Underground Economy,Evasion and Inequality

Economic theory is paying increasing attention to a non-observed economy (NOE) and its causes. Recently, a couple of works (Rosser et al., 2000 Rosser, J. B., Rosser, M. V. and Ahmed, E. 2000. Income inequality and the informal economy in transitions economies. Journal of Comparative Economics, 28(1): 156–171.  [Google Scholar], 2003 Rosser, J. B., Rosser, M. V. and Ahmed, E. 2003. Multiple unofficial economy equilibria and income distribution dynamics in systemic transition. Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, 25(3): 425–447. [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) have claimed that there is a positive relationship between income inequality and the size of NOE. This supposed relationship is not so clear and deserves in-depth analysis. There is a crucial aspect that has been completely avoided in these studies: income inequality is mainly measured using ‘regular’ incomes and this fact could lead to some bias. The existence of a certain size of NOE implies some income evasion that can affect the inequality indexes used in the study of the relationship between NOE and inequality. Including the regional share of NOE in a wage equation, I find that, in the specific case of the Italian private sector employees, the income evasion attached to NOE tends to reduce inequality measured by regular wages statistics.     

Enforcement and environmental quality in a decentralized emission trading system

Should the powers of monitoring compliance and allocating tradeable emissions allowances be appointed to a unique supranational regulator or decentralized to several local regulators? To answer this question, we develop a two stage-two country game where environmental regulators set the amount of emission allowances and the level of monitoring effort to achieve full compliance while the regulated firms choose actual emissions and the number of permits to be held. Various, possibly conflicting, spillovers between countries arise in a decentralized setting. We show that decentralization is socially harmful if no asymmetry among institutional settings is introduced and can be suboptimal even when decentralization features lower monitoring costs than a centralized setting. Lower monitoring costs are therefore necessary, but not sufficient, to justify decentralization. Also, our analysis reveals that welfare can be higher under decentralization even if the corresponding environmental quality is worse than under centralization. Indeed, better environmental quality is sufficient but not necessary for higher welfare under decentralization. Finally, we discuss how these results can provide a theoretical rationale for the recent evolution of the EU ETS design.     

Strategic incentives to human capital

Motivating human capital in knowledge‐intensive activities is a serious managerial challenge because it is difficult to link rewards to actions or performance. Firms instead might motivate knowledge workers by offering them opportunities to increase personal benefits (e.g., learning, satisfaction) through autonomy in the decision‐making process. Our model shows that firms can offer less autonomy in projects closer to their core business: Because firm specialization raises the value of the project's outcomes, it also increases the benefits for knowledge workers, who derive motivation even though they make fewer decisions to support their realization of personal goals. Projects farther from the core offer weaker firm contributions, so firms can motivate knowledge workers by allowing them to benefit from greater autonomy. We discuss several implications of our analysis. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Pricing Discretion and Price Regulation in Competitive Industries

Price capped firms enjoy a large degree of pricing discretion, which may harm customers and competition. We study two alternative regulatory regimes to limit it: the first regime (Absolute) places a fixed upper limit to the prices charged in captive markets, while the other regime (Relative) constrains the captive prices relatively to the competitive ones. Under the Relative regime, captive prices are only weakly lower and competitive prices are always higher than under the Absolute regime. However, the number of competitors and/or their output may be higher under the Relative regime. While the effects on aggregate welfare are ambiguous, there is some evidence that the Relative regime is more likely to increase consumers’ surplus and social welfare the more efficient are the competitors.     

Antecedents and consequences of Franchisee satisfaction in the U.S. restaurant industry

This study surveyed 3,177 franchisees from 58 restaurant brands with the purpose of examining the antecedents and consequences of franchisee satisfaction in the U.S. food service sector. Findings indicate that a high level of franchisee income and franchisor care and trust are associated with a high level of franchisee satisfaction. Education had a negative impact on franchisees' satisfaction, suggesting that the higher the level of franchisee education, the less franchisees were satisfied with the franchise. Furthermore, the higher the franchisees' satisfaction was, the stronger the franchisees' intention to remain in the franchise system was, and the higher the likelihood of recommending the franchise to others.     

Open innovation: Are inbound and outbound knowledge flows really complementary?

One novel implication of the open innovation paradigm is that inflows and outflows of knowledge are complementary. We argue that engaging simultaneously in buying and selling knowledge should allow firms to increase innovation outcomes. At the same time, we identify some of the relevant costs (cognitive, transaction, and organizational costs) that “open” firms can reduce by combining knowledge inflows and outflows. Empirically, however, we find no evidence for such complementarity in a sample of Belgian manufacturing firms. Firms buying and selling knowledge do increase their sales of new products, but at the same time their R&D costs increase more than proportionally. Our findings, therefore, indicate the need for research into a better understanding of the drivers of actual costs of organizing for open innovation. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Bribery and investment: Firm‐level evidence from Africa and Latin America

Research summary : Using a unique database that measures firm‐level bribery in Africa and Latin America, we corroborate extant results in the literature that paying bribes deters firm investments in fixed assets. Our contribution is to explore four mechanisms. By adopting a reverse causality approach (Gelman and Imbens, 2013), we find evidence consistent with one of them: short‐term oriented firms prefer to bribe rather than invest in fixed assets, while the opposite is true for firms with a long‐term orientation. We rule out that bribe payments drain financial resources for investment, that firms that invest do not bribe because fixed assets make them less flexible and more vulnerable to future bribes, and that less efficient firms bribe rather than invest. Managerial summary : We ask whether, along with ethical issues, bribing affects the behavior and performance of firms in Africa and Latin America. Our statistical analysis shows that bribe payments do not reduce the short‐term performance of firms, but frustrate investments in fixed assets, which is the foundation of firms' long‐term growth. It is like seeking a job via nepotism or education. Nepotism makes it likely to find a job in the short term. However, the solid skills generated by education raise the odds of finding better jobs in the future. We rule out some common explanations for the trade‐off between bribing and investment (e.g., bribes drain resources to invest or that less efficient firms bribe and do not invest). Our analysis suggests that firms with short‐term orientations are more likely to bribe and firms with long‐term orientation are more likely to invest. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Consumer (goal) satisfaction: A means‐ends chain approach

This study investigates the role that service attributes, customer subgoals, and goals play in forming the satisfaction judgment. Drawing on means‐ends chain theory, and on satisfaction research, satisfaction is conceptualized as the result of a process in which customers activate multiple comparative referents. In a pilot study, a paper‐and‐pencil laddering technique was used to collect attributes and goals connected to the satisfaction judgment. These elements were then used as items in a satisfaction survey of 200 customers. A mixture regression model revealed that both attribute‐related dimensions and goal‐related dimensions determine overall satisfaction, albeit not homogeneously among customers. Two customer segments were identified: Socializers, whose satisfaction is driven primarily by the goal of well‐being, and Achievers, whose satisfaction is generated mainly by the goal of efficiency. Two directed graphs describe the satisfaction path of the two groups of customers, illustrating how service attributes are connected to the satisfaction of lower‐order and higher‐order goals. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Measuring the effect of M&A on patenting quantity and quality

I explore the effect of M&A on the patenting quantity and quality of the firms involved in a deal. Three measures of quality are considered: impact, generality, and originality. The impact of a patent denotes its influence on future inventions. Generality refers to a patent's applicability across technological fields. Finally, the originality of a patent indicates the extent to which an invention synthesizes diverse technological inputs. Applying a matching estimator to data from the U.S. ‘medical devices and photographic equipment’ industry from 1988 to 1996, I find that M&A have a positive effect on patenting output, but decrease patent impact, originality, and generality. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Is Environmental Dumping Greater when Plants are Footloose?

We address concerns that globalisation gives national governments incentives to set weak environmental policies and that these incentives are particularly strong in industries where plants are footloose. Using a simple model of imperfect competition, we compare the environmental policies that would be set by non-cooperative governments for two different move structures—where governments set environmental policies after firms decide where to locate (market share game) and where governments set environmental policies before firms decide where to locate (location game). We show that the extent of environmental dumping in the market share game can be greater than in the location game.
JEL classification F 1; H 4; L 5; Q 2