Management strategies in the Czech telecommunications sector: a comparative study of Český Telecom and T-Mobile

This article compares employment relations (ER) strategies at the incumbent fixed line Czech telecommunications company (TelCo), ?eský Telecom (?T), and the T-Mobile subsidiary, T-Mobile Czech Republic (TMCZ). It considers the extent to which the firms were able to introduce Western-style HRM practices within the context of three changing dynamics. First, the collapse of communism in the former Czechoslovakia was followed by rapid economic liberalization and privatization in the Czech Republic. Second, telecommunications sectors worldwide were subject to deregulation and the rapid diffusion of new technologies. Third, fixed line and mobile TelCos were subject to differing challenges and opportunities. The article uses path dependency, institutionalist and strategic human resource management (SHRM) related theories to assist in this analysis. It concludes that by 2005 the introduction of Western-style HRM practices into the Czech telecommunications sector appeared less constrained by former institutional and historical constraints. TMCZ's ER policies were further influenced by its parent firm's transnational strategies that sought to coordinate better its subsidiaries and create a ‘global’ brand. Despite the differing circumstances of the fixed line and mobile sectors, by 2005 ER practices and strategies at the two firms were to an extent converging, as ?T continued to cut costs and TMCZ adjusted its strategies to better accommodate a saturated market. Given these changes the article postulates that the Czech telecommunications sector has now shifted towards a mature transformation stage, as ER strategies increasingly reflect Western-based SHRM practices and concepts.     

On the non-emptiness of the Mas-Colell bargaining set

We introduce an extension of the Mas-Colell bargaining set and construct, by an elaboration on a voting paradox, a superadditive four-person non-transferable utility game whose extended bargaining set is empty. It is shown that this extension constitutes an upper hemicontinuous correspondence. We conclude that the Mas-Colell bargaining set of a non-levelled superadditive NTU game may be empty.     

重新发现IT外包

IT业务外包已成为越来越普遍的现象,然而,企业从外包中获得好处的愿望能否成真?企业的商务环境是否发生了彻底变化?BCG专家经过研究认为,如果你对上述任一问题的答案是肯定的,那现在就到了你对上一次IT外包举措进行批判性审视的时候了。     

Racial Fractionalization and School Performance

The literature on racial “peer effects” suggests that diversity improves at least some students' school performance. However, a literature in economic development posits that diversity may negatively affect school performance by undermining the efficient provision of education. This article empirically tests this claim, which we call the “public goods channel,” by examining the relationship between racial diversity and student performance in Ohio's school districts. We find that moving from a completely homogenous school district to one in which two racial groups have equal population shares is associated with a 7–17.5 percentage point decline in the passage rate on the state math exam, holding per pupil spending across districts constant. These results suggest that racial diversity is negatively associated with school performance but that the public goods channel is not responsible for this relationship.     

Charity Technology Trust: a case study

Charity Technology Trust (CTT) is one of a new breed of philanthropic initiatives aimed at helping UK charities become more efficient by better use of technology. Its founder believes that charities are ideally placed to benefit from the reduced costs and shared benefits of jointly developed strategies and fundraising, communications and data management tools. CTT was formed to catalyse a move in this direction from the major UK fundraising charities and is supported by the personal philanthropic contributions of its trustees—a group of successful businessmen. The challenge for such a new organisation with a new idea is considerable, but after 18 months CTT is working with 27 of the top 100 UK charities on projects from online raffles through e‐mail communications to IT strategy. Copyright © 2003 Henry Stewart Publications     

Nash-equilibria in a heterogeneous oligopoly with fuzzy information

We consider a model of an oligopolistic market with heterogeneous firms and products where neither the cost nor the demand functions are common knowledge. Instead, each firm only has some vague ideas about the price strategies adopted by its competitors which is modelled by a fuzzy set. In analogy to the notion of an "equilibrium of actions and beliefs" we define and characterize a generalized Nash-equilibrium and show its existence under general conditions. Furthermore, the impact of the fuzzy information on the equilibrium outcome is analyzed by means of a comparative static analysis within a particular model framework.Received: 28 May 2002, Accepted: 25 December 2002, JEL Classification: D43, D80, L13We wish to thank Bernhard F. Arnold, the editor Murat Sertel , and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. Of course, we are responsible for all remaining errors.