全文获取类型
收费全文 | 2534篇 |
免费 | 170篇 |
专业分类
财政金融 | 307篇 |
工业经济 | 81篇 |
计划管理 | 583篇 |
经济学 | 788篇 |
综合类 | 28篇 |
运输经济 | 68篇 |
旅游经济 | 73篇 |
贸易经济 | 570篇 |
农业经济 | 78篇 |
经济概况 | 127篇 |
邮电经济 | 1篇 |
出版年
2024年 | 5篇 |
2023年 | 42篇 |
2022年 | 43篇 |
2021年 | 53篇 |
2020年 | 93篇 |
2019年 | 127篇 |
2018年 | 212篇 |
2017年 | 244篇 |
2016年 | 188篇 |
2015年 | 94篇 |
2014年 | 144篇 |
2013年 | 491篇 |
2012年 | 128篇 |
2011年 | 85篇 |
2010年 | 110篇 |
2009年 | 98篇 |
2008年 | 80篇 |
2007年 | 49篇 |
2006年 | 48篇 |
2005年 | 56篇 |
2004年 | 34篇 |
2003年 | 38篇 |
2002年 | 30篇 |
2001年 | 31篇 |
2000年 | 20篇 |
1999年 | 15篇 |
1998年 | 19篇 |
1997年 | 16篇 |
1996年 | 10篇 |
1995年 | 13篇 |
1994年 | 8篇 |
1993年 | 6篇 |
1992年 | 4篇 |
1991年 | 6篇 |
1989年 | 5篇 |
1988年 | 2篇 |
1987年 | 2篇 |
1985年 | 4篇 |
1984年 | 4篇 |
1983年 | 4篇 |
1982年 | 3篇 |
1980年 | 4篇 |
1978年 | 3篇 |
1977年 | 2篇 |
1976年 | 3篇 |
1974年 | 2篇 |
1973年 | 2篇 |
1969年 | 2篇 |
1968年 | 2篇 |
1961年 | 2篇 |
排序方式: 共有2704条查询结果,搜索用时 0 毫秒
21.
Rolando F. Peláez 《Journal of Economics and Finance》2005,29(1):127-137
This paper presents a logit model for dating business-cycle turning points. The regressors are monthly series from the Business
Cycle Indicators database of the Conference Board. Dividing the sample period into a subset for model initialization (1959∶9–1970∶12)
and a subset for testing (1971∶1–2003∶12) yields a chronology that is nearly identical to that established by the National
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). However, the recognition lag is less than four months, in contrast to an average of more
than eleven months for the official chronology. (JEL E320)
The author is grateful for comments by an anonymous referee. 相似文献
22.
Diánez-González Juan Pablo Camelo-Ordaz Carmen Fernández-Alles Mariluz 《The International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal》2021,17(2):1007-1035
International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal - This paper has been designed with a dual goal. On the one hand, the paper aims to examine the role of management teams, industry agents, and... 相似文献
23.
The literature on mergers has extensively analyzed the decision to merge by private firms, but it has not considered the decision to merge by private and public firms. We assume that when a private firm and a public firm merge (or when one of them acquires the other), they set up a multiproduct firm in which the government owns an exogenous percentage stake. In this framework, we show that the decision to merge by firms depends on the degree to which goods are substitutes and on the percentage of the shares owned by the government in the multiproduct firm. 相似文献
24.
María Xosé Vázquez Rodríguez Carmelo J. León 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2004,28(2):233-249
Altruism is a type of non-use value which can have different definitions depending on the type of goods entering the utility function of the altruists and their expectations about the contributions of others. The purpose of this paper is to measure the trade-offs between different types of altruist values originating from social and environmental policies. Environmental policies are concerned with reducing health effects from a power plant while social policies involve both the attainment of public facilities for education and leisure and an increase in the income of the affected population. The empirical application utilizes a choice experiment technique which allows for valuation of multiple goods. Health effects are decomposed into the values of the risk of becoming ill, the duration of the episodes and the limitations imposed by illness. Altruist values are elicited from a population that is not affected by pollution. Results show that altruism is significant for policies directed to reducing health effects and improving the income level of the affected population, whereas there is egoism for a policy aimed at improving public facilities in the polluted suburb. The value of altruism is significantly influenced by the expectations of net benefits to be received by the affected population. 相似文献
25.
John?K.?StranlundEmail author Christopher?Costello Carlos?A.?Chávez 《Journal of Regulatory Economics》2005,28(2):181-204
We propose enforcement strategies for emissions trading programs with bankable emissions permits that guarantee complete compliance with minimal enforcement costs. Our strategies emphasize imperfect monitoring supported by a high unit penalty for reporting violations, and tying this penalty directly to equilibrium permit prices. This approach is quite different from several existing enforcement strategies that emphasize high unit penalties for emissions in excess of permit holdings. Our analysis suggests that a high penalty for excess emissions cannot be used to conserve monitoring effort, and that it may actually increase the amount of monitoring necessary to maintain compliance.The authors are grateful to Anthony Heyes and three anonymous referees for their valuable comments. Partial support for this research was provided by the Cooperative State Research Extension, Education Service, U. S. Department of Agriculture, Massachusetts Agricultural Experiment Station under Project No. MAS00871. 相似文献
26.
Maroš Servátka 《Experimental Economics》2007,10(2):199-200
The three dissertation essays investigate different aspects of reputation in games where fairness is an important consideration.
The first essay studies the effects of reputation on indirect reciprocity in different dictator games. The first experiment
places dictators in two environments where they can either give money to the paired player or take money away from them: in
one treatment the paired player is a stranger and in the other treatment the dictator has information on the paired player’s
reputation. Contrary to anecdotal evidence, the statistical tests show that the dictators’ behavior towards a stranger is
not statistically significantly different from their behavior towards an individual with an established reputation. The findings
arise because a high proportion of dictators acted purely in their own self interest in both treatments. The data also provides
evidence that dictators are more generous when they know that their choices (but not their identities) will be revealed in
the future. In the second experiment the dictators’ choices were restricted to only generous actions. In such environment
the dictators sent more money on average to recipients with a reputation for being generous than to recipients without a reputation.
The second essay explores the ways in which information about others’ actions affects one’s own behavior in a dictator game.
The experimental design discriminates behaviorally between three possible effects of recipient’s within-game reputation on
the dictator’s decision: reputation causing indirect reciprocity, social influence, and identification. The separation of
motives helps to identify the mechanisms of social transmission of impulses towards selfish or generous behavior. The data
analysis reveals that the reputation effects have a stronger impact on dictators’ actions than social influence and identification.
In the third essay1 we examine the reputation effects in a labor market setting by analyzing the influence of negative technological shocks on
long run relationships between firms and workers. The positive correlation between wage and effort in static conditions has
been demonstrated in many experimental studies and has been one of the prominent explanations for the existence of wage rigidity.
We subject these findings to further tests in a non-stationary environment that better corresponds to outside-the-lab market
conditions. We observe the positive correlation of wages and effort but do not find support for downward wage rigidity in
our data. Once the shocks occur, firms lower the wages and relationships often break down. The workers who accept a lower
wage respond with exerting a lower effort.
JEL Classification C70, C91, D63, D64
1Co-authored with Ninghua Du.
Dissertation Committee:
Dissertation Advisor: James C. Cox
Martin Dufwenberg,
Price V. Fishback,
Ronald L. Oaxaca 相似文献
27.
János Gács 《Empirica》1994,21(1):83-104
The direct effect of market losses in CMEA on Hungarian output was 4%, out of the 18% decline registered in gross output in 1988–1992. Total (direct and indirect) effects amounted to 8%. In the same period Hungary's export expansion in western markets led to direct and total effects equivalent to 2.9% and 5.6% of the 1988 output, respectively. The share of reorientation within this switch from east to west was not negligible, it amounted to 19% of respective trade volumes. The 1991 price explosion of imported inputs inhibited the activity of Hungarian firms only moderately, due to earlier realistic domestic prices. In 1991 Hungary suffered a 26% terms of trade loss, and could have experienced an income terms of trade loss of USD 1400 to 1600 million, had the trade volume of 1990 been repeated. Since adjustments in 1991, much smaller income losses accrued. Due to earlier special tax arrangements, much of the burden of terms of trade losses had to be born by the budget. 相似文献
28.
Summary. Given a production economy, we define union games by considering strategic behavior of the suppliers of factors. We refer to the Nash equilibria of this game as union equilibria. We analyze situations where the unemployment of factors is supported as a union equilibrium. The degree of unemployment depends on technological conditions. This allows us to model a source of unemployment which differs from the usual sources provided in the literature. We state a limit result that demonstrates that, as the market power of unions decreases, the corresponding sequence of union equilibria converges to the Walrasian equilibrium, that is, to full employment of factors. We also provide some examples that illustrate the main results.Received: 21 October 2004, Revised: 14 December 2004, JEL Classification Numbers:
D51, C72.
Correspondence to: Emma Moreno-GarcíaE. Moreno acknowledges financial support from the Research Grant BEC2000-1388-C04-01 (Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología and FEDER). G. Fernández de Córdoba and E. Moreno acknowledge financial support from the Research Grant SA091/02 from Junta de Castilla y León. We are indebted to C. Alós-Ferrer, C. Pita, D. Anisi, J. A. Ortega, F. Jimeno, J. P. Torres-Martínez, M. Steinert and C. Hervés for helpful comments and insights. We are particularly grateful to T. Kehoe and an anonymous referee for suggestions that improved this paper. 相似文献
29.
Differences in exchange rate pass-through in the euro area 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
This paper focuses on the pass-through of exchange rate changes into the prices of imports made by euro area countries originating outside the area. Using data on import unit values for 13 different product categories for each country, we estimate industry-specific rates of pass-through across and within countries for all euro members. In the short-run, pass-through rates differ across industries and countries and are less than one. In the long-run neither full pass-through nor equality of pass-through rates across industries and countries can be rejected. Differences exist across euro area countries in the degree that a common exchange rate movement gets transmitted into consumer prices and costs of production indices. Most of these differences in transmission rates are due to the distinct degree of openness of each country to non-euro area imports rather than to the heterogeneity in the structure of imports. 相似文献
30.