Coordination and the Provision of Discrete Public Goods by Correlated Equilibria

The strategic analysis of the private provision of a discrete public good has shown the existence of multiple Nash equilibria with the efficient number of players voluntarily contributing. However the coordination issue is left unexplained by this literature. The experimental evidence shows that communication among players is helpful in achieving cooperation. We claim that, from the theoretical point of view, this is equivalent to playing correlated equilibria in an extended public good game with communication, modeled as Chicken. We characterize such equilibria as feasible coordination mechanisms to achieve public goods provision in the general contribution game. We further introduce a second kind of game characterized by payoff externalities that may persist after the minimal threshold of contributors is achieved. While it is easy to show the existence of Pareto efficient correlated equilibria in the first game, in the second one players face incentive problems such that a first best cannot always be an equilibrium. Nevertheless there exist correlated equilibria that can qualify as incentive efficient mechanisms, once free riding is seen as a moral hazard issue. Finally, with an example, we discuss the impact of coalition formation in our framework.     

Assessment of meaningful change in routine outcome measurement (ROM) with a combination of a longitudinal and a ‘classify and count’ approach

To assess significant changes of health status in people receiving health care, distribution-based and anchor-based methods have been proposed. However, there is no real consensus on what method is the best for evaluating clinically meaningful change. To maximize the internal and external validity of outcome assessment, we propose combining two approaches as recommended by recent practical guidelines on this field. Specifically, we suggest applying longitudinal hierarchical linear models on subgroups of patients showing reliable change and reliable and clinically significant change. This combined approach improved the model’s ability (1) to quantify the magnitude of changes to be reliable and clinically meaningful and (2) to select significant predictors of changes. An empirical application on a prevalence sample of Italian outpatients attending four community mental health services was done. A cross-sectional model and three longitudinal models were applied on the entire study sample and reliable and clinically meaningful change subsamples to investigate the magnitude of change and the predictive effect on outcomes of clinical, socio-demographic and process variables on different patients’ subgroups. Differences were found suggesting that both the statistical method and the sample used to calculate individual changes affect the estimates. The main conclusion is that ignoring the longitudinal data structure or including patients with unreliable change at the follow-up might result in misleading inferences that can alter the real magnitude of changes and the contributions of predictors. The approach proposed provides robust feedback to clinicians on clinically significant change and can be recommended in outcome studies and research.     

Patents, Secrets, and the First-Inventor Defense

We analyze optimal patent design when innovators can rely on secrecy to protect their innovations. Secrecy has no fixed term but does not preclude accidental disclosure nor independent creation by other inventors. We derive the optimal scope of the rights conferred to such second inventors, showing that if the patent life is set optimally, second inventors should be allowed to patent and to exclude first inventors who have relied on secrecy. We then identify conditions under which it is socially desirable to increase patent life as much as is necessary to induce first inventors to patent. The circumstances in which it is preferable that they rely on secrecy seem rather limited .     

Switching to Green: The Timing of Socially Responsible Innovation

We develop a timing game for adopting a product technology that features a public good. We investigate the effects of the degree of product market competition, product differentiation, the private benefits from contributing to the public good, and firm asymmetries on the timing of adoption. We then examine the effects of consumer subsidies on equilibrium timings and the proliferation of the public good.     

Measurement of Economic Result in Public Organizations： A Departmental Analysis

The aim of this work is to demonstrate how public university hospital （UH） managers can improve the process of decision-making by using the measurement of economic value added to the society （EVAS） generated by these organizations. Thus, the economic values of the organization and its departments were calculated, according to the theory studied： measurement model of economic result of Slomski （1996）. It was considered the conduction of a case study in a public UH, evaluating its economic performance in a 3-year period. For the interpretation of results, the Data Envelopment Analysis （DEA） which categorized the departments of the hospital studied as efficient or inefficient was used. This study revealed that managers can improve the decision-making process by using the EVAS, since it has been established that this measurement of economic value has sensitivity to identify which of the economic value drivers should be emphasized in the management.     

Can Leaders of Public Companies Make Them Innovative?

Public companies have limitations to innovate because they are usually concentrated on short‐term results and are subjected to scrutiny and accountability in their innovation projects. Therefore, leaders of public companies face a greater challenge if they want their companies to be innovative. Leaders must make use of all their creativity and leadership skills to accomplish short‐term goals and at the same time foster the innovation that companies need to remain successful.     

Rational expectations equilibria of economies with local interactions

We consider general economies in which rational agents interact locally. The local aspect of the interactions is designed to represent in a simple abstract way social interactions, that is, socioeconomic environments in which markets do not mediate all of agents’ choices, which might be in part determined, for instance, by family, peer group, or ethnic group effects. We study static as well as dynamic infinite horizon economies; we allow for economies with incomplete information, and we consider jointly global and local interactions, to integrate e.g., global externalities and markets with peer and group effects. We provide conditions under which such economies have rational expectations equilibria. We illustrate the effects of local interactions when agents are rational by studying in detail the equilibrium properties of a simple economy with quadratic preferences which captures, in turn, local preferences for conformity, habit persistence, and preferences for status or adherence to aggregate norms of behavior.     

Total factor productivity and R&D capital in the spanish economy, 1965–1980

A formal model of productivity growth and technical progress is presented. The model takes into account embodied and disembodied technical progress as explanatory variables. The slowdown in productivity growth for the Spanish economy after 1972 is explained for 92% by the decline in the rate of growth of technical progress originated from domestic R&D and technology imports.