Optimal Fines under Announced and Surprise Inspections

This paper examines optimal fines in a regulatory framework where the regulator can choose either surprise or announced inspections to monitor a firm for compliance. The firm can invest in detection avoidance, but it receives a fine if the regulator discovers that it is noncompliant. In the welfare maximization problem, we focus on the trade‐off between the frequency of inspections and the magnitude of the fine. We find that when inspections are unannounced, the optimal fine is maximal, but when they are announced, the optimal fine may be less than maximal.     

Stronger Risk Controls,Lower Risk: Evidence from U.S. Bank Holding Companies

We construct a risk management index (RMI) to measure the strength and independence of the risk management function at bank holding companies (BHCs). The U.S. BHCs with higher RMI before the onset of the financial crisis have lower tail risk, lower nonperforming loans, and better operating and stock return performance during the financial crisis years. Over the period 1995 to 2010, BHCs with a higher lagged RMI have lower tail risk and higher return on assets, all else equal. Overall, these results suggest that a strong and independent risk management function can curtail tail risk exposures at banks.     

Inco Ltd.: Market Value, Fair Value, and Management Discretion

We examine management discretion to decide when and how much to write down an asset, in a unique case where a tracking stock provides an observable market value for the asset. We find that, despite market evidence that Inco Ltd.'s financial statements substantially overvalued the Voisey's Bay nickel mine throughout 1997 to 2000, management chose not to write down the mine until 2002. Inco management used an independent fairness opinion to justify its December 2000 redemption of the tracking stock at 25% of its initial value, indicating almost surely that Inco management was aware of the generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) impairment. This case illustrates that GAAP's reliance on undiscounted cash flows for impairment decisions allows huge unrecorded disparities between book and market value. The management discretion exercised in this case provides a concrete example of the subjectivity inherent in fair valuation.     

Noneconomic Engagement and International Exchange: The Case of Environmental Treaties

We examine the role of noneconomic partnerships in promoting international economic exchange. Since far-sighted countries are more willing to join costly international partnerships such as environmental treaties, environmental engagement tends to encourage international lending. Countries with such noneconomic partnerships also find it easier to engage in economic exchanges since they face the possibility that debt default might also spill over to hinder their noneconomic relationships. We present a theoretical model of these ideas and then verify their empirical importance using a bilateral cross-section of data on international cross-holdings of assets and environmental treaties. Our results support the notion that international environmental cooperation facilitates economic exchange.     

On the High‐Frequency Dynamics of Hedge Fund Risk Exposures

We propose a new method to model hedge fund risk exposures using relatively high‐frequency conditioning variables. In a large sample of funds, we find substantial evidence that hedge fund risk exposures vary across and within months, and that capturing within‐month variation is more important for hedge funds than for mutual funds. We consider different within‐month functional forms, and uncover patterns such as day‐of‐the‐month variation in risk exposures. We also find that changes in portfolio allocations, rather than in the risk exposures of the underlying assets, are the main drivers of hedge funds' risk exposure variation.     

Portfolio Selection and the Investment Performance of the UK Pension Funds*

Pension funds are the main institutional investors, accounting for 38 per cent of personal sector net financial wealth. As a result of their growing importance in mobilizing personal sector saving, they have emerged as the principal institutional investor, controlling over £200bn of funds at the end of 1987, their total net assets equalling 38 per cent of personal sector net financial wealth. Pension funds also dominate domestic asset markets, owning 27per cent of the stock of outstanding UK equity, 23 per cent of UK government securities and 17 per cent of total UK holdings of overseas equity. In this paper we present the conclusions from recent research, undertaken as part of an updating of the LBS Financial Model. Our results suggest that UK pension fund investment since 1980 is better than previous studies have suggested and, in particular, that funds outperformed the equity market in the 1980s, offering a higher return for any given level of risk. In addition fund behaviour is slow to change, with past behaviour exerting the strongest influence on current investment patterns. Fund managers also appear guilty of “short termism” in that they place little weight on events beyond the next three months. However, this has not made them inefficient. Finally, we find that actions to restrict the funds' surpluses should not affect their investment behaviour. Our results also suggest that the costs from exchange controls in the 1970s were substantial, amounting to some £4bn per year.     

Selection from Many Investments with Managerial Private Information*

We investigate capital investment problems when a manager knows the costs of a set of available projects, while the owner only holds probabilistic beliefs about these costs. With mutually exclusive projects, an optimal policy can be defined by a series of cost targets, one for each of the possible projects. The project with the lowest reported cost relative to the target is chosen, and funded as if the cost were equal to the target. The optimal investment policy can deviate from a traditional policy of selecting the project with the highest, positive net present value (NPV) in a number of ways. First, under-investment arises to limit the manager's ability to capture the economic rents. Second, when investment takes place, it is not always the project with the highest NPV that is implemented. Third, projects with lower cost variability can be favored. We extend the analysis to non-mutually exclusive projects. With two independent projects, batch processing is superior to individual appraisal whenever both optimal individual appraisal cost targets are interior. Individual appraisal ignores the impact of individual targets on incentives to report the costs of other potential projects. Batch processing can improve individual assessment by cost effective switching of investment away from the individual projects and into the batch as a whole. The results suggest that the common practice of analyzing batches of capital requests in an annual capital budgeting cycle provides advantages in the organization's attempt to deal with asymmetric information and incentive problems.