On blocking coalitions: Linking Mas-Colell with Grodal–Schmeidler–Vind

In this paper we investigate the question of how many coalitions of a given relative size would block a non-Warlasian allocation in large finite economies. It is shown that in finite economies, if a Pareto optimal allocation is bounded away from being Walrasian, then, for any two numbers α$\alpha$ and β$\beta$ between 0 and 1, the proportion of blocking coalitions in the set of all coalitions with relative size between α$\alpha$ and β$\beta$, is arbitrarily close to 1/2, as the number of individuals in the economy becomes large.     

Human capital accumulation, fertility and economic development

We examine the development paths of an economy by incorporating the trade-off between the quality and quantity of children and the substitutability between the educational effect within the family and the education paid for by the parent. There is a threshold wage rate, above which individuals begin to invest in the human capital of their children, while reducing the number of children. At this point, the economy shifts from an exogenous growth phase to an endogenous growth phase. It is also shown that the aggregate saving rate is positively correlated with the youth dependency ratio in the development process.     

Considerations on Inequality,Corporate Governance,and Financialization

Abstract

Disjunctures between corporate governance, increasingly dominated by financial considerations, and social inequality have been among the motor forces of current world-wide “populist” voter revolts. This article looks for clues for the relation between economic inequality, corporate governance, and financialization by re-examining the work of Karl Marx and of Adolphe Berle and Gardiner Means. Marx is widely considered, in Japan, to have pointed out that the division of profit into the wages of management and the profit of enterprise is considered as a path to the association. However, this general interpretation in Japan may not be sufficient for capturing capitalism’s contemporary reality. This presentation develops an alternative interpretation of this chapter by combining Marx’s explanation with the theory of the separation of ownership and management proposed by Berle and Means. We then explore causal relations among income inequality, corporate governance, and financialization.     

Deregulation and labour earnings: Three motor carrier industries in Japan

We empirically examine the effect of product market deregulation on wages. The difference-in-difference approach is used with wage data from three motor carrier industries (the taxi, bus and trucking industries) in Japan to obtain the following findings. First, deregulations in the 1990s and 2000s caused the relative wages of taxi and bus drivers to decline, but this was not the case for truck drivers. Second, the large decline in the relative wages of taxi drivers can be explained by the deterioration of economic conditions; their wages are more sensitive to labour market conditions than those of drivers in other industries.     

Can productive government spending be a source of equilibrium indeterminacy?

This paper presents an examination of the interaction between indeterminacy and productive government spending financed by taxes in a one-sector growth model. In the paper, we show that the possibility of indeterminacy is positively affected by dependence on income tax financing and is negatively affected by consumption tax financing. Under balanced budget rules, a key determinant for indeterminacy is a revenue source for providing public services (i.e. income tax financing) rather than the presence of productive government spending.     

Inflation or monetary overhang?: Planners' preferences in china

Two models, based on utility maximization of economic planners, are developed to explain the stock of households' money holdings and rate of open inflation in China for the period 1954–85. Planners' preferences are found to be biased in favour of monetary overhang. This bias was reinforced when the bargaining strength of planners vis-a-vis households was weakened and during the post-Mao reform period. This could help to explain the increase in the value of rents and level of corruption during the reform period.     

The Emergence of Market Power in Emission Rights Markets: The Role of Initial Permit Distribution

This paper offers an analytical model of emission permit markets in which a large number of regulated emitters participate, and derives formulae that estimate the degree of market distortion. These formulae clearly show the entire dependence of the ratio of market prices to competitive levels on the permit initial distribution as well as the existence of a threshold for effective market power. While the findings challenge a well-known conception of the Coase Theorem, they have significant policy implications vis-à-vis the Kyoto Protocol and the related policy debates on excess emission rights known as hot air.