What Can Be Learned from DuPont and the Freon Ban: A Case Study

Between 1974 and 1988, executives of DuPont, the world's largest producer of CFCs, were confronted with emerging evidence that CFCs were destroying the stratospheric ozone layer. The difficulty that executives face in such cases is that scientific knowledge develops over time and does not necessarily proceed in a straight line toward true conclusions. At the beginning of a new field of research, there is much uncertainty and disagreement among the experts. The solution of the ozone problem required a remarkable cooperation among science, business, and international governments. After looking at the role of DuPont executives in this drama, and the difficulties facing any executive dealing with uncertain science, the paper turns to an evaluation of the field of Business Ethics to see what light it might throw on this and analogous problems. Finally, the paper offers specific suggestions in terms of principles in dealing with uncertain science, and concludes that the course of action that DuPont followed, including some mistakes, can serve as a model for analogous crises.     

UNIVERSAL BANKS ARE NOT THE ANSWER TO AMERICA'S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE "PROBLEM": A LOOK AT GERMANY, JAPAN, AND THE U.S.

This article objects to a recent tendency of legal and economic scholars to "romanticize" the corporate governance role of German universal banks and Japanese main banks. There are potential conflicts between banks' interests as lenders and as shareholders that are likely to make banks less-than-ideal monitors for outside shareholders. Citing evidence that Japanese corporate borrowers pay above-market interest rates for their bank financing, Macey and Miller interpret the high interest rates as "rents" earned by Japanese banks on their loan portfolios in exchange for (1) insulating incumbent management of borrower firms from hostile takeover and (2) accepting suboptimal returns on their equity holdings.
The main problems with the German and Japanese systems stem from their failure to produce well-developed capital markets. Concentrated and stable shareholdings reduce the order flow in the market, thereby depriving the market of liquidity. And the lack of capital market liquidity– combined with the intense loyalty of the banks towards incumbent management–removes the ability of outside shareholders to make a credible threat of takeover if managerial performance is substandard.
The problem with American corporate governance–if indeed there is one–is not that hostile takeovers are bad, but that there are not enough of them due to regulatory restrictions and misguided legal policies. While U.S. law should be amended to give banks and other debtholders more power over borrowers in the case of financial distress, encouraging U.S. banks to become large stockholders is not likely to improve corporate efficiency. Strengthening the "voice" of American equity holders by eliminating restrictions on the market for corporate control would be the most effective step in improving firm performance.     

Risk Management by Securities Settlement Agents

As developing countries search for ways to promote capital formation through the establishment of organized exchanges, they will need to pay more attention to the role of risk management in the securities settlement process. The delivery-versus-payment (DVP) agents that facilitate the process of exchanging securities for funds in most world markets have both the incentive and comparative informational advantage to monitor, measure, and manage risks inherent in the securities settlement system.
Unfortunately, most DVP agents have accomplished this task to date through the cumbersome use of position and net debit limits, capital requirements, and collateral requirements. Such limits and requirements are almost everywhere based on relatively arbitrary criteria that may have no relation to the actual replacement cost, principal, or liquidity risk of the transaction, portfolio, or participant on which they are imposed.
To remedy this shortcoming in the current state of risk management at DVP agents, this article holds out the possibility of integrated, comprehensive risk management processes that emphasize and rely on forward-looking measures of risk for individual brokers and across brokers. Many risk measures could serve the settlement agent's purposes, including "value at risk" (or "VaR"), "below target risk,""below-target probability," and "downside semi-variance." The actual summary risk measure used for risk monitoring and control is not as important as the methodology used to generate that risk measure. "The goal of such a process," as the authors put it, "is to ensure that the risks to which a settlement agent and its residual claimants are exposed are those risks to which the agent's shareholders think they are and want to be exposed."     

Futures and forward price differential and the effect of marking‐to‐market: Australian evidence

The objective of this paper is to examine the effects of marking‐to‐market of futures contracts on the price differential between futures and forward contracts based on the predictions of the Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1981) (CIR) model. Cox et al ., (1981) derive a series of propositions with respect to the relationship between futures and forward prices and a set of testable implications. These are tested empirically in this paper using Australian data from November 1991 to June 1997. The results provide evidence of the presence of significant futures and forward price differences, where the futures price is consistently below the forward price. Only partial support is found for the Cox et al ., (1981) propositions, implying that the effect of marking‐to‐market is not able to fully account for the price differential. Therefore, it is not possible to rule out the influence of other institutional factors on the futures‐forward price difference.     

The political economy of direct legislation: direct democracy and local decision–making

Local and regional governments account for an important share of total government spending and, given the decentralization trend in OECD nations, this is likely to increase. How should this spending be governed? This article argues that direct democracy is best suited to organize decision–making at the state and local level. To support this, we present the main theoretical arguments on why and how referenda and initiatives affect fiscal policy outcomes. The basic argument concerns voter control. Under representative democracy, citizens only have direct control at election time. With referenda and initiatives, citizens can selectively control their representatives on specific policies whenever they deviate sufficiently from citizens' preferences. As a result, fiscal policy outcomes are likely to more closely reflect voter preferences. We empirically test this on Swiss data since Switzerland provides a 'natural laboratory' for local governance. The governance structures of Swiss cantons and localities with respect to fiscal issues range from classic parliamentary democracy to pure direct democracy, and an important part of spending and taxation is controlled at these levels. Specifically, we estimate an econometric model of fiscal behaviour using data from 1986 to 1997 for the 26 Swiss cantons, and 1990 data on 134 local communities. It is shown that mandatory referenda on fiscal issues at both levels have a dampening effect on expenditure and revenue, and at the local level also on public debt. Combining this with existing empirical evidence leads to a relatively uncontested result, namely that elements of direct democracy are associated with sounder public finances, better economic performance and higher satisfaction of citizens.     

BEA's Regional Economic Accounts Program: Recent and Planned Improvements

This article highlights recent improvements and plans for further improvements to each of BEA’s major regional economic accounts programs. The improvements focus on the acceleration of release of the estimates and on the preparation of new and extended estimates. There also is a brief discussion on BEA’s research effort to improve the regional accounts.JEL Classification E010     

Human resource management,union voice and the use of discipline: an analysis of WIRS3

Three outcomes of personnel practice (rates of discipline, quitting and absence) are analysed. There was no firm association with measures of practices associated with Human Resource Management. By contrast, unionisation was strongly associated with the low use of discipline and low quit rates: union ‘voice’ remains influential in the 1990s.     

Employment,schooling and productivity growth

Summary This paper presents an empirical analysis of labour demand and labour productivity growth in The Netherlands. Assuming an aggregate production function with as factors capital and 3 types of labour, distinguished by educational attainment, cost minimization leads to a set of 3 labour demand relations to be estimated on time series data. Using the estimates and the implied elasticities, aggregate labour productivity growth is decomposed into factor substitution, autonomous factors, labour time shortening, economies of scale, utilization rates and the increased educational level of the working population. The contributions of substitution, utilization rates and education appear to be substantial, notably in the seventies.

List of symbols

Variables a _i Efficiency index of skill leveli - C production - h _i working-time index for skill leveli - g _i steady-state growth rate of skill leveli - K capital stock - L _i employment volume of skill leveli - L _i ^* desired level of labour skill leveli - p output price - p ^* desired output price - s _i ^* long-run static labour shares in the production value - p _k rental price of capital - P index of total factor productivity - P _l index of labour productivity - u _i utilization rate of skill leveli - u _k utilization rate of capital - w _i wage rate for skill leveli - y production volume - y _yij Hicks partial elasticities of complementarity - _i steady-state cost share of skill leveli - _k Bk steady-state cost share of capital - _f lf highest level price index in cost function nesting - _g 4 intermediate level price index in cost function nesting - _h 4 lowest level price index in cost function nesting - _i steady-state relative wage share of skill leveli - _ij Allen partial elasticities of substitution Parameters d _i l adjustment speed of skill leveli - d _p price adjustment speed - M mark-up on marginal costs - scale elasticity of production - _i distribution parameter in cost function,i = 3, g - _i distribution parameter in cost function,i = k, h - _i distribution parameter in cost function,i =1, 2 - _i autonomous labour productivity growth for skill leveli - _i cost share of skill level in base year - _f production cost index in base year - _i hours elasticity in labour efficiency index - group elasticity of substitution betweenL ₃ and (K, (L ₁,L ₂)) - _g Og group elasticity of substitution betweenK and (L ₁,L ₂) - _h 6h group elasticity of substitution betweenL ₁ andL ₂ We would like to thank B. Downey, G.M.M. Gelauff, A. Nieuwenhuis, J.M.M. Ritzen, J.C. Siebrand and an unknown referee for helpful comments on earlier drafts.