Multiple Equilibria in the Citizen-Candidate Model of Representative Democracy

The Besley-Coate model of representative democracy has the problem of multiple equilibria (Besley-Coate 1997). We show that requiring the Besley-Coate political equilibria to be iteratively undominated at the voting stage refines the set of (pure strategy) political equilibrium outcomes only for those cases where at least four candidates stand for election . This note complements the results of De Sinopoli and Turrini (1999).     

Games of status and discriminatory contracts

Following recent empirical evidence which indicates the importance of rank for the determination of workers' wellbeing, this paper introduces status seeking preferences in the form of rank-dependent utility functions into a moral-hazard framework with one firm and multiple workers, but no correlation in production. We show that workers' concern for the rank of their wage in the firm's wage distribution induces the firm to offer discriminatory wage contracts when its aim is to induce all workers to expend effort.     

The market response to corporate scandals involving CEOs

This article examines corporate scandals of both a financial and nonfinancial nature between 1993 and 2011 which is expressly linked to a firm’s CEO. Findings suggest that in the short run, investors react adversely to such events and that recalcitrant CEOs end up costing their shareholders dearly. Such scandals are more likely to occur among large firms, firms with insiders on the board and where the value of options granted to a firm’s managers is substantial. However, firms with more cash flows are less likely to be mired in such scandals, and their stock returns are less likely to be affected. There is an increase in stock price volatility of affected firms in the days following the announcement of the scandal. A point of respite for investors is the damage being confined to the short run. The stock price performance of the firms affected by the scandals matches the performance of control firms in the long run post-announcement. However, the operating performance of the sample firms is better than their matched counterparts in the years after the scandal. We contribute to the extant literature by considering corporate scandal events that are the doings of a firm’s CEO and not necessarily financially motivated.     

Corruption,intrinsic motivation,and the love of praise

Do higher wages prevent corruption (bribe taking)? We investigate a setting where individuals who apply for public sector jobs are motivated not just by monetary incentives but also by intrinsic motivation and concern for the collective reputation of their profession. We show that an increase in monetary compensation may cause reputation‐concerned individuals to be more prone to participate in corruption due to an “overjustification” effect. The overall effect of monetary incentives on fighting corruption crucially depends on the composition of the pool of public sector workers for two reasons: first, different types of workers react differently to the same policy; second, the composition of the pool of workers affects individual behavior through its effect on collective reputation. These results imply in particular that policies to fight corruption should focus more on increasing the collective reputation of the public sector rather than using monetary incentives, which have perverse effects on some agents.     

Mutual fund skill and the performance of corporate acquirers

We show that the commonly observed correlation between institutional investor ownership and the success of mergers is partly driven by active stock picking. Several mutual fund stock selection skill measures strongly predict the post-merger performance of corporate acquirers even after controlling for possible shareholder monitoring. These findings are stronger for funds with characteristics more indicative of active stock picking. Moreover, firms held by funds with higher stock selection skills are more likely to subsequently become acquirers, suggesting that the mutual fund skill set includes the ability to identify acquirers with value-enhancing acquisition opportunities.     

Saving by buying ahead: stockpiling in response to lump-sum payments

By purchasing larger quantities of goods and saving them for future consumption households are able to reduce transaction costs and acquire goods at a lower price per unit, presuming they can manage the transportation and storage costs. This study uses variations in state income tax refunds over time to estimate consumption responses to lump-sum payments. Households purchase around 20 per cent more of easily stored toilet paper in the months in which tax refunds are issued, but do not increase purchases of perishables such as bread and eggs. In addition to purchasing more goods at a lower per-unit price, households also appear to increase the time until their next purchase, which implies that they are saving goods for consumption over time. These in-kind savings allow people to smooth their consumption over time, much like pecuniary savings. Government payments that provide lump-sum payments can benefit consumers by providing additional liquidity to buy and store goods at a lower cost.     

Asymmetric impacts of ICT and energy intensity on agricultural productivity: Evidence from Asia-Pacific region

In the contemporary times of rising food insecurity and malnutrition, the agricultural sector needs more attention. This study aims to investigate the asymmetric impacts of information and communication technologies (ICTs), energy intensity, urbanization, and inequality on agricultural productivity for 20 Asia-Pacific countries from 1990 to 2020. To investigate asymmetric impacts, the study employs the panel nonlinear autoregressive distributed lag (NARDL) model. The estimated results revealed that positive and negative shocks in ICT, energy intensity, and urbanization have asymmetric impacts on agricultural productivity in the long run, whereas symmetry is observed in short-run impacts. It is found that a 1% increase (decrease) in ICT and urbanization increases (decreases) agricultural productivity by 0.292% (0.662%) and 2.717% (2.759%), respectively, whereas a 1% increase (decrease) in energy intensity decreases (increases) agricultural productivity by 0.252% (0.216%) in the long run. Furthermore, the results of the Dumitrescu-Hurlin panel causality test point out the existence of bi-directional causality between agricultural productivity and the independent variables (ICT, energy intensity, urbanization, and inequality). Based on the findings, the study suggests that the Asia-Pacific countries should increase the application of ICT and use energy more efficiently in agriculture to boost agricultural productivity.