Multi-product costs and standby capacity derived from queuing theory: the case of Belgian hospitals

Empirical hospital cost function studies can be divided into two categories: studies estimating traditional multi-product cost functions and studies including demand uncertainty (assuming that hospitals provide standby capacity to cope with uncertain demand and stressing that the relationship between the uncertain demand, excess capacity and costs should be investigated). Most studies include (the inverse of) the occupancy rate in a relatively basic cost function. The first contribution of this paper is to incorporate an indicator of reserve capacity into a genuine multi-product cost function. The second contribution is to propose an alternative indicator to proxy the reserve margin. The often used occupancy rate has an important shortcoming: the same occupancy rate can hide different turnaway probabilities and waiting times, obscuring the true degree of reservation quality. Since turnaway probabilities and waiting times are typical queuing theory indicators, an indicator for average waiting time (derived from queuing theory) is incorporated into a proper multi-product cost function to capture the degree of standby capacity into a proper multi-product cost function. The study uses 1997 data on Belgian general care hospitals to estimate a multi-product cost function and calculate cost elasticities, marginal costs and the degree of economies of scale. The results further show that providing standby capacity has a significant impact on total costs.     

Optimal monetary policy using an unrestricted VAR

This paper proposes a simple benchmark for monetary policy. Assuming the true model of the economy is unknown, it is based on an unrestricted vector autoregression (VAR). The key result is that instead of deriving optimal policy using the original VAR equations as the constraint, when no restriction is placed on the correlation structure of the VAR disturbances, the constraint should be formed from a transformation of the VAR. This method is applied to the USA, 1964–2009. Significant welfare gains are found compared with actual policy and using a Taylor rule. Incorporating a zero interest rate lower bound lowers output and inflation. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Emotional intelligence and resilience as predictors of leadership in school administrators

This mixed‐method study of 48 P–12 school administrators across three southeastern states was done to begin investigation of the impact of nontraditional leadership factors. As evidenced by the results, there is a strong correlation between the factors of emotional intelligence and resilience and leadership success.     

Behind M&;As in China and the United States: Networks,learning, and institutions

Few scholars would dispute the argument that mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are different in China and the United States, but we know little about how they differ. This article reports one of the first studies that systematically compares and contrasts how M&As differ in these two countries. While prior research on M&As tends to emphasize economic and financial explanations while treating firms as atomistic actors severed from their institutional and network relations, we develop a new theoretical framework based on relational, behavioral, and institutional perspectives. We not only consider firms as learning actors embedded in network relations, but also compare and contrast their M&A patterns between China and the United States, two distinctive institutional contexts. We find that both a firm’s structural hole position and its learning orientation (exploration/exploitation) in alliances have direct and joint impacts on subsequent M&As. Further, such impacts differ across the two countries, due to their institutional disparities.     

Understanding the Social Role of Entrepreneurship

There is a need to rethink and redefine the social value added of entrepreneurial activities to society. In this paper we develop five pillars on which the evolving social role of entrepreneurship can rest and have its impact: (1) connecting entrepreneurial activities to other societal efforts aimed at improving the quality of life, achieving progress, and enriching human existence, (2) identifying ways to reduce the dysfunctional effects of entrepreneurial activities on stakeholders, (3) redefining the scope of entrepreneurial activities as a scholarly arena, (4) recognizing entrepreneurship's social multiplier, and (5) pursuing blended value at the organizational level, centring on balancing the creation of financial, social and environmental wealth. In a final section we discuss implications for practices and for further research.     

Labour contracts in a stock market economy

In this paper, labour contracts are examined in the context of a general stock market economy where all shareholders are risk averse, and firms act in shareholders interest. The problem considered is whether some firm can offer a wage contract that will make all its shareholders better off. We show by example that, contrary to the arguments in the partial equilibrium framework, it is possible that no such contract will exist, even when there are potential gains to risk sharing. A sufficient condition for the existence of a feasible pareto improving contract is given. It is shown that contract trading will arise provided some firm has no large shareholders.     

A preference foundation for constant loss aversion

Following prospect theory and in particular the concept of loss aversion, introduced by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), we consider decision making under risk in which the decision maker’s preferences depend on a reference outcome. An outcome below this reference outcome is regarded as resulting from a loss: a loss decreases the decision maker’s basic utility more than a comparable gain increases this utility. An elegant and simple way to model this phenomenon was proposed by Shalev (2002): the utility of an outcome below the reference outcome is obtained from the basic utility by subtracting a multiple of the loss in basic utility: this multiple, the loss aversion coefficient, is constant across different reference outcomes. We provide a preference foundation for this loss aversion model.     

Sequential selling mechanisms

Summary In this paper we attempt to formalize the idea that a mechanism that involves multilateral communication between buyers and sellers may be dominated by one that involves simple bilateral communication. To do this we consider the well known problem in which a seller tries to sell a single unit of output to a group ofN buyers who have independently distributed private valuations. Our arguments hinge on two considerations. First, buyers communicate their willingness to negotiate with the seller sequentially, and second, buyers have the option of purchasing the good from some alternative supplier. It is shown that the seller cannot improve upon a procedure in which she offers the good to each buyer in turn at a fixed price. The seller reverts to multilateral communication if possible, only when no buyer is willing to pay the fixed price. In reasonable environments buyers will be too impatient to wait for the outcome of a multilateral negotiation and all communications will be bilateral.In many problems in mechanism design, informed traders have no alternative to participation in the mechanism that is offered by its designer. The best mechanism from the designer's point of view is then the one that is most efficient at extracting informational rents, that is, a simple auction. In a competitive environment it is likely to be costly for buyers to participate in an auction or any other multilateral selling scheme in which the seller must process information from many different buyers because alternative trading opportunities will be disappearing during the time that the seller is collecting this information. Buyers might be willing to participate in an auction, but only if they could be guaranteed that the competition that they face will not eliminate too much of their surplus.At the other extreme to the auction is a simple fixed price selling scheme 1. The seller simply waits until he meets a buyer whose valuation is high enough, given the opportunities that exist in the rest of the market, for him to be willing to pay this price. The seller extracts the minimum of the buyer's informational rents since the price that a buyer pays is independent of his valuation. Yet the seller might like this scheme if adding a second bidder to the process makes it very difficult for him to find a buyer with a valuation high enough to want to participate.In the presence of opportunity costs, the seller faces a trade-off between his ability to extract buyers informational rents and his ability to find buyers who are willing to participate in any competitive process. In practice this trade-off will impose structure on the method that is used to determine a price. In markets where there are auctions, limits are put on buyer participation. In tobacco auctions bids are submitted at a distinct point in time from buyers who are present at that time. In real estate auctions time limits are put on the amount of time the seller will wait before making a decision. These restrictions on participation are presumably endogenously selected by the seller (possibly in competition with other mechanism designers) with this trade-off in mind.On the other hand, markets in which objects appear to trade at a fixed price are rarely so simple. A baker with a fixed supply of fresh bagels is unlikely to collect bids from buyers and award the bagels to the high bidder at the end of the day. Buyers are unlikely to be willing to participate in such a scheme since they can buy fresh bagels from a competitor down the street. Yet despite the fact that bagels sell at a fixed price throughout the day, most bakers are more than willing to let it be known that they will discount price at the end of the day on any bagels that they have not yet sold. Selling used cars presents a similar problem. Each potential buyer for the used car is likely to have inspected a number of alternatives, and is likely to know the prices at which these alternative can be obtained. A seller who suggests that buyers submit a bid, then wait until the seller is sure that no higher offer will be submitted is asking buyers to forgo these alternative opportunities with no gain to themselves. To avoid the rigidity of the pure fixed price scheme most used cars are sold for a fixed price or best offer. These examples suggest that the best selling mechanism may involve a complex interplay between participation and surplus extraction considerations.The purpose of this paper is to provide a simple formalism within which the factors that determine the best contract can be evaluated. We consider the best known environment from the point of view of auction design in which there are a large number of buyers with independent private valuations for a unit of an indivisible commodity that is being sold by a single supplier who acts as the mechanism designer. We modify this standard problem in two critical ways. First, we assume that the seller meets the potential buyers sequentially rather than all at once. Secondly we assume that buyers have a valuable alternative that yields them a sure surplus. This creates a simple bidding cost that is effectively the expected loss in surplus (created by the disappearance of outside alternatives) that the buyer faces during the time that he spends negotiating with the seller.These simple assumptions allow us to calculate the impact of competition and communication costs using completely standard arguments from the mechanism design literature. We are able to show that with these assumptions the seller's expected surplus will be highest if the object is sold according to the following modified fixed price scheme: the seller contacts each of the potential buyers in turn and either offers to negotiate or announces that he no longer wishes to trade. If he offers to negotiate and the buyer agrees, the buyer immediately has the option of trading for sure with the seller at a fixed price set ex ante. If the buyer does not wish to pay this fixed price, he may submit an alternative bid. The seller will then continue to contact new buyers, returning to trade with the buyer only if no buyer wishes to pay the fixed price and no higher bid is submitted.It will be clear that in our environment, both the simple fixed price scheme and the simple auction are feasible. The simple auction prevails when the fixed price is set equal to the maximum possible valuation, while the simple fixed price scheme occurs when the fixed price is set so that buyers are willing to participate if and only if they are willing to pay the fixed price. Our results will show that a simple auction in never optimal for the seller. The seller can always strictly improve his payoff by moving to a scheme in which there is some strictly positive probability that trade will occur at the fixed price. On the other hand, there are reasonable circumstances in which the seller cannot achieve a higher payoff than the one she gets by selling at a fixed price. It is shown that for any positive participation cost, there is a large, but finite, number of potential buyers so that the seller cannot achieve a higher payoff than what she gets by selling at a fixed price. Two simple, but important continuity results are also illustrated. As the cost of participation in the mechanism increases (decreases), the probability with which the seller's unit of output is sold at a fixed price goes to one (zero) in the best modified fixed price mechanism for the seller.Our paper is not the first to generate such a modified fixed price scheme. Both McAfee and McMillan (1988) and Riley and Zeckhauser (1983) come up with similar schemes for the case in which the seller must bear a fixed cost for each new buyer that she contacts. There are two essential differences between our model and theirs. First, as the cost is interpreted as the opportunity cost of participation in the mechanism, it is reasonable to imagine that the seller advertises the mechanism ex ante. Another way of putting this is that the seller pays a fixed rather than a variable cost to communicate the mechanism to buyers. This makes it possible to assume that the mechanism is common knowledge to the seller and all the buyers at the beginning of the communication process. For this reason we can make our case using completely standard arguments. Secondly, the mechanism in the opportunity cost case plays a different allocative role than it does in the case when the seller bears a cost. The mechanism must decide whether buyers should communicate with the seller or pursue their alternative activities, as well as who should trade and at what price. It is this allocative role that makes bilateral communication superior to multilateral communication in a competitive environment. These differences allow us to show, for example, that a simple fixed price scheme is undominated for the seller when the number of buyers is finite. As shown by McAfee and McMillan, this is only possible when the number of potential buyers is infinite when the seller bears the cost of communication.Remarkably, the existence of opportunity costs to buyer participation is not, by itself, sufficient to explain why sellers might prefer bilateral communications mechanisms. Samuelson (1983) and McAfee and McMillan (1987) show that when buyers must pay a fixed cost to submit a bid, which is equivalent to giving up a valuable alternative, a seller cannot expect to earn more than she does in a second price auction (though Samuelson shows that the reserve price may depend on the number of potential buyers). One of the contributions of this paper is to show that the assumption that buyers make their participation decisions simultaneously is critical to this result. Simultaneous entry decisions means that whether or not any particular buyer is assigned to the alternative activity is independent of any other buyer's valuation. With sequential communication the seller is able to relax this constraint. It is precisely the enlargement of the class of feasible mechanism that breaks down the optimality of the simple auction.The second author acknowledges the support of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and the CRDE at the Université de Montreal.