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陈界仁对于探讨如何"重新看见"当代社会中无法被"看见"的现实,始终保持着长期关注,他擅长通过影像,将社会状态中隐而不显的政治操控力量、权力关系,甚至是潜在的体制性压迫呈现出来,这几乎可说是他作品中一贯的核心与精神。长期以来呈现和分析陈界仁的创作的方式中,多数是通过针对他的单件作品进入其背后的时代特征和意识型态分析,它们仍就是一个个单  相似文献   
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We identify two features of final offer arbitration (FOA) whichmay impede settlement in a bargaining game where asymmetricinformation drives the failure to settle. First, under FOA theinformed party has an incentive to conceal private informationabout the expected outcome in arbitration from his bargainingpartner. Revealing this information allows the previously uninformedparty to submit a more advantageous offer to the arbitratorto the detriment of the informed party. Second, in a two-typemodel, the uninformed player may choose to arbitrate all cases,a result which never occurs in a simple litigation game. Eachplayer's offer directly affects the outcome of arbitration underFOA, and it is this feature that generates impediments to settlementthat are not observed in a simple litigation game. Both impedimentsto settlement are removed if bargaining is allowed to take placeafter potentially binding offers have been submitted to thearbitrator.  相似文献   
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A three-wave longitudinal study of 1071 female Minnesota Family Investment Program (MFIP) recipients was conducted to examine predictors of welfare outcomes in the context of the 1996 federal welfare reform act. In addition to the demographic and socioeconomic variables that typically have been examined in the welfare literature, motivational variables (i.e., achievement motivation and goal commitment) that have been touted to be important by the popular press and in qualitative studies but never systematically measured were examined.  相似文献   
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Under the increasingly competitive global market, a firm simply can not survive without new products developed under network cooperation, especially for high-tech industries. Even though new product development (NPD) can be carried out in customer–supplier collaboration, only some products can be developed successfully at the end. Therefore, how to increase the possibility of having more successful NPD is a critical issue for a firm. This paper, by reviewing literature and analyzing theories, first analyzes the characteristics of strategic project of NPD, including knowledge creation model, development process, product and technology maturity. Then, three-dimension elements, consisting of knowledge management methods, linkage adjustment positioning and development process differentiation, are proposed to be adopted in the NPD process in order to obtain an optimal integration effect in network cooperation. As a result, an innovative, efficient and effective NPD can be elevated and achieved. Finally, the balanced scorecard (BSC) associated with fuzzy analytic hierarchy process (FAHP) is used to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed method.  相似文献   
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Licensing versus direct investment: implications for economic growth   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
We develop a symmetric two country model of foreign direct investment (FDI) that captures the internalization decision and its implications for both the rate and magnitude of innovations. When mode choice (licensing versus FDI) is fixed, a subsidy to multinational production increases the rate but decreases the size of innovations. When mode can switch, the rate and size of innovations both increase, provided the subsidy is not too large. Although innovation size decreases for industries where firms already were choosing FDI, innovation size increases for industries where firms switch from licensing to FDI because multinationals choose larger innovations than licensors.  相似文献   
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