On a linear stochastic differential equation

Summary Stochastic differential (s. d.) equations had been considered in [Nasr, 1960] and [Nasr]. We consider here, the s. d. equationf(D)x(t)=m(t)+v(t)z(t) wherem(t),v(t) are real functions oft,f(D) is a polynomial inD withD=d/dt, andz(t) is a random function. In particular,z(t) is assumed here, to be of the stationary type, while other types namely whenz(t) is of theGaussian or of thePoisson type, are considered in [Nasr]. A particular integral of the stated equation, and an associated covariance function of this integral are given in the form of generalized (g-)functions; [Nasr, 1965]. The equationdx/dt=v(t)z(t) wherez(t) is stationary in the wide sense is considered as a special case.     

A law of large numbers for abstract random variables

Summary It was emphasized by Fréchet [8] that in many of the practical applications, we get, as a result of a random experiment, an abstract random variableX belonging to a setX. Givenn determinations of the variableX, an arithmetic meanZ _n is introduced in 2-. It reduces to the classical arithmetic mean, whenX is the set of real numbers. Moreover, if the random variableX is Gaussian, having a meanM(X), and belongs to a certain (4-) familyF, the introduced arithmetic meanZ _n constitutes an exhausting estimation [5] of the meanM(X).     

Government Ownership and Dividend Policy: Evidence from Newly Privatised Firms

In this paper we examine the relationship between government ownership and dividend policy. Using a multinational sample of newly privatised firms from 43 countries, we find strong and robust evidence indicating that dividend payout is negatively related to government ownership, consistent with the predictions of agency theory. We also find that country‐level corporate governance affects the relationship between government ownership and dividend policy. Specifically, the adverse effects of government ownership on dividend policy are more pronounced in countries with weak law and order and a lower level of checks and balances. Our results are important, as they show that government ownership, as well as the institutional environment, does in fact affect the critical corporate policies, such as dividend policy, of newly privatised firms.     

The Determinants of Corruption: Cross‐Country‐Panel‐Data Analysis

This study explores the determinants of corruption, utilizing the Hausman and Taylor's technique to estimate a random effects model that incorporates both the effects of corruption determinants that vary over time and those that are time‐invariant, and using a larger panel dataset and a comprehensive set of corruption determinants. The first interesting result is that perception of strong support for rule of law is strongly correlated with reduced corruption, suggesting that a better quality of law enforcement reduces corruption. Rich countries have lower corruption, and the perception of free expression and accountability strongly decreases corruption, indicating that providing greater opportunities for citizens to participate in selecting their government, more freedom of expression, and free media are effective ways of curbing corruption. Conversely, natural resource abundance, country population size, country's dominant religious tradition, ethnic fractionalization, and political stability are unimportant determinants of corruption, while previous research has suggested they are important.     

On the role and nature of alliance management capability in family business: Empirical evidence from a developing market

Despite the research on alliance management capability (AMC) has evolved in recent years, we still lack a clear understanding of its antecedents and performance outcomes in the context of family businesses, a setting that is inherently different from a typical firm-to-firm corporation. Collecting data from the Libyan family firms sector, we found that alliance experience, family culture (as internal antecedence), and political instability (as external antecedence) are crucial for AMC development, where the latter has a significant effect on the alliance performance of these firms. We also discuss the theoretical and practical implications of our study.