Small firm mutual funds: Additional evidence on the small firm effect

Returns generated with small firm mutual fund data are used to examine the extent to which identification of a small firm effect is due to the difficulty in measuring the direct and indirect transaction costs involved in investing in the common shares of small capitalization stocks. Little if any evidence of the excess risk-adjusted returns is obtained for either of the period 1978–1983, when the small firm effect was observed, or the period 1984–1989, when it was not. The small firm effect may therefore be attributed to (1) higher direct transaction costs including bid-ask spread and broker fees and (2) higher indirect transaction costs including portfolio management expenses and market impact costs.The authors thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper, and Brett Salazar for valuable assistance in data collection. Errors remain our own.     

Lower Bound Restrictions on Intensities in Data Envelopment Analysis

We propose an extension to the basic DEA models that guarantees that if an intensity is positive then it must be at least as large as a pre-defined lower bound. This requirement adds an integer programming constraint known within Operations Research as a Fixed-Charge (FC) type of constraint. Accordingly, we term the new model DEA_FC. The proposed model lies between the DEA models that allow units to be scaled arbitrarily low, and the Free Disposal Hull model that allows no scaling. We analyze 18 datasets from the literature to demonstrate that sufficiently low intensities—those for which the scaled Decision-Making Unit (DMU) has inputs and outputs that lie below the minimum values observed—are pervasive, and that the new model ensures fairer comparisons without sacrificing the required discriminating power. We explain why the low-intensity phenomenon exists. In sharp contrast to standard DEA models we demonstrate via examples that an inefficient DMU may play a pivotal role in determining the technology. We also propose a goal programming model that determines how deviations from the lower bounds affect efficiency, which we term the trade-off between the deviation gap and the efficiency gap.     

Exchange rates, tax-subsidy schemes, and the revenue from foreign trade in a centrally planned economy

Conclusions It has been argued that while in the traditional analysis of the classic CPE the exchange rate has only an accounting function, inappropriate methods of national income accounting can lead to changes in the exchange rate generating changes in the real economy, provided that trade in unbalanced in foreign currency prices. This thesis was explored by examining the way the profits from foreign trade were calculated by the Ministry of Foreign Trade, and then transferred to the state budget. It was shown that the correct measure of the state's increased command over domestic resources from engaging in foreign trade, derived from the implicit taxes on that sector, was the ministry's profits on its domestic operations, the first term in (2). However, evidence was presented which suggested that its profits on foreign currency account measured in domestic currency, the second term in (2), were also passed over to the state budget. This implies that transferred profits from foreign trade will overstate the underlying command over resources when there is a balance of payments surplus, and understate them when there is a deficit. The consequence of this is that the domestic economy faces a series of erratic, though small, inflationary and deflationary impulses, regardless of changes in the exchange rate.The theoretical role of the preisausleich system was explored in some detail and it was argued that, although the system has been designed to insulate the domestic economy from external disturbances, there were clear reasons why it had come to play a major part in revenue raising. Specifically, it is administratively convenient to tax resources at their point of entry into or exit from the economy; the taxation of foreign trade widens the tax base and reduces the visibility of the tax system. But, of course, this grafting onto the preisausgleich of a second major function of revenue raising does lead to the development of a further channel through which external disturbances can pass into the domestic economy. That is external disturbances impact on the domestic economy not only through the production and welfare effects of changing exports and imports, and through whatever tenuous links are allowed between foreign and domestic prices, but also insofar as those disturbances affect the ministry's profits from foreign trade. In short, foreign economic disturbances show up in variations in the position of the non-inflationary government budget constraint. To that extent the second function of the preisausgleich impairs its ability to perform its original insulation function. In a minor way, the successful non-inflationary performance of the insulation function has always required adjustments in the government budget constraint. But the growth in the importance of foreign trade taxation has magnified the importance of this phenomenon, and led to a trade-off between the two functions.University of Bath. Initial research for this paper was carried out under ESRC grant HRP 7417/1.     

学会用钱说话

·质量专业人员在讨论到他们的活动所产生的财务影响时，往往会感到很困难。 ·要想引起管理者的关注，质量专业人员必须学习重要的财务术语，诸如像净收益、资产回报率等，并能够理解资产负债表和收支表。     

The Zilcha criterion for dynamic inefficiency

Summary. This paper reexamines the condition (1 + n), which Zilcha (1991) presents as a necessary and sufficient condition for dynamic inefficiency of stationary allocations in overlapping generation models with stochastic production. We show that this condition is necessary but not sufficient for a stationary allocation to be dynamically inefficient by Zilchas definition. We also show that there is a narrow but widely studied class of specifications in which the Zilcha test is both necessary and sufficient for dynamic inefficiency of stationary competitive equilibrium allocations. Outside this class, however, counterexamples can be constructed relatively easily.Received: 30 September 2002, Revised: 13 August 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D51, D90, E13, E22. Correspondence to: Steven RussellWe thank Jon Burke, Subir Chakrabarti, Itzhak Zilcha and an anonymous referee for helpful conversations and/or comments.     

Total Freedom: Toward a Dialectical Libertarianism by Chris Matthew Sciabarra

The Review of Austrian Economics -     

A theory of persistent income inequality

This paper explores the dynamics of income inequality by studying the evolution of human capital investment and neighborhood choice for a population of families. Parents affect the conditional probability distribution of their children's income through the choice of a neighborhood in which to live. Neighborhood location affects children both through local public finance of education as well as through sociological effects. These forces combine to create incentives for wealthier families to segregate themselves into economically homogeneous neighborhoods. Economic stratification combines with strong neighborhoodwide feedback effects to transmit economic status across generations, leading to persistent income inequality.     

An Austrian Theory of the Firm

The modern Theory of the Firm uses the concept of rent and makes implicit assumptions about equilibrium. An Austrian (Market Process) Theory of the Firm should have something to say about each of these. Two strategic perspectives are analyzed, the neoclassical microeconomic perspective (using the Ricardo-Marshall approach to rent) and the Market Process perspective (using the Fetter approach to rent). In a neoclassical world, rents indicate unsolved or unexploited inefficiencies as every hypothetical outcome is viewed against the standard of perfect competition. By contrast, in the Market Process world there is no single ideal standard by which to measure any particular outcome. All action takes place in an open ended universe in which the future is continually being created, in which competition is a discovery process.