A structuralist North–South model on structural change,economic growth and catching-up

This paper presents a structuralist North–South model on structural change, industrialization and economic convergence. In a balance-of-payments-constrained macro-setting, we assume a cumulative process between industrialization and growth. Differently from the traditional post-Keynesian models, we endogenize the productive structure of developing countries. We enquire how industrialization affects uneven development and convergence processes. Multiple growth paths and a long-run path-dependent equilibrium emerge. Industrialization proves to be a necessary but not sufficient condition for catching-up. Good management by the domestic institutions of domestic industrialization is a complementary requirement.     

Liquidity, Trading Size, and the Co-existence of Dealership and Auction Markets

This paper analyses the co-existence of two markets for the same shares, a quote-driven market and an order-driven market, as observed for example for the trading of continental shares on the London SEAQ International. The focus is on the trade-off between the uncertain execution price faced by investors on an auction market and the implicit transaction cost represented by the spread in a dealer market. We obtain that those investors who desire to make large trades will prefer to trade with the dealer, while trades of smaller size will be carried out on the auction market. Moreover, we explicitly investigate the interrelations between the two markets showing that the pricing policy followed by a dealer depends on the conditions prevailing on the auction market.
(J.E.L: G10, D40)     

OBSERVABLE MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES AND SPATIAL COMPETITION

In this paper we investigate the relationship between product market competition and managerial incentives within a circular city model with observable agency contracts. With respect to the case of unobservability studied by Raith (2003 ), we find that optimal managerial contracts provide lower incentives, and that equilibrium expected prices and profits are higher. Changes in competition fundamentals have ambiguous effects, but observable contracts alleviate their impact on incentives. Finally, observability involves three major implications: managerial incentives are higher under price regulation than under competition; prices may increase with the number of firms; consumer welfare may diminish when competition increases.     

On the role of retaliation in trade agreements

This paper analyzes the role of retaliation in trade agreements. It shows that, in the presence of private information, retaliation can always be used to increase the welfare derived from such agreements by the participating governments. In particular, it is shown that retaliation is a necessary feature of any efficient equilibrium.We argue that retaliation would not be necessary if governments could resort to international transfers or export subsidies to compensate for terms-of-trade externalities. Within the current world trading system, though, in which transfers are seldom observed whereas export subsidies are prohibited, the use of the remaining trade instruments in a retaliatory fashion might be optimal. The model is used to interpret the retaliatory use of antidumping observed in the last decades, and the proliferation of these measures relative to other trade remedies.     

WELFARE ENHANCING COORDINATION IN CONSUMER COOPERATIVES UNDER MIXED OLIGOPOLY

The recent globalization of world economies has led the retail markets of developed countries towards increasing levels of integration and strategic interdependence. A non negligible share of retail and food markets is currently served by co‐operative societies. Consistently with this trend, the consumer cooperatives have recently experienced increasing levels of integration. The main aim of this paper is to study the welfare effects of coordination among consumer cooperatives competing in quantities in a mixed oligopoly against profit‐maximizing firms. We show that, in absence of agency problems, under increasing or constant returns to scale a higher output coordination of the consumer cooperatives does not affect the total welfare as long as a nonnegative profit constraint holds in these firms. On the other hand, under decreasing returns to scale, the consumer cooperatives contribute more to social welfare when acting on behalf of all consumers. This is because, by coordinating consumers’ preferences, these firms can reduce their market output, thus helping the market to come closer to the first best. All together these results seem to provide an argument in favour of the recent process of integration involving consumer cooperatives in many developed countries.     

Organizational culture in a terminally ill hospital

This study analyzed an organizational culture in a community hospital in Texas to measure organizational culture change and its impact on Patient Satisfaction (PS). The study employed primary and secondary data, combining quantitative and qualitative methods for a case study. Participant observation was used and archival data were collected to provide a better understanding of the organizational culture and the context in which change was taking place. This study also applied a "Shared Vision" of the organization as the central process in bringing forth the knowledge shared by members of the community hospital who were both subjects and research participants. The results from the study suggest an increase in PS due to the shared vision of one subculture within the hospital. There were powerful subcultures in this organization based on occupation and specialization, and their interests and functional orientations were not conducive to a systems approach. Hospital management was conducted in "silos" and there was lack of feedback between organizational levels of the hospital, especially in financial management, with organizational dysfunctionality in reacting and adapting to the health care market.     

New firm location: An equilibrium model and its disequilibrium dynamics

This paper is centered on two basic statements: i) the birth of new firms is spatially related to location factors endowment and ii) the set of location factors can support only up to a given number of firms.The paper firstly defines the regional ex-ante demand for firms as a function of location factors set. In the following step a definition of regional equilibrium stock of firms is given and a static equilibrium model of new firms birth is built up. In a dynamic disequilibrium model the net birth of firms is a function of two disequilibrium terms: a sectoral and a regional one.The sectoral disequilibrium depends on the industry production structure, the regional disequilibrium is linked to the adaptation elasticity of location factors set to an exogenous shock.Finally, a first estimation on Italian data is performed, on the basis of which some new lines of analysis are suggested.