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21.
Olivier Boiral Jean‐François Henri David Talbot 《Business Strategy and the Environment》2012,21(8):495-516
The aim of this paper is to propose an integrative framework for understanding the determinants of business strategies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and the impact of these determinants on performance. The proposed structural equation model is based on a survey of 319 Canadian manufacturing firms. The study calls into question the traditionally positive relationship between a firm's environmental commitment and its economic motivations. However, the results also show a win–win relationship between the commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and financial performance. This study contributes to the understanding of the motivations underlying the efforts manufacturers make to tackle climate change and their economic benefits. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment. 相似文献
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Macroeconomic Consequences of Outsourcing: An Analysis of Growth, Welfare, and Product Variety 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Henri L.F. De Groot 《De Economist》2001,149(1):33-51
Outsourcing of non-core activities is nowadays a common business strategy. Declining transaction and transportation costs caused by the advent of Information and Communication Technology are a potentially important driving force behind this development. This paper provides a theoretical framework for analysing a firm's incentive to follow such a strategy of outsourcing and its consequences for macroeconomic variables like growth and product variety. We divide production activities into core and non-core activities. Non-core activities can be performed within the firm or can be mediated by the market. We derive conditions under which outsourcing occurs, and under which outsourcing is socially desirable. These conditions do not necessarily coincide. Outsourcing may hence be a profitable strategy for firms, while it is socially suboptimal. Crucial parameters in the model are the relative scale of core versus non-core activities, management costs, transaction costs and love for variety of consumers. 相似文献
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Questionnaire data were obtained from 128 managers representing all levels and functions of a large manufacturer. Variables describing the superior/subordinate relationship were related to respondent's perceptions of the values of management by objectives using correlational methods. These relationships were then moderated using personality and situational characteristics of the respondents.
The involvement of the boss is generally related to positive orientations 相似文献
The involvement of the boss is generally related to positive orientations 相似文献
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Working's (1943) model is shown to imply conditional Engel curves of the Working form when the income elasticity of demand for the group of goods as a whole is about unity. 相似文献
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Silvia Dominguez-Martinez Otto H. Swank Bauke Visser 《Journal of Economics & Management Strategy》2008,17(3):667-682
It is often assumed that bad corporate performance means a bad CEO. The task of a board of directors is then simple: dismiss the executive. If it fails to do so, the board is said to be indolent. We take a kinder approach to observed board behavior and point to the problems even well-intended boards would encounter. They face the twin task of disciplining and screening executives. We analyze the nature of the retention contract a board uses to discipline and screen executives. Consistent with empirical observation, we find that executives may become overly active to show their credentials, and that the link between bad performance and dismissal is weak. 相似文献