to produce design, and its implications for reactive product strategies are discussed. The optimal product design problem for each firm is formulated as a nonlinear integer programming problem, which is solved via a specialized branch and bound method combined with a heuristic. In order to compute a Nash equilibrium, a sequential iterative procedure is proposed. The proposed procedure is illustrated under several scenarios of competition using previously published conjoint data.This research has been supported by the Henry Rutgers Research Fellowship, Rutgers University.     

Measurement error and panel data1

The underidentification of linear models with measurement error does not necessarily extend to panel data models, as has been shown by GAiliches and Hausman (1986). We discuss and extend some of their results for a simple case and address particular issues concerning identification and asymptotic variances.     

A note on securities market response to pension fund termination*

Abstract. A recent article in this journal (Hsieh, Ferris, and Chen, 1990) presents evidence demonstrating that financially distressed firms that terminate overfunded pension plans experience significantly positive abnormal returns, while nondistressed terminating firms experience returns not different from zero. The article concludes from this evidence that the market regards the property rights to excess assets as residing fully with the sponsoring firm prior to termination, particularly when the sponsoring firm is not financially distressed. Accordingly, the reporting requirements of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 88, which require immediate recognition of gains resulting from termination, are inconsistent with the market's view of the ownership rights to excess plan assets. Similarly, the article suggests that the excise tax imposed on asset reversions is “punitive” because property rights to fund assets resided with the company prior to termination. This paper questions three aspects of the Hsieh, Ferris, and Chen article: (1) the plausibility of the theory explaining differential reaction to the announcement to terminate for distressed and nondistressed firms; (2) the effect of the distressed/nondistressed classification criteria, event date specification, and event window length on the results; and (3) the appropriateness of using the empirical results, if reliable, to evaluate accounting treatment or federal tax policy. Résumé. Dans un récent article paru dans cette même publication, Hsieh, Ferris et Chen (1990) soumettaient des faits démontrant que les entreprises en difficulté financière qui mettent fin à un régime de retraite surprovisionné enregistrent des rendements anormaux positifs importants, tandis que les entreprises qui mettent fin à un régime de retraite sans être en difficulté financière enregistrent des rendements qui ne sont pas différents de zéro. De là, les auteurs concluaient que le marché estime que les droits à l'excédent d'actif appartiennent exclusivement à l'entreprise responsable du régime avant la cessation, en particulier lorsque cette dernière n'est pas en difficulté financière. Par conséquent, les exigences de la norme SFAS No. 88 en matière d'information à fournir, qui prévoient la constatation immédiate du produit de la cessation du régime, ne sont pas conformes à la façon de voir du marché relativement aux droits à l'excédent d'actif du régime. De la même façon, selon les auteurs, la taxe d'accise imposée en cas de retour de l'actif est “punitive”, étant donné que les droits à l'actif du régime appartenaient à l'entreprise avant la cessation du régime. Les auteurs s'interrogent ici sur trois aspects de l'article de Hsieh, Ferris, et Chen: 1) la pertinence de la théorie expliquant la réaction marginale à l'annonce de la cessation d'un régime pour les entreprise qui sont en difficulté financière et celles qui ne le sont pas; 2) l'incidence sur les résultats des critères permettant de classer les entreprises comme étant en difficulté financière ou ne l‘étant pas, de la précision de la date de l’événement et de la longueur de la période pré-post relative à l‘événement; et 3) l'opportunité de l'utilisation des résultats empiriques, s'ils sont fiables, pour évaluer le traitement comptable ou la politique fiscale fédérale.     

Economic Comparison of Alternative Tillage Systems under Risk.

Stochastic dominance efficiency criteria are used to rank the net farm return distributions for four different tillage systems under six different farm scenarios. Pairwise comparisons of tillage systems are carried over incremental upper and lower risk-aversion coefficient (RAC) bounds identified for each farm scenario, based on the size and spread of the outcome distributions to identify regions where dominance may switch between tillage systems. Ridge-till systems are generally the dominant tillage system for all farm scenarios considered. No-till systems on clay loam soils are more dominant in the risk-preferring range and less dominant in the risk-averse range, which relates to the relatively larger range of net return values and smaller mean net return values generated by this tillage system. Conversely, the moldboard plow and chisel plow systems are more dominant in risk-aversion intervals and less dominant in the risk-preferring intervals for clay loam soils. In sandy soil scenarios, the ridge-till and no-till systems are dominant over the two fall tillage systems for all farm sizes, indicating that these tillage systems are more competitive with conventional tillage systems in lighter soil type situations. A sensitivity analysis between moldboard plow and no-till systems indicates that no-till would dominate in risk-preferring intervals, and an increase in no-till net farm returns of 16 per acre would change dominance in favor of no-till in risk-averse interval space. On a utilisé les critères d'efficacitéà dominance stochastique pour classer les divers niveaux de recettes agricoles nettes dans quatre systèmes différents de travail du sol, selon six scénarios d'exploitation. Des comparaisons en paires des systèmes de travail ont été faites en regard de tranches croissantes des limites supérieures et inférieures du coefficient d'aversion du risque (CER), établies pour chaque scénario d'après l'importance et l'étendue des distributions du rendement, dans le but d'identifier les régions où la dominance serait susceptible de passer d'un système de travail à l'autre. Le système de travail sur billons était en général le système dominant dans tous les scénarios d'exploitation examinés. La culture sans travail du sol sur loam argileux était plus dominante dans les intervalles d'acceptation du resque et moins dominante dans les intervalles d'aversion du resque, cequi s'explique au fait que ce système de travail donne lieu à une fourchette relativement plus large, mais aussi à une moyenne plus faible du revenu net. À l'inverse, le labour à la charrue classique et au chisel dominait davantage dans les intervalles d'aversion du risque. Dans les sols sableux, le travail sur billons et la culture sans labour l'emportaient sur les deux autres régimes dans toutes les tailles d'exploitation, ce qui porte à croire que, dans les sols plus légers, ces régimes sont plus concurrentiels avec les systèmes classiques. L'analyse de sensibilité entre le labour à la charrue et les systèmes sans travail du sol montre que ces derniers dominent dans les intervalles d'acceptation du risque et qu'un accroissement du revenu agricole net de 16 /acre ferait glisser la dominance vers les intervalles d'aversion du risque.