What's wrong with strategy?

Why is it that successful strategies are rarely developed as a result of formal planning processes? What is wrong with the way most companies go about developing strategy? Andrew Campbell and Marcus Alexander take a common sense look at why the planning frameworks managers use so often yield disappointing results. Companies often fail to distinguish between purpose (what an organization exists to do) and constraints (what an organization must do in order to survive), the authors say. Many executives mistakenly believe, for example, that satisfying stakeholders is an objective that drives thinking about strategy. In fact, it's a constraint, not an objective. Companies that don't win the loyalty of stakeholders will go out of business. Strategy is not about plans but about insights, the authors add. Strategy development is the process of discovering and understanding insights and should not be confused with planning, which is about turning insights into action. Furthermore, because executives develop most of their insights while actually doing the real work of running a business, it is important for companies not to separate strategy development from implementation. Is there a better way? The answer is not new planning processes or more effort. Instead, managers must understand two fundamental points: the benefit of having a well-articulated, stable purpose and the importance of discovering, understanding, documenting, and exploiting insights about how to create value.     

Realizing the Potential of Real Options: Does Theory Meet Practice?

The idea of viewing corporate investment opportunities as “real options” has been around for over 25 years. Real options concepts and techniques now routinely appear in academic research in finance and economics, and have begun to influence scholarly work in virtually every business discipline, including strategy, organizations, management science, operations management, information systems, accounting, and marketing. Real options concepts have also made considerable headway in practice. Corporate managers are more likely to recognize options in their strategic planning process, and have become more proactive in designing flexibility into projects and contracts, frequently using real options vocabulary in their discussions. Thanks in part to the spread of real options thinking, today's strategic planners are more likely than their predecessors to recognize the “option” value of actions like the following: ? dividing up large projects into a number of stages; ? investing in the acquisition or production of information; ? introducing “modularity” in manufacturing and design; ? developing competing prototypes for new products; and ? investing in overseas markets. But if real options has clearly succeeded as a way of thinking, the application of real options valuation methods has been limited to companies in relatively few industries and has thus failed to live up to expectations created in the mid‐ to late‐1990s. Increased corporate acceptance and implementations of real options valuation techniques will require several changes coming together. On the theory side, we need more realistic models that better reflect differences between financial and real options, simple heuristic methods that can be more easily implemented (but that have been carefully benchmarked against more precise models), and better guidance on implementation issues such as the estimation of discount rates for the “optionless” underlying projects. On the practitioner side, we need user‐friendly real options software, more senior‐level buy‐in, more deliberate diffusion of real options knowledge throughout organizations, better alignment of managerial incentives with long‐term shareholder value, and better‐designed contracts to correct the misalignment of incentives across the value chain. If these challenges can be met, there will continue to be a steady if gradual diffusion of real options analysis throughout organizations over the next few decades, with real options eventually becoming not only a standard part of corporate strategic planning, but also the primary valuation tool for assessing the expected shareholder effect of large capital investment projects.     

Risk aversion and the dynamics of optimal liquidation strategies in illiquid markets

We consider the infinite-horizon optimal portfolio liquidation problem for a von Neumann–Morgenstern investor in the liquidity model of Almgren (Appl. Math. Finance 10:1–18, 2003). Using a stochastic control approach, we characterize the value function and the optimal strategy as classical solutions of nonlinear parabolic partial differential equations. We furthermore analyze the sensitivities of the value function and the optimal strategy with respect to the various model parameters. In particular, we find that the optimal strategy is aggressive or passive in-the-money, respectively, if and only if the utility function displays increasing or decreasing risk aversion. Surprisingly, only few further monotonicity relations exist with respect to the other parameters. We point out in particular that the speed by which the remaining asset position is sold can be decreasing in the size of the position but increasing in the liquidity price impact.      

Occupational structure in the Czech lands under the second serfdom

This article presents an analysis of occupational structure, a key component of the ‘Little Divergence’, in an eastern‐central European economy under the second serfdom, using data on 6,983 Bohemian villages in 1654. Non‐agricultural activity was lower than in western Europe, but varied positively with village size, pastoral agriculture, sub‐peasant strata, Jews, freemen, female headship, and mills, and negatively with arable agriculture and towns. It showed a curvilinear relationship with the ‘second serfdom’, as proxied by landlord presence on village holdings. Landlord presence in serf villages also reversed the positive effects of female headship and mills on non‐agricultural activities. Under the second serfdom, landlords encouraged serf activities from which they could extract rents, while stifling others which threatened manorial interests.     

VOTING AND SOCIAL PRESSURE UNDER IMPERFECT INFORMATION

We develop a model in which costly voting in a large, two‐party election is a sequentially rational choice of strategic, self‐interested players who can reward fellow voters by forming stronger ties in a network formation coordination game. The predictions match a variety of stylized facts, including explaining why an individual's voting behavior may depend on what she knows about her friends' actions. Players have imperfect information about others' voting behavior, and we find that some degree of privacy may be necessary for voting in equilibrium, enabling hypocritical but useful social pressure. Our framework applies to any costly prosocial behavior.     

Gross substitutes and complements: A simple generalization

We extend the gross substitutes and complements framework (Sun and Yang, 2006). Competitive equilibrium with indivisible goods exists under significantly weaker, intuitive and interpretable conditions. A generalized dynamic double-track procedure (Sun and Yang, 2008, 2009) finds the competitive equilibrium outcome.     

Conceptualizing businesses as social actors: A framework for understanding sustainability actions in small‐ and medium‐sized enterprises

Small‐ and medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs) can play a crucial role in advancing environmental and social well‐being. Yet various—often conflicting—explanations have been offered to clarify why SMEs pursue sustainability. Some arguments foreground possibilities of profit maximization, whereas others emphasize individual values and convictions. Research supporting such contradicting explanations is often biased towards large enterprises or small, innovative frontrunners. In this article, we examine the underlying drivers of social and environmental interventions of SMEs by exploring empirical data from a survey of over 1,600 Canadian SMEs and complementary in‐depth interviews. We argue that sustainability actions of SMEs can be understood by viewing these firms as social actors—organizations that are shaped by individual values, internal and external interpersonal relationships, and are embedded in a social environment. This conceptualization directs attention to the full range of factors that shape sustainability engagement of SMEs and highlights frequently overlooked forms of sustainability‐oriented actions.     

Appraisal Accuracy and Automated Valuation Models in Rural Areas

The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics - Accurate and unbiased property value estimates are essential to credit risk management. Along with loan amount, they determine a mortgage’s...     

Subjective Performance Evaluations and Reciprocity in Principal–Agent Relations

We conduct a laboratory experiment with agents working on, and principals benefiting from, a real effort task in which the agents' performance can only be evaluated subjectively. Principals give subjective performance feedback to agents, and agents have an opportunity to sanction principals. In contrast to existing models of reciprocity, we find that agents tend to sanction whenever the feedback of principals is below their subjective self‐evaluations even if agents' pay‐offs are independent of it. In turn, principals provide more positive feedback (relative to their actual performance assessment of the agent) if this does not affect their pay‐off.