When Do Analysts Adjust for Biases in Management Guidance? Effects of Guidance Track Record and Analysts’ Incentives

Prior research indicates that analysts do not fully adjust for the general downward bias in earnings guidance issued by management. We report the results of two experiments designed to investigate how guidance track record and analysts’ incentives jointly explain the extent to which analysts adjust for guidance bias. Our results suggest that analysts with accuracy incentives adjust for management’s track record of downwardly biased guidance when the bias is relatively small (one cent), but those with relationship incentives do not. Furthermore, the difference in adjustment is larger when the bias track record is inconsistent than when it is consistent. Also, when guidance bias is larger (two cents) relative to smaller (one cent), analysts with relationship incentives partially adjust, as they appear to strike a balance between accuracy and their desire to please management. These findings hold implications for investors, regulators, and the interpretation of prior research.     

Variety,Globalization, and Social Efficiency

The standard formal presentation of the Dixit‐Stiglitz‐Krugman (DSK) model of monopolistic competition with a constant‐elasticity‐of‐substitution (CES) utility function supposes a sufficient number of firms so that the elasticity of demand facing each variety is approximated by a constant elasticity of substitution. Such a formulation forces economies of scale to be frozen so that firm size never changes. We use a Bertrand‐Nash interpretation of the equilibrium that allows the elasticity of demand facing each variety to depend on the number of varieties, thus allowing the gains from globalization to reflect both the increase in variety and the exploitation of economies of scale. We also develop a precise expression for per capita real income with any number of sectors and examine the age‐old question of the socially optimal number of varieties.     

The cluster approach in the innovation development strategy of foreign countries

Foreign experience in carrying out cluster policy and the scales of distribution and the variety of cluster structure types abroad are considered and generalized. The main attention is given to innovation directivity as the key factor of increasing regional and national economic competitiveness. The important role of the state in formation of effective cluster policy providing substantial improvement in the business climate and stimulating the priority development of high-tech fields is placed in strong relief. The next issue of the journal will contain an article about the situation in Russia (Ed.).     

Socio-demographic risks of the long-term development of the Russian economy

Key risks and threats of the long-term development of the Russian economy, originating from the social sphere, are revealed and analyzed. The article focuses on human capital development and replenishment problems, as well as on the social effects of these problems on education, health conditions, labor migration, and pension provision.     

港口物流化发展的现实意义分析——以广州港南沙港区为例

南沙港区是广州港外移发展大型深水港区的战略举措,是广州城市和产业空间格局南拓的前沿和支撑点。本文深刻剖析南沙港区物流化经营的现实意义即迫切性和现有条件,以促进其更加健康、快速地发展。     

新《公司法》的新看点

2006年1月1日,新《公司法》正式实施.《公司法》作了许多修改以解决公司治理方面存在的突出问题,完善公司治理.一直为业界所诟病的内部人控制和关联交易等将会大大减少,中小股东和债权人的利益将会得到有效保护.在新〈公司法〉的指引下,中国公司治理显露出新的走向.     

AIDS and agricultural production. Report of a land utilization survey,Masaka and Rakai districts of Uganda

Increased AIDS mortality and other preexisting conditions have contributed to agricultural productivity declines in the districts of Masaka and Rakai in Uganda. These two districts were the most fertile in Uganda and also had the highest HIV seroprevalence rates in Africa. 66% of study households experienced land use decline to some extent over the past 5 years. The 11% decline in poultry production and 32% decline in cattle production was reportedly due to poor management and loss of grazing land from overpopulation and larger scale farms. The most frequently reported reasons for crop reductions were death and sickness; these was estimated as affecting 8% of families with children under 5 years in the study area. Morbidity and mortality as a reason for the decline was reported two times as much as poverty and decline in international coffee prices. Other reasons for loss of productivity were food shortages and insecurity, loss of income, and reduced ability to respond to educational and medical needs. Cassava is replacing the culturally preferred matooke banana as a crop that is more disease-, pest-, and drought resistant. The banana weevil has been a recent problem. Marginal farming systems have been the most affected by declines in land use and livestock production, but fertile areas have not been spared the impact from AIDS and adult mortality. Poverty has decreased the use of pesticides, herbicides, and fertilizers in the districts. Policy has had an impact on agricultural practices: population growth and inheritance have added to loss of individual land holdings and contributed to fallow periods and infertility. Appropriate land management practices have not been adequately promoted in the agricultural extension service. Civil wars and the drop in coffee prices have reduced the number of farm laborers. Common grazing land has been turned over to large commercial ranches. Government should maintain research and monitoring of declines in food and cash crop production and manpower needs. Policy must be designed to respond to the complicated factors affecting productivity. High AIDS prevalence areas and marginal areas where reduced production effects would be the most severe must be given priority status. Development of cash crop alternatives must be examined and perhaps supported on an experimental basis by donor agencies. Maximum productivity should be encouraged by rural extension and education agencies. A number of other specific recommendations were made for individual survival strategies to maintain high agricultural productivity.     

PRODUCER COOPERATIVES,INPUT PRICING AND LAND ALLOCATION

This paper considers input pricing rules for a producer cooperative which supplies its members with two inputs: a publicly provided private input (water), and a local public input (road services). An Israeli Moshav which allocates land equally among producers is a good example. The cooperative uses a two-part pricing rule: a product-dependent uniform fee (head tax) and a user charge per unit of the private input. Discrimination of head tax among the producer groups is shown to dominate that of user charge in the short run. However, land reallocation among producers can result in a Pareto-superior pricing rule and the Henry George theorem emerges in the long run. Thus, allowing land leasing while maintaining equal rights to land increases producer welfare.