Excess payoff dynamics and other well-behaved evolutionary dynamics

We consider a model of evolution in games in which agents occasionally receive opportunities to switch strategies, choosing between them using a probabilistic rule. Both the rate at which revision opportunities arrive and the probabilities with which each strategy is chosen are functions of current normalized payoffs. We call the aggregate dynamics induced by this model excess payoff dynamics. We show that every excess payoff dynamic is well-behaved: regardless of the underlying game, each excess payoff dynamic admits unique solution trajectories that vary continuously with the initial state, identifies rest points with Nash equilibria, and respects a basic payoff monotonicity property. We show how excess payoff dynamics can be used to construct well-behaved modifications of imitative dynamics, and relate them to two other well-behaved dynamics based on projections.     

All politics is local: The effect of fiscal and monetary constitutions on economic policy

The rules of behavior for the monetary authorities changed in 1933 and 1947 and the Fed temporarily changed its operating procedures in 1979, but these changes did not alter the fact that the monetary authorities serve as the agent of the fiscal authorities. On the fiscal side, a shift from a centralized process to one where Congress was composed of a set of individual entrepreneurs altered the fiscal focus from the national economy to one of localized interests. This change led to a more autoregressive and deficit-prone federal budget and changed the interaction between monetary and fiscal policy. It also elevated the status of monetary policy to the extent where financial markets react to every utterance from the monetary authorities.     

Consumer mobility and community tax bases : The financing of local public goods

In a model of economic ‘clubs’, size is fixed and members consuming a public good raise the question of composition; with whom would they rather consume? This depends on the way collective consumption is financed, and three results are proven With a poll tax, clubs must be homogeneous in income for all to be satisfied With a marginal benefit (Lindahl) tax, no consumer is ever satisfied with any composition; and with an income tax, at least one consumer in each club is always dissatisfied. Satisfaction implies there exists no club composition preferred to the existing one.     

Income determination in market disequilibrium: The implications of spillover for the design of monetary policy

This paper specifies and analyzes a generalized disequilibrium macroeconomic model that explicitly includes the concept of spillover in nontatonnement financial and real markets. It is shown that the dynamic quantity and expenditure theories of income determination are special cases of the model which depend upon the degree of spillover from the bond to the commodity market. Simulation experiments designed to produce a vigorous monetary shock to the system clearly show that national product is very sensitive to the degree of spillover, and thus, the design of monetary policy within the context of gradual market clearing should consider the size of spillover.     

A framework for market-based organizational learning: Linking values, knowledge, and behavior

The authors review the concept of organizational learning and present a broad conceptual framework for its modeling. Within this framework, one specific process for market-based organizational learning is postulated. An empirical test of this model leads the authors to conclude that a more positive learning orientation (a value-based construct) will directly result in increased market information generation and dissemination (knowledge-based constructs), which, in turn, directly affects the degree to which an organization makes changes in its marketing strategies (a behavioral construct). Managerial implications are discussed. His research interests lie primarily in the areas of organizational information use and market-based organizational learning. His work has been published in theJournal of the Academy of Marketing Science, Journal of Advertising Research, Journal of Business Research, andJournal of Marketing. His research interests include both individual and organizational learning. He has published in the areas of consumer decision making, advertising effectiveness, and market-based organizational learning. His research interests include organizational marketing and marketing channels. His work has been published in theJournal of Marketing, Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, Journal of Business Logistics, Journal of Purchasing and Materials Management, andJournal of Health Care Marketing.     

Book Reviews

Andrew MacIntyre (ed.), Business and Government in Industrialising Asia, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1994, pp. xii + 312. Paper: A$29.95.

John Bresnan, From Dominoes to Dynamos: The Transformation of Southeast Asia, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 1994, pp. x + 115. $17.95.

Anthony Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce 1450–1680: Volume Two, Expansion and Crisis, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1993, pp. xv + 390.

Binhadi, Financial Sector Deregulation, Banking Development and Monetary Policy: The Indonesian Experience (1983–1993), Indonesian Bankers' Institute, Jakarta, 1995.

Anwar Shah and Zia Qureshi, with Amaresh Bagchi, Brian Binder, and Heng-fu Zou, Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in Indonesia: Issues and Reform Options, World Bank Discussion Papers 239, Washington DC, pp. xxxii + 279. $17.95; A$425.00; NZ$30.25.

Jacqueline Vel, The Uma-economy: Indigenous Economics and Development Work in Lawonda, Sumba (Eastern-Indonesia), Wageningen, pp. xiv + 283. $20.00 + $8 postage & handling.

Joao Mariano de Sousa Saldanha, The Political Economy of East Timor Development, translated by Theresia Slamet and P.G. Kattopo, Pustaka Sinar Harapan, Jakarta, 1994, pp. 414.

Jan-Paul Dirkse, Frans H$uUsken and Mario Rutten (eds), Development and Social Welfare: Indonesia's Experiences under the New Order, KITLV Press, Leiden, 1993, pp. 267.

W.G. Huff, The Economic Growth of Singapore: Trade and Development in the Twentieth Century, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994, pp. xxi + 472. A$60.

Saha Dhevan Meyanathan (ed.), Industrial Structures and the Development of Small and Medium Enterprise Linkages: Examples from East Asia, The World Bank (Economic Development Institute of the World Bank Seminar Series), Washington DC, 1994, pp. v + 158. Paper: $9.95.

Thee Kian Wie, Industrialisasi di Indonesia: Beberapa Kajian, LP3ES, Jakarta, pp. xxvi + 278 (including Introduction by Mari Pangestu).     

The “Iron Law of Paternalism” in Employee Grievances and Arbitration? A Comparison of Disciplinary and Nondisciplinary Cases

In the criminology literature, the iron law of paternalism suggests that women receive less serious sanctions in the judicial system. This examination of three years of grievance outcomes (n= 1216) and arbitration outcomes (n= 1146) tests this iron law in the context of organizational disciplinary and dispute resolutions. These data, across several levels of outcomes (win, lose, compromise), controlling for the severity of grievances (disciplinary/nondisciplinary) and arbitrations (termination/nontermination) provide no support for the paternalistic thesis. Moreover, we find no support for the paternalistic thesis with regard to either the incidence or length of suspensions as a function of gender.     

Conditional and Unconditional Conservatism:Concepts and Modeling

We develop a model that captures the distinct natures of and interactions between conditional and unconditional conservatism. Under unconditional conservatism, the book value of net assets is understated due to predetermined aspects of the accounting process. Under conditional conservatism, book value is written down under sufficiently adverse circumstances, but not up under favorable circumstances. The specification of earnings provided by the model yields hypotheses about how unconditional conservatism and other factors preempt conditional conservatism and so affect the asymmetric response of earnings to positive and negative share returns, both current and lagged, documented by Basu (1995, “Conservatism and the Asymmetric Timeliness of Earnings.” Ph.D. dissertation, University of Rochester’ 1997, “The Conservatism Principle and the Asymmetric Timeliness of Earnings.” Journal of Accounting and Economics 24, 3–37).This revised version was published online in August 2005 with a corrected cover date.