Reconciling Weber and Mises on Understanding Human Action

A bstract .   Max Weber and Ludwig von Mises were two of the 20^th century's foremost theorists of human action. Mises held Weber, his senior by some 17 years, in great esteem and often discussed his theories, even weaving some, such as Weber's model of ideal types, deeply into the fabric of his own social thought. However, at least at first glance, there seems to be a deep rift between the two men's conceptions about the rationality of action. Weber classified "social actions" into several distinct categories, some of which he saw as exhibiting little, if any, rationality. Mises, in contrast, held that all action is rational by conceptual necessity. Various writers have taken their views to be obviously incompatible, among them, Mises himself. This article suggests that the appearance of a conflict is produced by the failure to discern that Weber and Mises were addressing different sorts of questions and constructing frameworks to support different modes of analyzing social phenomena. I contend that, if that divergence of aim is properly understood, then the apparent contradiction will be seen as illusory.     

Debunking Economics by Steve Keen

The Review of Austrian Economics -     

The valuation and reliability implications of FIN 46 for synthetic lease liabilities

We examine whether adoption of FASB Interpretation No. 46/R (FIN 46), Consolidation of Variable Interest Entities–an Interpretation of ARB No. 51, changed the market valuation and related measurement reliability of synthetic lease liabilities. Adopted in 2003, FIN 46 requires financial statement recognition of many previously off-balance sheet structures, including synthetic leases. Synthetic leases are hybrid financing structures that, prior to FIN 46, allowed firms to maximize the benefits of asset ownership for tax purposes while retaining operating lease treatment within the firm’s financial statements. We identify a sample of 125 synthetic leasing firms impacted by FIN 46. Utilizing methodology consistent with Dhaliwal et al. (2011), we constructively capitalize these lease liabilities in the period preceding FIN 46 and compare market valuation of these liabilities with capitalized leases after adoption of the standard. We find that the market places greater weight on synthetic lease obligations recognized within the body of the financial statements than it does liabilities disclosed within the associated notes. Finally, we rely on econometric procedures developed in Barth (1991) and extended in Choi et al. (1997) to examine whether the differential market valuation of lease liabilities post FIN 46 is due in part to perceived differences in measurement reliability. The results indicate there is a post FIN 46 reliability effect for all lease liabilities examined. However, while the synthetic lease amounts are the most unreliable examined, they also experience the greatest increase in reliability post FIN 46, indicating that perceived measurement reliability explains in part differential market valuation associated with FIN 46. Our findings have the potential to inform the ongoing standard setting debate surrounding the possible capitalization of all leases. Further, our study also has economic implications for managers concerned with the potential constraints on asset financing options imposed by accounting regulation.     

Employee attitudes toward whistleblowing: Management and public policy implications

Managers of organizations should be aware of the attitudes of employees concerning whistleblowing. Employee views should affect how employers choose to respond to whistleblowers through the evolving law of wrongful discharge. This article reports on a survey of employee attitudes toward the legal protection of whistleblowers and presents an analysis of the results of that survey. Among the most significant findings of the survey are:

1. Recognition by employees of a hierarchy of proper whistleblowing outlets: internal first, law enforcement agencies second, and news media last.
2. Less employee support for legal protection for whistleblowers who report unethical activities than for those who report illegal conduct.
3. Very strong overall employee support for legal protection of whistleblowers, even among managerial and supervisory employees.
4. A belief among employees that a fear of being fired deters whistleblowing.

These findings have important implications for both management and public policy. Organizations that want to encourage whistleblowing clearly must protect whistleblowers from retaliation, while organizations that do not encourage whistleblowing may want to reconsider that policy. The survey results also have implications in the handling of individual whistleblowers. From a public policy perspective, the survey results provide support for increasing the legal protection of whistleblowers. On the other hand, any such increase in whistleblower protection should considerr the importance of employee loyalty and managerial discretion.     

Tax and Regulatory Motivations for Issuing Non-voting, Non-convertible Preferred Stock

This paper extends prior studies that attempt to explain the existence of unique securities, particularly Engel, Erickson, and Maydew [1999], by investigating why firms issue non-voting, non-convertible preferred stock (PS) instead of other securities. We find that the choice of PS is influenced by tax and regulatory changes imposed by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) and the 1989 Basle Banking Accord as well as various firm specific incentives. We find that industrials issue PS to preserve tax attributes by avoiding an ownership change and to maximize foreign tax credit utilization. In addition, we find that the regulatory requirements of the Basle Accord influence the choice by banks to issue PS. Finally, we show that although firms could have issued alternative securities that would have allowed them to achieve the same tax or regulatory goals, firm specific factors limit their ability to do so. For example, firms can also avoid triggering an ownership change by issuing straight debt, however, financial distress considerations may constrain their ability to issue additional debt. Therefore, we demonstrate that the final choice of PS is influenced by a combination of tax, regulatory, and firm specific incentives.