The Politics of Inequality as Organised Spectacle: Why the Swiss Do Not Want to Tax the Rich

In 2015, Swiss voters had the opportunity to impose a tax on the super rich in a popular vote and thereby fund a redistributive policy. However, a large majority voted against its seemingly obvious self-interest and rejected the tax. We propose an explanation for this puzzling outcome, bridging the usually separate behavioralist and institutionalist perspectives on the politics of inequality. We start from the observation that political economy tends to neglect processes of preference formation. Theorising preferences as socially constructed, we show that interest groups played a major role in shaping the outcome of the vote. Business frames were multiplied through allied parties and the media and had a major impact on individual voting behaviour. In addition, we demonstrate that interest groups representing business interests derive the content of their communication from business’s structurally privileged position in the capitalist economy. Specifically, creating uncertainty about possible perverse effects of government policies on jobs and growth is a powerful tool to undermine popular support. Frames based on this structural power ultimately explain why the Swiss refrained from ‘soaking the rich.’     

EDITORIAL: TAX REFORM AND SIMPLIFICATION

Major tax reform to simplify the UK tax system is possible. Merging income taxes, social security taxes and corporation tax into only a single flat-rate of tax on all incomes would be a radical start. Avoiding taxes on income and expenditure which are 'too high' requires major reductions in government spending, mainly on the welfare state. Given the political will, over a period of years we really can hugely improve the UK tax system.     

Intra-Household Resource Allocation, Consumer Preferences and Commodity Tax Reforms: Australian Evidence

Empirical analysis of household expenditure behaviour has traditionally ignored the issue of resource allocation between household members, assuming that they have identical or unitary preferences. This paper relaxes that assumption, develops a household sharing rule and proposes intra-household demand systems that are able to identify differences in the preferences of members from conventional data. The resulting price and expenditure elasticities are used to demonstrate that collective demand models suggest different directions for commodity tax reforms to those implied by the traditional unitary model.     

Predicting Household Poverty: A Methodological Note with a Kenyan Example

Household surveys provide data that is used for identifying and measuring the poverty status of households and individuals. However, carrying out such surveys is expensive, especially in poor developing countries. Thus it is important to make maximum use of the available survey data in developing countries, especially in sub‐Saharan Africa, where such data are expensive to collect and analyse. This paper develops a simple method for using poverty indices derived from survey data for a given year, to predict poverty rates for subsequent periods without having to conduct a new household survey. We illustrate the workings of the method with data from Kenyan household surveys for 1994 and 1997.     

Intertemporal Substitution and Terms-of-Trade Shocks

The paper examines the relationship between transitory terms‐of‐trade shocks and private saving. Using a model allowing for nonseparability between the consumption of tradables and nontradables, the paper estimates the intertemporal elasticity of substitution while accounting for the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between the consumption of tradables and nontradables. Empirical analysis of data for five industrial countries indicates that in response to transitory terms‐of‐trade shocks, intertemporal substitution of consumption and intratemporal substitution of consumption between tradables and nontradables both have large effects on private saving.     

A Paleoeconomic Theory of Co-Evolution and Extinction of Domesticable Animals

One Pleistocene mystery is why early North Americans eradicated their large, potentially domesticable animals (e.g., horses), whereas early Europeans did not. A commonly‐held hypothesis is that European species were evasive due to co‐evolution with hominids, whereas North American animals were naïve and unable to adapt quickly enough when experienced human hunters arrived from Eurasia. We explore this hypothesis with a paleoeconomic model of co‐evolution that integrates human hunting investments and wildlife population responses. We find that investments in hunting ability, based on the relative scarcity of prey species, could have mattered more than wildlife ‘naivety’ in explaining the extinction.