Client discretion, switching costs, and financial innovation

We analyze the incentives of investment banks to develop innovativeproducts. We show that client characteristics and market structureaffect these incentives significantly. Investment banks withlarger market shares have greater incentives to innovate andsmaller banks are likely to share their innovations with thelargest bank. Innovation incentives increase in volatile environmentsand regulatory scrutiny actually encourages loophole exploitationactivity. Our predictions are consistent with stylized factsand the analysis has broad testable implications for innovativeactivity in other markets similarly characterized by a lackof comprehensive protection for intellectual property rights,for example, the software industry.     

Randomized Stopping Times and American Option Pricing with Transaction Costs

In a general discrete-time market model with proportional transaction costs, we derive new expectation representations of the range of arbitrage-free prices of an arbitrary American option. The upper bound of this range is called the upper hedging price, and is the smallest initial wealth needed to construct a self-financing portfolio whose value dominates the option payoff at all times. A surprising feature of our upper hedging price representation is that it requires the use of randomized stopping times (Baxter and Chacon 1977), just as ordinary stopping times are needed in the absence of transaction costs. We also represent the upper hedging price as the optimum value of a variety of optimization problems. Additionally, we show a two-player game where at Nash equilibrium the value to both players is the upper hedging price, and one of the players must in general choose a mixture of stopping times. We derive similar representations for the lower hedging price as well. Our results make use of strong duality in linear programming.     

Patterns of ‘Mock Bureaucracy’ in Mining Disasters: An Analysis of the Westray Coal Mine Explosion

Recent studies on the antecedents of industrial crises have tended to focus on disasters in high-risk systems involving complex technologies and tightly-knit processes. This paper examines events leading up to mining disasters which past research has characterized as being typically more foreseeable and avoidable. We discuss how many mining disasters are likely to be the result of ‘mock bureaucracies’ or situations characterized by overt violation of safety rules at the workplace. Using the Westray mine explosion as an illustrative case, the paper traces the development and institutionalization of a mock bureaucracy in an organization. Implications for further research and understanding of industrial crises are drawn.     

The relative importance of old and new decision specific experience in foreign ownership strategies: an exploratory study

In this paper, we examine the relative importance of old and recent decision specific experience for MNC's foreign ownership structure decision. Using established procedures to measure decision specific experience construct, we find, from data for Japanese MNCs for the period 1969–1991, empirical evidence that firms tend to rely on both old and recent decision specific experiences for their current ownership structure decision, but that they rely more on recent decision specific experience than on old decision specific experience, contrary to the conventional organizational learning view on the temporal importance of decision specific experience. Sub-sample analysis involving developed and developing countries indicates that both old and new decision specific experience are important for both groups of countries, but old (new) decision specific experience is marginally more important for investments made in developing (developed) countries.     

The Diffusion of a Medical Innovation: Is Success in the Stars?

This paper relates the diffusion of the coronary stent to the presence of prominent or “star” physicians within a local peer group. The paper uses panel data on coronary care in Florida covering the period immediately following the 1995 Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval of the stent, a significant improvement in coronary angioplasty. Adoption timing and utilization varied considerably across doctors between 1995 and 2001. We consider the role of asymmetric social influence among physicians based on professional status. Defining “star” status as having completed residency at a top-ranked hospital, we find that the diffusion of stents by non-stars depends positively on the number of stars practicing contemporaneously at the same hospitals, while we find no social influence in the opposite direction. The findings indicate that lack of local exposure to star physicians may slow adoption, and clustering of stars in a small number of hospitals may entail welfare costs.     

Corporate Social Responsibility: Why Business Should Act Responsibly and Be Accountable

This paper identifies drivers which are pressurising organisations to adopt corporate social responsibility and produce corporate social reports. The authors discuss what constitutes a good report, some of the problems with current reporting practices, benefits to organisations which produce corporate social reports and the costs to those which do not.     

Stable risk-sharing

We analyze the evolution of contract participation and evaluate the selection of risk-sharing contracts in the presence of moral hazard. Organizations specify rules for sharing output among producers, and so affect the extent of private investment in production. Organizations are rigid, as some details of the contract are fixed, but people are free to move around. In the presence of rigidity, equilibrium displays coordination failure because potentially efficient contracts can fail to attract participants. Methods of evolutionary stability are used to select equilibria when organizations compete for members. We identify stable contracts which survive competition against any other. Stable contracts need not be efficient, but for large groups the loss becomes small.