Mediating Internal Competition for Resources*

We consider a model of internal competition, where projects developed by agents with different preferences compete for resources in an organization. Allowing a manager—who has moderate preferences—to control the allocation of resources has benefits when preferences are not too diverse. In particular, the manager acts as a mediator, forcing agents to compromise when competing projects succeed, thus providing better insurance to agents and increasing their effort. Our framework provides a theoretical foundation for two influential views of a manager—as the “visible hand” that allocates resources, and as a “power broker” who resolves conflict in an organization.     

New Zealand finance companies and risk premiums

This article uses the recent implosion of the finance company sector in New Zealand to examine a number of questions. In the period between the upsurge in the default rate in 2006 and the implementation of a Government Guarantee Scheme in October 2008, we find that the debt risk premiums within the deposit rates of these institutions were grossly inadequate to compensate for default risk, that depositors continued to make significant new deposits even into firms that failed shortly afterwards and that the failure of the companies to increase the risk premiums was likely out of concern that this would aggravate perceptions of default risk.     

Nonprofit boards: Size,performance and managerial incentives

We examine relations between board size, managerial incentives and enterprise performance in nonprofit organizations. We posit that a nonprofit's demand for directors increases in the number of programs it pursues, resulting in a positive association between program diversity and board size. Consequently, we predict that board size is inversely related to managerial pay-performance incentives and positively with overall organization performance. We find empirical evidence consistent with our hypotheses. The number of programs is positively related to board size. Board size is associated negatively with managerial incentives, positively with program spending and fundraising performance, and negatively with commercial revenue, in levels and changes.     

Allocation to Anchor Investors,Underpricing, and the After‐Market Performance of IPOs

We study bidding by anchor investors in a two‐stage initial public offering (IPO) process and document a negative, causal relation between allocation to anchor investors and underpricing. We find that anchor investors are likely to invest in hard‐to‐place offerings characterized by valuation uncertainty. We also document a positive relation between allocation to reputed anchor investors and returns up to lock‐up expiration. Our evidence provides support for information revelation and targeting specific investors’ theories of book building. Anchor‐backed IPOs earn superior returns mainly due to monitoring. Who bids in an IPO seems to matter just as particular types of bids do.     

Cross‐Country Variability in Cost of Raising Equity: Evidence from Seasoned Equity Offerings

We examine how county‐level governance affects the cost of raising equity. Using data on seasoned equity offerings, we find that the underwriting spread is determined by the litigation risk of issue certifiers, and offer underpricing is largely determined by the investment risk of the equity issue. Underwriting spread increases with enhanced legal enforcement, offsetting the reduction in underpricing associated with strong legal enforcement. Our study offers insight into the effect of legal enforcement and regulatory policy on the cost of raising equity.     

Binge watching: An exploration of the role of technology

Watching television shows in quick succession on the Netflix and Amazon Prime platforms is on the rise. Although widespread, this binge watching behavior has received limited attention from marketing academics. The current study conceptualizes binge watching needs and examines their effect on the gratifications obtained from binge watching. We apply the lens of uses and gratifications (U&G) theory for model development and test the model empirically, using data from two cities in India. We add a new category of needs, namely technology-related needs, to the existing psycho-sociological-related needs (named as content-related needs in this paper) present in plain-old-television studies (POTS). We find that a technology-related need—that is, modal experience (the presence of media content in various formats leading to superior experience)—significantly impacts gratification from binge watching. We also find a strong moderating effect of self-control, used in previous studies of binge-eating and binge-shopping, in which the effect of modal experience, navigability and parasocial interaction need gratification is heightened for consumers who have low levels of self-control. We build on these findings to suggest implications for marketers, advertisers, and consumer-advocacy groups.     

Within-syndicate conflicts,loan covenants,and syndicate formation

We study how conflicts within a lending syndicate affect loan contract and syndicate formation. We argue that loan provisions serve an important dual function: In addition to moderating borrower–lender conflicts, they reduce within-syndicate conflicts. We show that greater potential for within-syndicate conflicts is associated with more and stricter covenants. Loans are less restrictive when the interests of participants and the lead arrangers are better aligned, for example, when participant–banks have stronger relationships with the lead arranger or hold borrower's equity (indirectly). Overall, our results show that covenant choice, syndicate formation, and lead arranger's loan allocation all play an important role in reducing within-syndicate conflicts.     

How does religion discipline the consumer subject? Negotiating the paradoxical tension between consumer desire and the social order

ABSTRACT

In this article, we revisit Russell Belk, Guliz Ger and Soren Askegaard’s study on consumer desire. We do so in an effort to further advance the extant understanding of desire in consumer research. Specifically, informed by Lacanian psychoanalytic thought and sharing much affinity with Foucault’s central argument in The History of Sexuality, we consider how the institution of religion functions as a disciplining force by which to mediate the (potential) conflict between human desire and the social order. For the purposes of this article, we focus our analytical gaze on how consumption practices have the disciplinary effect of regulating desire. That is to say, we illuminate how religion (and religious ideology) dictates certain consumption practices, which ultimately perform to ensure that the pursuit of desire does not contravene the pre-existing social order that structures society and organises social relating. To animate our theoretical claims, we draw on a qualitative study of the Tablighi Jamaat, an Islamic sub-culture originating in South Asia. This article builds on extant sociological and anthropological studies that have captured the nexus between religion and the workings of the marketplace. However, unlike past studies, the question posited at the crux of this article concerns desire and, particularly, how desire becomes subjected to the discourses pertaining to religiously prescribed consumption practices.     

A darker side to decentralized banks: Market power and credit rationing in SME lending

We use loan-level data to study how the organizational structure of banks impacts small business lending. We find that decentralized banks—where branch managers have greater autonomy over lending decisions—give larger loans to small firms and those with “soft information.” However, decentralized banks are also more responsive to their own competitive environment. They are more likely to expand credit when faced with competition but also cherry pick customers and restrict credit when they have market power. This “darker side” to decentralized banks in concentrated markets highlights that the level of local banking competition is key to determining which organizational structure provides better lending terms for small businesses.     

Book Reviews

Review of World Economics -