Tests of ex ante versus ex post theories of collateral using private and public information

Collateral is a widely used, but not well understood, debt contracting feature. Two broad strands of theoretical literature explain collateral as arising from the existence of either ex ante private information or ex post incentive problems between borrowers and lenders. However, the extant empirical literature has been unable to isolate each of these effects. This paper attempts to do so using a credit registry that is unique in that it allows the researcher to have access to some private information about borrower risk that is unobserved by the lender. The data also include public information about borrower risk, loan contract terms, and ex post performance for both secured and unsecured loans. The results suggest that the ex post theories of collateral are empirically dominant, although the ex ante theories are also valid for customers with short borrower–lender relations that are relatively unknown to the lender.     

Flipped v’s traditional teaching perspectives in a first year accounting unit: an action research study

With the need to move accounting students towards deeper learning approaches and understandings, this first cycle of an action research study sought to determine the student’s perspective of the flipped learning approach. With this learning approach gaining momentum in recent times, this study focuses on a first-year introductory accounting class in an undergraduate business degree. In making changes to the learning environment, we survey students and find that there are significant differences between the flexible student, that is, students that are already exposed in a limited way to this approach, and the face-to-face student. Results indicate further action research is required if the flipped learning approach is to be considered a serious teaching and learning contender for the first-year student.     

Residential Asking Rents and Time on the Market

Landlords offering a house in the rental market face a difficult strategic pricing decision. The revenue maximizing decision for the landlord involves a tradeoff between the rental rate and time on the market. Because the turnover of renters is higher than owners, and because the landlord must bear some carrying costs on a vacant house, pricing the rent too high may decrease revenue due to a higher vacancy period and pricing it too low may reduce the revenue when occupied. While there is substantial research on the relationship between listed prices and time on the market for freehold interests, this is the first study to provide empirical evidence on the relationship between asking rent, contract rent and time on the market for single family residential rental (leasehold) property interests. We present two models; a rental price model and a duration model for time-on-the market. Using data from the Dallas–Fort Worth area we find that landlords who set a lower asking rent relative to predicted rent can expect a shorter marketing period for their properties. The results also indicate that overpricing the asking rent and then lowering it at a later date leads to a longer marketing time (after the reset) and often a lower rent. These finding are reasonably robust for low-, mid-, and higher-valued rental properties.

Should more local governments purchase a bond rating?

We investigate whether issuers that choose to forgo a bond rating suffer an interest cost penalty greater than the cost of the rating. We use estimated ratings provided by Moody’s Investor Service to proxy for what the rating would have been if it had been purchased. We find that the primary factors associated with an issuer’s decision to purchase a rating are the rating expected by the issuer and the extent to which an issue is marketed locally. After controlling for self-selection bias, we find that the issuers that forgo a rating do not suffer an interest cost penalty.

The rise and decline of the Soviet economy

The reasons for the rapid growth of the Soviet Union before roughly 1970 and for its subsequent growth slowdown are analysed. The concentration of investment on heavy industry and soft budget constraints explain most of the growth in the 1930s. The growth slowdown was due to disastrous investment decisions following the elimination of surplus labour and the diversion of research and development resources to the military rather than the failure of firms to carry out plans or diminishing returns to capital.     

Corporate Equity Ownership, Strategic Alliances, and Product Market Relationships

This paper examines long-term block ownership by corporations and performance changes in firms with corporate block owners. We also examine potential reasons for corporate ownership including benefits in product market relationships, alleviation of financing constraints, and board monitoring by corporate owners. We find the largest significant increases in targets' stock prices, investment, and operating profitability when ownership is combined with alliances, joint ventures, and other product market relationships between purchasing and target firms, especially in industries with high research and development. Our findings are consistent with the conclusion that block ownership by corporations has significant benefits in product market relationships.     

The Effect of Board Independence on Target Shareholder Wealth

We seek insights into whether, and if so how, an independent board enhances the bid premiums offered to target firm shareholders during a takeover. The results indicate that the presence of an independent board enhances the initial bid premium by, on average, 21.1%. However, the results of more refined analysis suggest that the enhanced bid premium is in fact driven by independent boards comprising non-executive directors who have reputation capital at stake. We also find that independent boards that resist takeovers or include voluntary independent expert reports in target statements, increase the bid premium revision by, on average, 15.6% and 16.2%, respectively.     

University Commercialization Strategies in the Development of Regional Bioclusters*

To analyze university contribution to economic development, the present study examines universities' technology transfer policies and their associated economic development impact. The article examines how a university defines itself as part of a region as well as what activities, if any, do university commercialization strategies in context of their regional environment affect spin‐off activity. Furthermore, this study explores the ways universities contribute to regional economic development by examining existing theories and analyzing universities' relationships with both government and industry in two regions. This study draws from Roberts and Malone's (1996) selectivity–support typology and highlights this article's argument by comparing the commercialization strategies of world‐class universities strategies in the development of regional biotechnology clusters in Massachusetts and in Connecticut. This article investigates the notion of whether universities can differently influence the economic development processes of the while still having successful commercial outcomes. These findings build on previous research ( Clarysse et al., 2005; Degroof and Roberts, 2004; Powers and McDougall, 2005 ), which argues that low support–low selectivity policies may be more suitable to entrepreneurially developed environments, whereas high support–high selectivity policies are more efficient in entrepreneurially underdeveloped environments. Masachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) is located in a strong technopole region, whereby many of its support structures for spin‐off formation are provided by the regional infrastructure of the Cambridge–Boston region. In contrast, Yale University, which has an underdeveloped entrepreneurial context, has had to take a more proactive role in providing incubation capabilities to their spin‐off projects. This finding supports a contingent based perspective of academic entrepreneurship, whereby low support–low selectivity policies are more fitted to entrepreneurially developed environments, whereas high support–high selectivity policies are more efficient in entrepreneurially underdeveloped environments.