THE DETERMINANTS OF LAWS RESTRICTING YOUTH ACCESS TO TOBACCO

Since many smokers begin consuming tobacco products in their adolescent years, many states have adopted a variety of restrictions on youth access to tobacco, which studies show reduces the demand for tobacco among this cohort. This paper takes a different track by addressing the demand for youth access restrictions. Specifically, using a random effects Probit procedure, which controls for the endogeneity of cigarette consumption and taxation, we examine the determinants of nine methods commonly used by states to restrict youth access to tobacco . ( JEL H70, I18)     

COMMERCIAL BANKS AND LDC DEBT REDUCTION

This paper investigates the relationship between the probability of default of lesser developed country commercial bank debt and the level of debt reduction granted by commercial banks. The analysis tests this relationship by regressing debt reduction totals for 29 middle-income debtors on 11 default probability indicators over the years 1985 through 1993 and finds a statistically significant relationship between the expected probability of default and the level of debt reduction. However, the findings fail to determine clearly the overall direction of this relationship. Thus, the evidence is insufficient to support the conclusion that the banks have behaved systematically as if they believed a debt-relief Laffer curve existed.     

Liquidity Provision,Bank Capital,and the Macroeconomy

New bank equity must come from somewhere. In general equilibrium, raising bank capital requirements means either that banks produce less short‐term debt (as debt holders must become shareholders), or short‐term debt is not reduced and the banking system acquires nonbank equity (as the shareholders in nonbanks become shareholders in banks). The welfare effects involve a trade‐off because bank debt is special as it is used for transactions purposes, but more bank capital can reduce the chance of bank failure (producing welfare losses).     

The Life and Death of the Canadian Contingent Gains and Losses Accounting Standards Project*

In April 1994, the Canadian Accounting Standards Board formally approved a new accounting standard for contingent gains and losses. The new standard would have increased the frequency of recording contingent losses, enabled the accrual of some contingent gains, and enhanced disclosures for all contingencies. The changes would primarily have been achieved by requiring management, and their legal advisers, to make predictions, estimates, and disclosures that the existing accounting standard enabled them to avoid. Over two years later, and following numerous changes to the implementation date, the board ultimately decided not to release the new standard, and in July 1999, formally abandoned the contingencies project. This study provides a telling of the standard's genesis, development, and ultimate demise, which should prove instructive to those parties with an interest and a stake in accounting standard setting.     

Arbitrage Chains

A privately informed trader will engage in costly arbitrage, that is, trade on his knowledge that the price of an asset is different from the fundamental value if: (1) his order does not move the price immediately to reflect the information; and (2) he can hold the asset until the date when the information is reflected in the price. We study a general equilibrium model in which all agents optimize. In each period, there may be a trader with a limited horizon who has private information about a distant event. Whether he acts on his information, and whether subsequent informed traders act, is shown to depend on the possibility of a sequence or chain of future informed traders spanning the event date. An arbitrageur who receives good news will buy only if it is likely that, at the end of his trading horizon, a subsequent arbitrageur's buying will have pushed up the expected price. We show that limited trading horizons result in inefficient prices, because informed traders do not act on their information until the event date is sufficiently close. We also show that limited horizons can arise because of the cost-carry associated with holding an arbitrage portfolio over an extended period of time.     

A Disequilibrium Model of Savings and Loan Associations

This paper discusses the consistent specification and estimation of asset demand equations in a disequilibrium model of financial markets. We estimate the effective asset demands of savings and loan associations, allowing for rationing in the mortgage market. These disequilibrium estimates are not very different from the estimates of notional demands with no rationing assumed. Savings and loans seem to be least affected by excess demand situations in that they are apparently not reluctant to raise mortgage rates and/or to ration borrowers.