Migration decisions, expected remittances, and altruism

We investigate the effects of altruism on migration decisions by the potential migrant as well as the effects of altruism on remittances by the migrant to clarify how altruism affects remittances that the household in the home country will receive, i.e., expected remittances. Previous studies did not pay adequate attention to the effects of altruism on migration decisions of the potential migrant when examining the effects of altruism on remittances that will be sent from aboard. We find that if migration does not incur any costs, the potential migrant always migrates, and altruism increases expected remittances monotonically. On the other hand, if migration incurs costs, the potential migrant does not necessarily migrate, and the potential migrant with a higher degree of altruism is less likely to migrate. As a result, with migration costs, altruism may decrease expected remittances. Therefore, altruism does not increase expected remittances monotonically. Our results falsify the usual assumption of monotonicity regarding the effects of altruism on remittances.     

Corporate Social Responsibility or Payoff Asymmetry? A Study of an Endogenous Timing Game

We revisit an endogenous timing game by introducing corporate social responsibility into firms' payoffs. Previous research investigates an endogenous timing game in a mixed oligopoly, wherein one welfare‐maximizing public firm competes against profit‐maximizing private firms. It shows that the outcome is completely different from that of private oligopoly. In contrast to its result, we find that this change in payoff does not matter as long as the payoffs are symmetric. Our result indicates that asymmetry, and not welfare‐concerning objectives, yields specific results in the literature on mixed oligopoly.     

Endogenous longevity,public debt and endogenous growth

This study explores the mechanism that causes an inverted U-shaped relationship between the public debt to GDP ratio and the economic growth rate which is observed in empirical studies. We show that this relationship is caused even when the government does not introduce the golden rule of public finance, and government health care expenditure has important role in generating this relationship.     

The Nash bargaining solution in general n-person cooperative games

We present a noncooperative foundation for the Nash bargaining solution for an n-person cooperative game in strategic form. The Nash bargaining solution should be immune to any coalitional deviations. Our noncooperative approach yields a new core concept, called the Nash core, for a cooperative game based on a consistency principle. We prove that the Nash bargaining solution can be supported (in every subgame) by a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium of the bargaining game if and only if the Nash bargaining solution belongs to the Nash core.     

Endogenous Timing in Mixed Duopolies With Externality

We investigate endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly with a negative externality. We find that quantity (price) competition yields a simultaneous‐move (sequential‐move) outcome under a significant negative externality. These results indicate that mixed duopolies yield the same results as private duopolies under a significant negative externality, which is in sharp contrast to the results in mixed duopolies without a negative externality. Unless the negative externality is insignificant, public leadership yields greater welfare than private leadership, and public leadership is more robust than the private leadership as equilibrium. If optimal environmental tax policy is introduced, however, private leadership yields the greatest welfare and this an equilibrium outcome in the endogenous timing game under quantity competition.     

Cooperation and Institution in Games

Based on recent developments in non‐cooperative coalitional bargaining theory, I review game theoretical analyses of cooperation and institution. First, I present basic results of the random‐proposer model and apply them to the problem of involuntary unemployment in a labour market. I discuss extensions to cooperative games with externalities and incomplete information. Next, I consider the enforceability of an agreement as an institutional foundation of cooperation. I re‐examine the contractarian approach to the problem of cooperation from the viewpoint that individuals may voluntarily create an enforcement institution.     

Global early warning system for displaced persons: interlinkages of environment, development, peace and human rights

The work described here is based on the FUGI global modeling concept. Its development is termed the Global Early Warning System for Displaced Persons (GEWS). The paper explains 1) the scope and objectives of the current research: 2) the methodology employed; 3) the main features of the model; and 4) some case studies having to do with the Philippines and Thailand.