On Rothschild–Stiglitz as Competitive Pooling

Dubey and Geanakoplos (Q J Econ 117:1529–1570, 2002) have developed a theory of competitive pooling, which incorporates adverse selection and signaling into general equilibrium. By recasting the Rothschild–Stiglitz model of insurance in this framework, they find that a separating equilibrium always exists and is unique. We prove that their uniqueness result is not a consequence of the framework, but rather of their definition of refined equilibria. When other types of perturbations are used, the model allows for many pooling allocations to be supported as such: in particular, this is the case for pooling allocations that Pareto dominate the separating equilibrium.     

Does knowledge explain trust behaviors and outcomes? The different influences of initial knowledge and experiential knowledge on personal trust interactions

This paper examines the influences of initial knowledge and experiential knowledge on trust behaviors and trust outcomes, respectively, at an interpersonal level. We use an experimental dynamic trust game, and our results show that (1) the initial knowledge that exists a priori between a trustor and a trustee helps to explain the trustor's trust behaviors toward the trustee, and (2) the experiential knowledge gained directly by a trustor during a specific trust interaction with a trustee influences the trust outcome, i.e. the difference between the original expectations of the trustor and the subsequent trust behaviors. Our results contribute to human resource literature by clarifying the specific influences of different types of knowledge on interpersonal trust relationships (e.g. between managers and employees) and by supplementing the traditional notion that trust within a firm develops slowly by showing that personal expectations have an immediate and important influence on trust output.     

Rational expectations equilibria of economies with local interactions

We consider general economies in which rational agents interact locally. The local aspect of the interactions is designed to represent in a simple abstract way social interactions, that is, socioeconomic environments in which markets do not mediate all of agents’ choices, which might be in part determined, for instance, by family, peer group, or ethnic group effects. We study static as well as dynamic infinite horizon economies; we allow for economies with incomplete information, and we consider jointly global and local interactions, to integrate e.g., global externalities and markets with peer and group effects. We provide conditions under which such economies have rational expectations equilibria. We illustrate the effects of local interactions when agents are rational by studying in detail the equilibrium properties of a simple economy with quadratic preferences which captures, in turn, local preferences for conformity, habit persistence, and preferences for status or adherence to aggregate norms of behavior.     

R&D competition, absorptive capacity, and market shares

This paper deals with an oligopolistic industry where firms are engaged in cost-reducting R&D activity to maximize their market shares. The existence and uniqueness of a feedback-Nash-optimal R&D strategy for each firm are discussed. Our simulations highlight that variations in spillovers hardly influence the firms' R&D investment, if their absorptive capacities to exploit extramural knowledge depend on their R&D efforts. Moreover, extramural knowledge cannot completely replace in-house R&D. However, a high level of public R&D favors the firm with the most restrictive R&D expenditure constraint and/or with the lowest initial R&D stock, provided it invests in R&D.     

Will elders provide for their grandchildren? Unconditional cash transfers and educational expenditures in Bolivia

We take advantage of repeated cross‐sectional household surveys and a sharp discontinuity created by the introduction of an unconditional cash transfer to elders in Bolivia, to evaluate its impact on educational expenditures on children within a household. We find positive and significant impacts of the program at the aggregate level. We also find that the program has stronger effects on indigenous populations as well as on female and rural populations. Our results are robust to a series of falsification tests, survey structure, model specification, and estimation methods.     

A structuralist North–South model on structural change,economic growth and catching-up

This paper presents a structuralist North–South model on structural change, industrialization and economic convergence. In a balance-of-payments-constrained macro-setting, we assume a cumulative process between industrialization and growth. Differently from the traditional post-Keynesian models, we endogenize the productive structure of developing countries. We enquire how industrialization affects uneven development and convergence processes. Multiple growth paths and a long-run path-dependent equilibrium emerge. Industrialization proves to be a necessary but not sufficient condition for catching-up. Good management by the domestic institutions of domestic industrialization is a complementary requirement.