Post‐Cameralist Governance: Towards a Robust Political Economy of Bureaucracy

I develop a robust political economy of bureaucracy by highlighting the conditions necessary for hierarchical administrative bodies to govern protectively and productively, but not predatorily. These conditions are residual claimancy and jurisdictional competition. I make this argument by exploring a post‐cameralist interpretation of governance. Cameralism arose as a governance philosophy in the fractured principalities of seventeenth‐century Germany following the Thirty Years' War. Post‐cameralism focuses not on particular cameralist governance strategies but on a paradigm which sees governance as an activity provided within a larger exchange order, rather than imposing itself on that order as in more conventional treatments of public economics. While a post‐cameralist conception of governance comes with its own challenges, such as tensions with normative visions that promote self‐governance, it nonetheless presents an intriguing synthesis of monocentric and polycentric insights.     

Supply-side effects of strong energy price hikes in German industry and transportation

This article studies the short-term effects of energy price hikes on the supply of industrial goods and transport services including the repercussions on remuneration of input factors. The empirical analysis is based on a theoretical model, which assumes that the output good is produced by capital, labour and energy according to a nested production function framework where capital and energy are combined by a CES function at the intermediate stage. The output responses to energy price changes are derived, using estimates of the elasticity of substitution. While industry suffered more from the oil price shock of the late 1970s than from that of the early 1970s and the 2004?C2008 upsurge, evidence suggests the reverse for transportation. Regarding the impact on income distribution, both sectors share the same pattern, whereby in the recent episode, rising energy costs were more than compensated by falling unit labour costs, while in the 1970s, cost structures had been strained by an expansive wage policy in addition to the oil price shocks.     

Stakeholder Engagement: Defining Strategic Advantage for Sustainable Construction

Although sustainable development is increasingly becoming a part of business plans, it is unclear what makes the economic, social and environmental dynamics strategically compatible. This research examines which of the following in sustainable development – government policy, managerial attitude and stakeholder engagement – is the most influential on the profitability of companies in the UK construction sector. Quantitative and qualitative analyses were rendered through a survey and semi‐structured interviews. Patterns of ambiguity in legislation were discovered as an obstacle for changing the sector's mind‐set. Stakeholder engagement was identified as the defining factor increasing managers' awareness, helping legislation to be effectively implemented and making sustainability highly appealing to clients. These findings indicate that to gain competitive advantage, companies should embark on long‐term strategic alliances which adopt the proposals of environmental non‐governmental organisations and closely follow public opinion. This, strengthens brand equity, allows for premium pricing, increases market share and maximizes profit. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.     

Are long‐term incentive plans an effective and efficient way of motivating senior executives?

Research on senior executive reward has typically explored the connection between pay, performance and the alignment of interests of executives and shareholders. This article examines the relationship between reward and motivation, drawing on the psychological, behavioural economics and decision‐making literatures. Based on an empirical study of FTSE 350 senior executives, the research examines whether long‐term incentive plans are an effective and efficient way of motivating executives, taking into account risk, time discounting, uncertainty and fairness. The article concludes that the way executives frame choices, perceive value, assess probability, evaluate temporal effects and respond to uncertainty means that long‐term incentive plans (LTIPs) are generally not efficient and are often not effective in meeting their objectives. It proposes that, in its current form, agency theory does not provide a sound basis for modelling senior executive reward, and suggests five areas for development.     

An empirical test of a correspondence model of expatriate managers' work adjustment

We develop and empirically test a model of expatriate managers' work adjustment. In this model we relate the fit between work-related abilities and needs of expatriate managers as well as the fit between the job requirements of, and incentives associated with, an international assignment to the level of expatriate managers' work adjustment. We test this model with data gathered by means of an electronic survey among 118 German expatriate managers. The empirical findings largely support our theoretical model. The paper enhances our understanding of expatriate managers' work adjustment and its antecedents and contributes to the theoretical and empirical basis of research into expatriate management.     

$$\mathcal{D}$$-optimal Minimum Support Mixture Designs in Blocks

An easy method to construct efficient blocked mixture experiments in the presence of fixed and/or random blocks is presented. The method can be used when qualitative variables are involved in a mixture experiment as well. The resulting designs are -optimal in the class of minimum support designs. It is illustrated that the minimum support designs are more efficient than orthogonally blocked mixture experiments presented in the literature and only slightly less efficient than -optimal designs.