非对称信息下商业银行资本配置研究——基于PCA理论模型分析

资本配置是银行风险管理的核心,是决定银行竞争力的重要因素.经典的资本配置理论均以信息在银行内部各机构完全对称作为基本假设,忽略了总分行问的委托代理关系.鉴于此,本文借鉴PCA模型,在商业银行内部构建一套资本配置的优化机制,以提高银行资本配置的有效性.     

低压供电线路电压损耗的简便校验

为了确保低压供电线路的供电质量,本文就低压配电线路未端,包括地埋、架空户内干线、支线的电压校验问题,提供简单易行的估算方法,对低压供电线路电压质量的校验通过简单四则运算,判别电压质量是否符合要求.     

我国中小企业法律环境分析

促进中小企业发展的经济理论基础源于市场与政府的配置机制.促进我国中小企业发展要解决的前提性问题是要界定什么是中小企业,其次是如何建立中小企业发展的法律环境体系.     

关于高职院校开设质量管理课程的一些想法

本文从质量管理与我国社会经济发展的密切关系出发,针对我国当前存在的质量管理发展不平衡的现状,讨论了在高等职业院校开设质量管理课程的意义,以及课程定位、教材内容、授课师资等相关的问题.     

中小企业融资问题初探

本文主要论述在我国经济中占据着极其重要地位的中小企业的融资问题.全文由三部分组成第一部分对中小企业的重要作用和市场定位做了介绍.第二部分阐述中小企业陷入融资困境的成因.第三部分提出缓解中小企业的融资困难的对策.     

践行工匠精神 打造土木建筑行业高素质人才队伍

培养德艺兼备的建筑工匠人才是推动建筑企业发展的必然举措。基于新时代我国建筑行业人才爱岗敬业精神缺失、技术专业能力不强的问题,建筑人才培养必须以工匠精神为指引,打造爱岗敬业、专业能力突出的高素质土木建筑人才。论文以工匠精神的内涵概述作为切入点,分析培育具有工匠精神的建筑人才的价值和意义,最后提出践行工匠精神,培养高素质建筑人才的路径对策。     

The Tax Man Cometh: Constitutional Principles for Tax Enforcement

Passage of an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) overhaul bill in 1998 reflects the depth of American taxpayer frustration with the agency. We bring a constitutional, or rules of the game, perspective to tax enforcement. We examine political costs and benefits and agency discretion as reasons why tax enforcement by the government might deviate from the preferences of a representative citizen. We also examine prospects for reform. Lasting reform must alter the rules for deciding tax enforcement policy or the political pressures which yield excessive enforcement today will reemerge in the future.     

A Note on Regulating Oligopolistic Industries: A Hierarchical Model

In a 1994 paper, extending the well-known incremental surplus subsidy scheme of Sappington and Sibley, Schwermer presented a non-Bayesian incentive scheme for regulating a Cournot oligopoly industry. This note designs an oligopolistic incentive scheme for a hierarchical Stackelberg model in which firms choose outputs sequentially.     

A duration analysis of privatization in the telecom sector

The paper attempts to identify the telecom-sector performance indicators, relevant economic variables, and institutional characteristics of a country that effect the process of privatization of state-owned telecom enterprises. Using standard duration analysis of a panel data, we demonstrate that the privatization incentives are not only shaped by the mobility of financial capital in a country but are also influenced by the degree of competitiveness of private sector participation in policy-making process. The empirical results also reveal the significant impact of productive efficiency in telecom service provision on its course to privatization. We thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions. We are solely responsible for all mistakes.     

Taxation of Mobile Factors as Insurance under Uncertainty

This paper considers the effects of the taxation of mobile factors, i.e., capital, under uncertainty. The wages earned by residents of a jurisdiction are uncertain due to random shocks. Since the uncertain wages in a jurisdiction depend on the amount of mobile capital employed in the jurisdiction, and since taxation alters the quantity of capital employed, taxation affects the riskiness of uncertain wages. In particular, the taxation of capital moderates the fluctuation of uncertain wages, thereby providing insurance. For this reason, jurisdictions use distortionary capital taxation even if lump‐sum taxation is available. In addition, this insurance effect counteracts the tendency toward too low tax rates on capital arising from tax competition, and possibly improves the efficiency of tax competition.