Corporate Cash Policy and How to Manage it with Stock Repurchases

At the end of 2004 total U.S. corporate cash holdings reached an all‐time high of just under $2 trillion—an amount equal to roughly 15% of the total U.S. GDP. And during the past 25 years, average cash holdings have jumped from 10% to 23% of total corporate assets. But at the same time their levels of cash have risen, U.S. companies have paid out dramatically increasing amounts of cash to buy back shares. This article addresses the following questions: What accounts for the dramatic increase in the average level of corporate cash holdings since 1980? And why do some companies keep so much cash (with one fourth of U.S. firms holding cash amounting to at least 36% of total assets) while others have so little (with another quarter having less than 3%)? Why do companies pay out excess cash in the form of stock repurchases (rather than, say, dividends), and what explains the significant increase in repurchases (both in absolute terms and relative to dividends) over time? The author begins by arguing that cash reserves provide companies with a buffer against possible shortfalls in operating profits—one that, especially during periods of financial trouble, can be used to avoid financial distress or provide funding for promising projects that might otherwise have to be put off. Such buffers are particularly valuable in the case of smaller, riskier companies with lots of growth opportunities and limited access to capital markets. And the dramatic increase in corporate cash holdings between 1980 and the present can be attributed mainly to an increase in the risk of publicly traded companies—an increase in risk that reflects in part a general increase in competition, but also a notable change over time in the kinds of companies (smaller, newer, less profitable, non‐dividend paying firms) that have chosen to go public. At the other end of the corporate spectrum are large, relatively mature companies with limited growth opportunities. Although such companies tend to produce considerable free cash flow, they also tend to retain relatively small amounts of cash (as a percentage of total assets), in part because of shareholder concern about the corporate “free cash flow problem”—the well‐documented tendency of such companies to destroy value through overpriced (often diversifying) acquisitions and other misguided attempts to pursue growth at the expense of profitability. For companies with highly predictable earnings and investment plans, dividends provide one means of addressing the free cash flow problem. But for companies with more variable earnings and less predictable reinvestment, open‐market stock repurchases provide a more flexible means of distributing cash to shareholders. Unlike the corporate “commitment” implied by dividend payments, an open market stock repurchase program creates what amounts to an option but not an obligation to distribute funds. The value of such flexibility, which increases during periods of increased risk and uncertainty, explains much of the apparent substitution of repurchases for dividends in recent years.     

More preventive care, and fewer emergency room visits and prescription drugs--health care utilization in a consumer-driven health plan

Although consumer-driven health plans (CDHPs) have grown dramatically, the question of whether CDHPs have reduced health care costs has not been answered definitively. This article presents what the authors believe to be the first study to analyze a large sample of claims data and to look in detail at different types of utilization among enrollees in a CDHP and those in a traditional comprehensive major medical (CMM) plan. After adjusting for the finding that CDHP enrollees are both younger and healthier than those in CMM plans, the authors found that CDHP enrollees show no consistent or significant utilization differences for measures over which consumers have little control (e.g., inpatient stays); lower utilization for measures over which consumers have greater control (e.g., emergency room visits); and higher utilization of preventive services.     

Executive option exercises and financial misreporting

Several recent papers document that the magnitude of potential gains from stock-based compensation is positively related to the likelihood of misreporting. In a sample of firms that announce restatements of their financial statements from 1997 to 2002, we examine whether managers realize these potential gains occurring from their accounting choices. After controlling for diversification needs and stock price impact, we find no significant evidence of higher option exercises by executives in the misreported years. However, for firms that are more likely to have made deliberate aggressive accounting choices, we find significant evidence of higher option exercises. For these firms, option exercises are higher by 20–60% in comparison to industry and size matched nonrestating firms. Options exercises by executives are also increasing in the magnitude of the restatement as captured by the effect of the restatement on net income. These higher option exercises tend to be more pervasive and are not just confined to the CEO and CFO of the firm.     

Expert opinion and probabilistic volcanic risk assessment

We present data from an international survey of scientists working at volcanic observatories concerning eruption likelihoods. The scientists were asked a range of questions using different types of phrasing. The data suggest that the phrasing of questions affects the ways in which probabilities are estimated. In total, 71% of respondents (N = 70) exhibited some form of inconsistency in their answers between and/or within different question formats. The data also allow for an analysis of the use of scaling in probabilistic assessment, and the use of quantitative versus verbal risk measurements. However, some respondents were uncomfortable with providing any numerical probability estimate, perhaps suggesting that they considered the uncertainty too high for meaningful judgements to be made.     

Corporate political strategies and firm performance: indications of firm‐specific benefits from personal service in the U.S. government

Firms employ a variety of political strategies (e.g., lobbying, contributions) in an attempt to gain influence or access to the public policy process. A variety of benefits may accrue to firms that are successful in creating a linkage with the government: information, access, influence, reduced uncertainty and transaction costs, etc. However, the direct benefits of such strategies are difficult to observe. One political strategy is studied here—personal service (having a firm representative serve in a political capacity). Event‐study methodology results show that such linkages with the government positively affect firm value. These findings indicate that firm‐specific benefits may result from political strategies. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Demystifying the Meese–Rogoff puzzle: structural breaks or measures of forecasting accuracy?

Structural breaks have been suggested by several economists as a possible explanation for the Meese–Rogoff puzzle, in the sense that an exchange rate model can outperform the random walk in terms of the out-of-sample forecasting error if the period under investigation is free of structural breaks. The results indicate that structural breaks cannot explain the inability of the flexible price monetary model to outperform the random walk. The only plausible explanation for the Meese–Rogoff puzzle is that forecasting accuracy is traditionally assessed by magnitude-only measures. When forecasting accuracy is assessed by alternative measures that do not rely exclusively on the magnitude of error, the monetary model can outperform the random walk regardless of the presence or otherwise of structural breaks.     

Fuzzy Bargaining Games: Conditions of Agreement,Satisfaction, and Equilibrium

Game theory in its several variants is widely recognized as a contribution to social and economic modeling. One relevant development of classical game theory, Generalized Game Theory (GGT), entails its extension and generalization through the formulation of the mathematical theory of rules and rule complexes. Social theory concepts such as norm, value, belief, role, social relationship, and institution as well as game can be defined in a uniform way in terms of rules and rule complexes. Among the applications, one major initiative has been the conceptualization of fuzzy games and equilibria. In this paper a GGT model of 2-person fuzzy bargaining games is outlined. Two key concepts are applied: (1) players’ value (or “utility”) structures consisting of ideal points or expectation levels, on the one hand, and limits of acceptance, on the other; (2) fuzzy judgment functions in which players deal with imprecise information and use approximate reasoning in making decisions and negotiating agreements. Such fuzzy judgment functions can take into account economic, socio-psychological, and cultural and institutional aspects of the bargaining context, which affect the bargaining process in specifiable ways. Several significant results are obtained from the application of this model: the opportunities (or not) for agreement, the participants’ satisfaction levels with an agreement, and the question whether or not the agreed “price” is an equilibrium price.     

Long‐Term Growth in Housing Prices and Stock Returns

A firm's long‐term stock returns are negatively related to past growth in housing prices in the state where the firm is located. The housing price effect is persistent and robust to controlling for the long‐term stock return reversal effect, changes in mortgage interest rates across the states, cyclicality in housing prices and overall local economic conditions. There is no evidence that extant asset pricing models can adequately explain the effect. The study discusses potential explanations for, and the implications of, the cross‐regional housing price effect.