Two-Part Trade Policy under Imperfect Competition

In this paper we consider the potential gain of a government pursuing a two-part trade policy: an import license for entry, along with a per-unit tariff on imports. The model is a two-stage game of complete but imperfect information. In the first stage, the domestic government sets trade policy, while in the second stage the home and foreign producers behave as Cournot competitors. The paper demonstrates that the optimal trade policy depends upon the number of firms, the degree of heterogeneity in cost functions, and the degree of convexity in cost functions.     

The Structure of Protection in Indonesia in 1989 1

Around the mid-1980s, Indonesia's protectionist regime supported an industrial structure in which industries were mainly oriented towards producing for the domestic market. Since then, trade policies have shifted to a more outward-looking strategy, stimulating the growth and diversification of non-oil manufactured exports. This paper attempts to quantify the nominal and effective rates of protection resulting from trade policies at the end of the 1980s. After an introduction in which the 1989 trade policies are discussed, estimates of nominal and effective rates of protection are presented. It is shown that though the level of protection has declined since 1987, it still varies widely across economic sectors. Furthermore, despite the more open trade strategy, the paper's findings show that the trade regime remains biased against exports. Finally, by examining some trade policy issues, the paper presents further ways of rationalising the structure of protection in Indonesia's industrial sector.     

The Structural Relation Between Mortgage and Market Interest Rates

This paper analyzes the dynamic relationship between primary and secondary mortgage markets and the short-term and long-term market interest rates. Using a series of monthly data on fixed rate mortgage rates and GNMA rates, we explore the dependence and speed of adjustment in these primary and secondary mortgage rates to each other as well as to the long and short-term government rates. The results indicate that residential mortgage rates in general, appear to follow the long-term rate and are not very sensitive to movements in the short-term interest rate.     

Financing budget deficits in the Netherlands

Summary In The Netherlands public debt management is in the hands of the budgetary policy-maker, whose recourse to the capital market can exceed or fall short of the total borrowing requirement in order to absorb or create liquidity. The conduct of that policy since the early 1960's is analyzed in this paper, emphasizing the importance of medium-term control over the public finances as a prerequisite for the ability of debt management to make a flexible contribution to monetary policy. During the 1960's this condition was satisfied and debt management followed a stable countercyclical pattern which, however, was abandoned after the early 1970's as the public finances swung into substantial disequilibrium.The author thanks J. Boughton, L. Bovenberg, D. Hendry, P. Masson, J. Muellbauer, and the referees for comments on earlier versions. However, the views expressed are his alone and do not necessarily represent those of the International Monetary Fund.     

Teams,Teamwork and Absence*

We argue that firms with interdependent worker productivity, team production, have a higher cost of absence and, as a consequence, spend additional resources on monitoring absence. As a result, firms with team production should have lower absence rates. We estimate the determinants of absence for blue‐collar workers using a sample of German manufacturing establishments. Workplace teams are used as a proxy for team production. The estimates reveal that firms with teams have lower absence rates, as do smaller establishments. The size effect, however, is unique to establishments with teams, which fits prior theoretical work that has not been previously tested.     

Protection versus Promotion: An Empirical Investigation

Using Turkish industry-level data from 1983 to 1990, we find that politically organized industries receive both higher protection and promotion than unorganized ones. Tariff rates are decreasing (increasing) in the import-penetration ratio and the absolute value of the import-demandelasticity for organized (unorganized) industries. Subsidy rates are decreasing (increasing) in the output-supply elasticity for organized (unorganized) industries. The results are consistent with the predictions of the Grossman–Helpman model and its extension in this paper. The mix of protection and promotion is inversely related to the ratio of their respective marginal deadweight cost measures.