Politically stable pay-as-you-go pension systems: When the social-insurance budget is too small in a democracy

The essay analyzes in an overlapping-generations model, to which extent a pay-as-you-go pension system will be the outcome of majority voting, given specific institutional set-ups. Clearly, the vote of an active person depends on his expectations about how the present decision (i.e., his contribution) is linked to the future (i.e., his benefits), when he will be retired. In the paper we employ the assumption of a basic social contract where each active voter's future benefits are positively related to his contributions. It is shown that in this framework a steady-state with a positive (though lower than optimal) level of the pension system exists, even if a new majority decision about the system takes place every period.     

Service Quality,Competition, and Regulatory Policies in the Postal Sector

This paper presents a simple model which illustrates the possible policy- and welfare-implications of endogenous product selection in the postal sector. The cost of a unit of mail depends on its "quality" (e.g., speed of delivery) and on the type and location of the addressee (firms, urban households, and rural households). Senders have inelastic demands and differ in their willingness to pay for quality. Addressees are passive but their utility may affect social welfare. Two operators play a two-stage game, first choosing qualities and then prices. We first show that the equilibrium with two private (profit maximizing) operators results in an inefficient provision of quality. Then, we consider the mixed (Nash) equilibrium with one private and one (welfare maximizing) public operator. If the budget constraint of the public firm is not binding, this equilibrium is shown to be first-best efficient even if social welfare accounts for the utility of addressees. If the budget constraint is binding, the mixed equilibrium is not efficient but yields a higher level of welfare than the private equilibrium. Finally, we study the impact of minimum quality standards within our setting.     

Hedging Housing Risk in London

This paper investigates the benefits of allowing households to compensate the portfolio distortion due to their housing consumption through investments in housing price derivatives. Focusing on the London market, we show that a major loss from over-investment in housing is that households are forced to hold a very risky portfolio. However, the strong performance of the London housing market means that little is lost in terms of expected returns. Even households with limited wealth are better off owning their home rather than renting and investing in financial assets, as long as they are willing to face the financial risk involved. In this context, access to housing price derivatives would benefit most poor homeowners looking to limit their risk exposure. It would also benefit wealthier investors looking for the high returns provided by housing investments without the costs of direct ownership of properties. Comparisons with French, Swedish and U.S. data provide a broader perspective on our findings.     

中国金融控股集团发展：分业还是混业？

中国的金融控股集团可界定为跨业经营,再加上金融企业资产的弱专用性,因此现有金融管理体制下存在金融控股集团发展的空间。但本文分析认为金融控股集团的经营前景不能确定,应积极、审慎地发展。     

An international study of internal audit function quality

We investigate organisational and environmental factors that influence firms’ incentives to develop high-quality internal audit functions (IAFs) by using a unique international sample formed by matching proprietary data from a global internal auditor survey with public data obtained from Worldscope. Concerning organisational factors, we find that a positive relationship exists between IAF quality and firm complexity and confirm that complex firms have a higher demand for monitoring and advising and, therefore, a greater need for formal controls. In addition, IAF quality is positively related to board monitoring and audit committee diligence but negatively associated with CEO power, which suggests that IAF quality is influenced by other key players in corporate governance. Regarding environmental factors, we document that IAF quality is positively associated with industry competition, which implies that a firm’s incentive for a high-quality IAF is enhanced when confronted with greater environmental uncertainty. Furthermore, IAF quality has a significantly positive relationship with our self-constructed index of IAF requirements included in national corporate governance codes, which indicates that strong home-country corporate governance codes play a role in fostering IAF development.     

Replicating portfolio approach to capital calculation

The replicating portfolio (RP) approach to the calculation of capital for life insurance portfolios is an industry standard. The RP is obtained from projecting the terminal loss of discounted asset–liability cash flows on a set of factors generated by a family of financial instruments that can be efficiently simulated. We provide the mathematical foundations and a novel dynamic and path-dependent RP approach for real-world and risk-neutral sampling. We show that our RP approach yields asymptotically consistent capital estimators if the chaotic representation property holds. We illustrate the tractability of the RP approach by three numerical examples.     

An expansion in the model space in the context of utility maximization

In the framework of an incomplete financial market where the stock price dynamics are modeled by a continuous semimartingale (not necessarily Markovian), an explicit second-order expansion formula for the power investor’s value function—seen as a function of the underlying market price of risk process—is provided. This allows us to provide first-order approximations of the optimal primal and dual controls. Two specific calibrated numerical examples illustrating the accuracy of the method are also given.     

A risk-neutral equilibrium leading to uncertain volatility pricing

We study the formation of derivative prices in an equilibrium between risk-neutral agents with heterogeneous beliefs about the dynamics of the underlying. Under the condition that short-selling is limited, we prove the existence of a unique equilibrium price and show that it incorporates the speculative value of possibly reselling the derivative. This value typically leads to a bubble; that is, the price exceeds the autonomous valuation of any given agent. Mathematically, the equilibrium price operator is of the same nonlinear form that is obtained in single-agent settings with worst-case aversion against model uncertainty. Thus, our equilibrium leads to a novel interpretation of this price.