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101.
Short sale constraints in the aftermarket of initial public offerings (IPOs) are often used to explain short-term underpricing that is subsequently reversed. This paper shows that short selling is integral to aftermarket trading and is higher in IPOs with greater underpricing. Perceived restrictions on borrowing shares are not systematically circumvented by “naked” short selling. Short sellers, on average, do not appear to earn abnormal profits in the near term and our findings are not driven by market makers. Short selling in IPOs is not as constrained as suggested by the literature, implying that other factors may be responsible for underpricing. 相似文献
102.
The Implicit Incentive Effects of Horizontal Monitoring and Team Member Dependence on Individual Performance
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Karen L. Sedatole Amy M. Swaney Alexander Woods 《Contemporary Accounting Research》2016,33(3):889-919
This study examines the implicit incentive effects of horizontal monitoring and team member dependence for individuals working in teams but facing explicit incentives based solely on measures of individual performance. We combine proprietary performance data with survey data for 133 internal auditors. We show that the social influences of relatively high levels of both horizontal monitoring and team member dependence provide implicit incentives that motivate individual performance, making the provision of team rewards unnecessary to ensure individual and team productivity. We conclude that horizontal monitoring and team member dependence are complementary control mechanisms whose effectiveness helps explain the observed practice of organizing work into teams without explicit team‐based rewards. 相似文献
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Divestitures and Divisional Investment Policies 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
We study a sample of diversified firms that alter their organizational structure by divesting a business segment. These firms experience a reduction in the diversification discount after the divestiture. We show that the efficiency of segment investment increases substantially following the divestiture and that this improvement is associated with a decrease in the diversification discount. Our results support the corporate focus and financing hypotheses for corporate divestitures. We demonstrate that inefficient investment is partly responsible for the diversification discount and show that asset sales lead to an improvement in the efficiency of investment for remaining divisions. 相似文献
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Why do corporate financing events occur in waves? We challenge recent evidence of the importance of valuation cycles in driving financing waves by documenting that the aggregate pattern of stock repurchases mirrors that of equity issuance and mergers, despite repurchases involving an opposite transaction. We then show that trends in financing decisions result from differing responses to the same economic stimulus: growth in GDP. Specifically, economic expansion reduces the cost of equity relative to the cost of debt, inducing firms to issue equity, and increases cash flow and also causes varying degrees of uncertainty, increasing stock repurchases. We document similar trends and provide similar motivation for merger waves. 相似文献
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Amy Jocelyn Glass 《Review of International Economics》2004,12(5):867-884
The paper examines possible reasons behind expanded outsourcing by modeling outsourcing decisions when intellectual property rights are imperfectly protected. Firms in the North develop higher quality levels of existing products and then decide whether to shift some stages of production to the South. Production in the South lowers costs but entails risk of imitation by Southern firms. In this setting, a lower risk of imitation or larger labor supplies can cause increased outsourcing, a higher rate of innovation, and a lower Northern relative wage. Damage due to lower incomes can be offset by gains in terms of better quality products. 相似文献
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Amy Jocelyn Glass 《The Canadian journal of economics》2001,34(2):549-569
This paper models quality improvements when multiple quality levels can sell, owing to differences in consumers' valuations of quality improvements. Firms can collude to price discriminate, so that consumers with high valuations pay a price premium, while others receive a quality level below the highest available. Imposing minimum quality standards or price ceilings can ensure that only the highest quality level of each product is sold. Such intervention reduces the quality‐adjusted price paid by consumers but also reduces the incentives for firms to innovate. When enough consumers have high valuations, such intervention must be welfare reducing, owing to reduced innovation. JEL Classification: O31, L16 Discrimination par les prix et amélioration de la qualité. Ce mémoire présente un modèle d'amélioration de la qualité quand on peut vendre des produits à divers niveaux de qualitéà cause des différences dans les évaluations d'amélioration de qualité par les consommateurs. Les entreprises peuvent entrer en collusion pour faire de la discrimination par les prix de manière à ce que les consommateurs qui apprécient davantage la qualité paient une prime pendant que les autres consommateurs reçoivent une qualité au‐dessous de ce qui est la meilleure qualité disponible. Si on impose des normes de qualité minimale ou des plafonds aux prix, on peut s'assurer que seuls les produits de la plus haute qualité seront vendus. De telles interventions réduisent le niveau de prix ajusté pour la qualité payé par les consommateurs, mais réduisent aussi les incitations des entreprises à innover. Quand un nombre suffisant de consommateurs apprécient beaucoup la qualité, de telles interventions peuvent réduire le niveau de bien‐être à cause des innovations moins importantes. 相似文献
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