Success in social marketing

In a series of articles, Philip Kotler, first with Sidney Levy [11], then with Gerald Zaltman [12], and then singularly [8], has significantly broadened the scope of marketing management. Marketing strategy, according to Kotler, is pertinent in numerous areas in addition to its business application. This article is concerned with one particular area for the expanding application of the marketing concept— social marketing.The use of marketing strategy to achieve social objectives produces both similarities and differences to business applications. Comparing these similarities and differences should produce some insight about the potential success of social marketing.     

THE TIME‐SERIES PROPERTIES OF UK INFLATION: EVIDENCE FROM AGGREGATE AND DISAGGREGATE DATA

This paper contrasts the time‐series properties of aggregate and disaggregate UK inflation. While aggregate inflation is found to be non‐stationary, unit root rejection frequencies are increasing when we use more disaggregate data. Structural break analysis suggests that structural shifts in monetary policy could alter inflation persistence. Additionally, panel evidence indicates that the unit root hypothesis can be rejected for sectoral inflation rates. Finally, we compare the persistence properties of UK inflation, finding statistically significant differences between aggregate and disaggregate series. Our analysis suggests that aggregation matters, which has important implications for econometric analysis and the conduct of monetary policy.     

Why Punish? Social reciprocity and the enforcement of prosocial norms

Recently economists have become interested in why people who face social dilemmas in the experimental lab use the seemingly incredible threat of punishment to deter free riding. Three theories with evolutionary microfoundations have been developed to explain punishment. We survey these theories and use behavioral data from surveys and experiments to show that the theory called social reciprocity in which people punish norm violators indiscriminately explains punishment best.JEL Classification: C91, C92, D64, H41 Correspondence to: Jeffrey P. CarpenterWe thank Carolyn Craven, Corinna Noelke and two referees for comments, and Middlebury College for financial assistance. In addition, Carpenter acknowledges the support of the National Science Foundation (SES-CAREER 0092953).     

Homotopy methods to compute equilibria in game theory

This paper presents a survey of the use of homotopy methods in game theory. Homotopies allow for a robust computation of game-theoretic equilibria and their refinements. Homotopies are also suitable to compute equilibria that are selected by various selection theories. We present the relevant techniques underlying homotopy algorithms. We give detailed expositions of the Lemke–Howson algorithm and the van den Elzen–Talman algorithm to compute Nash equilibria in 2-person games, and the Herings–van den Elzen, Herings–Peeters, and McKelvey–Palfrey algorithms to compute Nash equilibria in general n-person games. We explain how the main ideas can be extended to compute equilibria in extensive form and dynamic games, and how homotopies can be used to compute all Nash equilibria.