The risky business of hiring stars

With the battle for the best and brightest people heating up again, you're most likely out there looking for first-rate talent in the ranks of your competitors. Chances are, you're sold on the idea of recruiting from outside your organization, since developing people within the firm takes time and money. But the authors, who have tracked the careers of high-flying CEOs, researchers, software developers, and leading professionals, argue that top performers quickly fade after leaving one company for another. To study this phenomenon in greater detail, the authors analyzed the ups and downs of more than 1,000 star stock analysts, a well-defined group for which there are abundant data. The results were striking. After a star moves, not only does her performance plunge, but so does the effectiveness of the group she joins--and the market value of her new company. Moreover, transplanted stars don't stay with their new organizations for long, despite the astronomical salaries firms pay to lure them from rivals. Most companies that hire stars overlook the fact that an executive's performance is not entirely transferable because his personal competencies inevitably include company-specific skills. When the star leaves the old company for the new, he cannot take with him many of the resources that contributed to his achievements. As a result, he is unable to repeat his performance in another company--at least not until he learns to work the new system, which could take years. The authors conclude that companies cannot gain a competitive advantage or successfully grow by hiring stars from outside. Instead, they should focus on cultivating talent from within and do everything possible to retain the stars they create. Firms shouldn't fight the star wars, because winning could be the worst thing that happens to them.     

Consumers' perceptions and awareness of safe food preparation practices at homes in Trinidad,West Indies

The objectives were to evaluate consumer perception and awareness of safe food preparation practices at homes. A questionnaire was self‐administered to 124 consumers who were primarily responsible for preparation of foods and owned a refrigerator at home. Data were analysed by frequencies and chi‐square. Most (97.6%) consumers considered safe food practices as ‘very important’. Few (8.9%) related Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point to safe food preparation practices. Microbiological hazard was ranked as a most serious threat to food safety (80.5%). Salmonella was most well known (79.8%). Diarrhoea (23.7%) was a common symptom of food‐borne illness. More than 50% would ‘always’ check for expiry dates on labels, seals and would never purchase swollen cans. Only 48.4% consumers used separate cutting boards for meats and vegetables ‘always’. Some (6.5%) felt it was appropriate to give unfit food to someone else. The study identified critical points in safe food preparation practices for effective public health education.     

Internal Marketing at Continental Airlines: Convincing Employees that Management Knows Best

Maintaining a high level of customer service quality is necessary for success, particularly for firms in service industries, but employees need to be motivated to provide it. Management can provide the motivation through the use of compensation schemes and internal marketing. In this paper we examine profit sharing compensation schemes that reward employees for achieving customer service objectives. We discuss how such schemes should be implemented, and explain why management needs to convince employees through internal marketing programs about the benefits of its scheme. We obtain the optimal amount of profit that the firm should share with employees, and the optimal effort it should spend on internal marketing. Finally, we relate the analysis to a successful scheme implemented by Continental Airlines.     

Government Public Policy, Regulatory Intervention, and Their Impact on IPO Underpricing: The Case of Malaysian IPOs

This study examines the impact of government initial public offering (IPO) regulation intending on promoting public policy. The study examines the results of the implementation of a Malaysian government policy in 1976, which mandated that at least 30 percent of any new shares on an IPO offer be sold to the indigenous Bumiputera population or to mutual funds owned by them. The study examined the short-run and long-run underpricing of Malaysian IPOs and found that Malaysian IPOs are highly underpriced compared to IPOs in developing countries, creating a market microstructure effect. It also confirmed that the Malaysian government's regulatory intervention in spite of noble public policy intentions appeared to be the significant factor for the emergence of an average first-day underpricing increase of Malaysian IPOs by 61 percent during the period after the regulatory economic policy was instituted. Furthermore, the study found that this high underpricing persists even for the long run, in contrast to the long-run performance of IPOs in the United States.     

How many pirates should a software firm tolerate?: An analysis of piracy protection on the diffusion of software

This paper examines the relationship between the rate of software diffusion and piracy. Literature suggests that tolerating some piracy can be justified since it speeds up software diffusion. The question is, how much should be tolerated? Using innovation diffusion models of software adoption by legal buyers and pirates, answers to this question are obtained for the three scenarios of monopoly, multiple generations of software and competitive markets. Results include, for example, that a monopoly should start with minimum protection of its software but well before the product has diffused half way, impose maximum protection and maintain it thereafter. The results provide important strategic guidelines for firms in the software industry for managing piracy.     

CEO tenure and the performance-turnover relation

In a broad cross-section of US firms, we document that the likelihood of a CEO’s performance-related dismissal declines in his tenure. This finding is consistent with both firm performance revealing information about a CEO’s uncertain executive ability and CEO tenure reflecting weak firm governance choices that reduce the likelihood of performance-related dismissal. In a sample of CEOs who begin their appointment during our sample period, we find evidence more broadly in favor of the former explanation. Specifically, we find that (1) CEO survival is associated with superior firm performance, (2) this relation is unaffected by firm governance choices, (3) the intensity with which a firm monitors its CEO declines over his tenure, and (4) firms’ monitoring intensity increases following CEO turnover. Collectively, our results suggest that periodic performance reports increasingly resolve uncertainty regarding executive ability, thereby lowering firm owners’ demand for monitoring their CEO over his tenure.     

The value of 1800 MHz and 2100 MHz spectrums in India and implications for auction design

The sequence of events leading up to the upcoming auction of 1800 MHz spectrum in India has led to the auctions acquiring an extraordinary significance for the future of the Indian mobile industry. A key feature of the auction design proposed by the regulator TRAI is the benchmarking of the reserve price of 1800 MHz to the price of 2100 – 3G spectrum revealed in the 2010 auction. In the context of the low number of LTE devices available and the fragmentation in the 1800 MHz band, this paper proposes reducing the duration of spectrum holding to ten years (from the current level of twenty years), and calibrating the reserve price of 1800 MHz with its value with GSM deployment. An economic model is used to compute the value of startup and incremental 1800 MHz spectrum. The estimated values are shown to differ from the value of 2100 MHz spectrum at a pan-India level and also in their distribution across circles. A new set of reserve prices are computed based on the estimation. The estimated values are also shown to be close to the AGR-adjusted price revealed in the 2001 auction. A reserve price based on the 2001 auction is also provided. Concomitant features of the auction are suggested to give coherence to the auction design.     

DO INSTITUTIONS PREFER HIGH‐VALUE ACQUIRERS? AN ANALYSIS OF TRADING IN STOCK‐FINANCED ACQUISITIONS

If owners of target shares in a stock‐for‐stock merger perceive the acquirer as overvalued, they should sell their holdings more aggressively to profit before such overvaluation dissipates. We study institutional owners of targets and find that slightly more than half liquidate their shares in stock mergers, consistent with high institutional‐share turnover rates found in the prior literature. However, share retention is higher when valuation measures suggest greater acquirer overvaluation, regardless of whether institutional owners generally prefer growth or value stock. Institutions that prefer large‐cap, growth stock are most enthusiastic about bids from large, high‐valuation acquirers, and substantially increase their stakes in such deals.