COMMUNITY MEMBERSHIP ASPIRATIONS: THE LINK BETWEEN INEQUALITY AND REDISTRIBUTION REVISITED*

This article studies how distributional tensions can act in many different ways depending on the social affinity between the different economic classes and their prospect of upward or downward mobility. We consider that socioeconomic group membership through its implied social interactions and peer effects is an important determinant of an individual's outcome. Agents, while voting on a social contract, take into account the consequences of their choice over their ex post belonging to a particular community. Thus, the endogenous sorting of the population into clusters may lead to a nonmonotonic relationship between inequality and the pressure for redistributive policies.     

A multidimensional spatial lag panel data model with spatial moving average nested random effects errors

This paper focuses on a three-dimensional model that combines two different types of spatial interaction effects, i.e. endogenous interaction effects via a spatial lag on the dependent variable and interaction effects among the disturbances via a spatial moving average (SMA) nested random effects errors. A three-stage procedure is proposed to estimate the parameters. In a first stage, the spatial lag panel data model is estimated using an instrumental variable (IV) estimator. In a second stage, a generalized moments (GM) approach is developed to estimate the SMA parameter and the variance components of the disturbance process using IV residuals from the first stage. In a third stage, to purge the equation of the specific structure of the disturbances a Cochrane–Orcutt-type transformation is applied combined with the IV principle. This leads to the GM spatial IV estimator and the regression parameter estimates. Monte Carlo simulations show that our estimators are not very different in terms of root mean square error from those produced by maximum likelihood. The approach is applied to European Union regional employment data for regions nested within countries.     

Falling Wage Shares in Europe and the United States: How Important is Aggregation Bias?

This paper sheds light on the importance of aggregation bias in the analysis of wage shares developments over time and across countries. We focus on five European countries and the United States and show that the trend decline in the aggregate wage share observed in these countries over much of the 1980s and 1990s partly reflects changes in the sectoral composition of the economy. The application of a fixed-weight aggregation method changes the profile of the observed wage share in a significant way: in particular there is no longer sign of an overshooting of the wage share levels of the early-1970s. Error-correction wage equations based on the adjusted wage shares generally have a better regression fit and show long-run elasticities of real wages to unemployment that vary less across countries and are substantially lower than those obtained with observed shares.     

Protecting software development projects against underestimation

When a project in progress has been seriously underestimated, it is essential to figure out how much additional effort is required to complete it within its original scope and delivery date. This article posits that project contingencies should be based on the amount it will take to recover from the underestimation, and not on the amount that would have been required had the project been adequately planned from the beginning, and that these funds should be administered at the portfolio level. A model to calculate the required funds is developed.     

INEQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITIES VS. INEQUALITY OF OUTCOMES: ARE WESTERN SOCIETIES ALL ALIKE?

This paper analyzes the relationship between income inequality and inequality of opportunities for income acquisition in nine developed countries during the 1990s. Equality of opportunity is defined as the situation where income distributions conditional on social origin cannot be ranked according to stochastic dominance criteria. We measure social origin by parental education and occupation and use the database built by Roemer et al. (2003 ). Stochastic dominance is assessed using nonparametric statistical tests. Our results indicate strong disparities in the degree of equality of opportunity across countries and a strong correlation between inequality of outcomes and inequality of opportunity. The U.S. and Italy show up as the most unequal countries in terms of both outcome and opportunity. At the opposite extreme, income distributions conditional on social origin are almost the same in Scandinavian countries even before any redistributive policy. We complement the ordinal comparison by resorting to an original scalar “Gini” index of opportunities, which can be decomposed into a risk and a return component. In our sample, inequality of opportunity is mostly driven by differences in mean income conditional on social origin, and differences in risk compensate the return element in most countries.     

Nowcasting causality in mixed frequency vector autoregressive models

This paper introduces nowcasting causality as the mixed-frequency version of instantaneous causality. We analyze the relationship between nowcasting and Granger causality in a mixed-frequency VAR and illustrate its impact on the significance of high-frequency variables in mixed-frequency conditional models.     

Genetically Modified Crops, Corporate Pricing Strategies, and Farmers' Adoption: The Case of Bt Cotton in Argentina

This article analyzes adoption and impacts of Bt cotton in Argentina against the background of monopoly pricing. Based on survey data, it is shown that the technology significantly reduces insecticide applications and increases yields; however, these advantages are curbed by the high price charged for genetically modified seeds. Using the contingent valuation method, it is shown that farmers' average willingness to pay is less than half the actual technology price. A lower price would not only increase benefits for growers, but could also multiply company profits, thus, resulting in a Pareto improvement. Implications of the sub-optimal pricing strategy are discussed.     

The impact of competitive advantage on the investment timing in Stackelberg leader–follower game

This short note clarifies how the Stackelberg leader’s competitive advantage after the follower’s entry affects the leader’s optimal market entry decision and Stackelberg strategic interactions under uncertainty. Although the Stackelberg leader’s first investment threshold remains constant and coincides with the monopolist’s investment trigger, his second (third) investment threshold, which defines the exit (entry) of the first (second) investment interval, increases with an increased competitive advantage. With an increased competitive advantage, the probability of sequential investment equilibrium (simultaneous investment equilibrium) increases (decreases) irrespective of the level of volatility. Moreover, for a given level of competitive advantage, an increase in the volatility tends to decrease (increase) the probability of simultaneous investment equilibrium (sequential investment equilibrium). For a richer set of results, endogenous firm roles are examined and analyzed as well. The leader’s preemptive threshold is negatively affected by his competitive advantage.     

Indeterminacy and cycles in two-sector discrete-time model

Summary. We consider a discrete-time two-sector Cobb-Douglas economy with positive sector specific external effects. We show that indeterminacy of steady states and cycles can easily arise with constant or decreasing social returns to scale, and very small market imperfections. This is in sharp contrast with most of the contributions in the literature in which increasing social returns are required to generate indeterminacy. Received: July 31, 2000; revised version: June 5, 2001     

A simple axiomatization and constructive representation proof for choquet expected utility

>P>Summary. We provide a set of simple and intuitive set of axioms that allow for a direct and constructive proof of the Choquet Expected Utility representation for decision making under uncertainty. Received: October 29, 2002; revised version: November 13, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" We thank Matthew Ryan for very useful comments and suggestions on related work and for encouraging us to write this note. Correspondence to: S. Grant