Fixed-Rate Endowment Mortgage and Mortgage Indemnity Valuation

We use a contingent claims framework for valuing the the default and prepayment embedded options in certain British fixed-rate endowment mortgages, with a (capped) mortgage indemnity guarantee (MIG). This methodology provides a template for the borrower, lender, and insurer to compare mortgage terms, including the fairness of contract rates, arrangement fees, prepayment penalties, any MIG premiums required, and co-insurance exposure. With empirical inputs, this model may eventually be useful as a mark-to-value proxy for all parties, as expected parameters change (especially interest rate and house price levels, and expected future volatilities), for purposes of determining valued added accounting, appropriate reserves, and indeed for setting premiums and business drivers. Fixed-rate endowment mortgages differ from fixed-rate repayment mortgages primarily because, in the event of early termination, the amount owed by the borrower is a function of the evolution of the term structure of interest rates, whereas for a repayment mortgage it is pre-determined. We compare endownment and repayment mortgages for different levels of loan-to-value ratios, interest rate and house price volatilities.     

Do venture capitalists imitate portfolio size?

Venture capitalists face the challenge of determining how many entrepreneurial ventures they should invest in. Kanniainen and Keuschnigg (J Corp Finance 9:521–534, 2003) develop a theoretical model based on economic factors that shows how a venture capital fund should set its portfolio size in order to achieve optimal returns. Determining the required economic inputs to this model is difficult in practice however, given the informational asymmetries, uncertainties and ambiguities present in the decision-making environment of venture capitalists. Hence, we contend that general partners of venture capital funds also use their prior venture capital fund management experience, which we refer to as social capital, to overcome the difficulties they face in solving the above optimization problem. Our results support our hypotheses that portfolio size is explained by the interplay of economic and social factors.      

Public production and shadow pricing in a model of disequilibrium in labour and capital markets

This paper develops second-best rules for public investment and employment in various regimes of disequilibrium on the capital and the labour markets. The model used is very simple so as to imply rules which can easily be interpreted and contrasted with the current literature on the subject. Another issue considered is that of possible changes of regimes within a process of welfare improvement involving adjustments in the public production plan; it is dealt with through a numerical example which points out that such changes can indeed occur.     

Privacy,confidentiality and computers: National and international implications of US information policy

The author assesses what the USA has been doing or not doing in recent years to develop information policies for personal record information to deal with the rapidly changing record-keeping world of public and private organizations. He reviews how well these policies have been implemented and enforced in the context of the US system of government, and compares the experience of European countries with US efforts, especially in the light of the serious debate which is emerging over restraints placed on transborder data flows by the privacy protection efforts of various countries.     

Some results on residual entropy function

Ebrahimi and Pellerey (1995) and Ebrahimi (1996) proposed the Shannon residual entropy function as a useful dynamic measure of uncertainty. They studied the characterization problem from the residual entropy. They also used this function to define a stochastic order and two classes of distributions, DURL and IURL. In this paper, we obtain some new results on this function and we correct some mistakes in the preceding literature.Supported by Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnologia under grant BFM2000-0362Acknowledgements. We thank two anonymous referees for some useful comments that led to an improvement in the presentation of this paper.     

The Origins of the State from Reciprocity to Coercive Power

This paper attemptsto explain the process of emergence of the state. It argues thatmorality is the first institution created by human beings tomaintain social order. But social order based on morality breaksdown when the human group becomes too large. When that occurs,most groups tend to split. Some groups, however, are able todevelop a hierarchical structure that allows them to escape thatfate. Political leadership is described as the result of a socialcontract. It is argued that this contract undergoes an essentialchange along the process of consolidation of statehood. At someinitial stage, it can be regarded as a consent contract,but, later on, it becomes a duress contract. This processis related to three main causes: population growth, increasingeconomic interdependence and geographic confinement. Other topicsdiscussed in the paper are the origins of private property rights,the emergence of autocratic governments, and the origins of democracy.     

Shareholder wealth gains through better corporate governance—The case of European LBO-transactions

We examine shareholder wealth effects in a heterogeneous sample of 115 European leveraged going private transactions from 1997 to 2005. Average abnormal returns as reaction to the LBO announcement amount to 24.20%. In cross-sectional regressions, we find that these value gains can largely be attributed to differences in corporate governance: on a macro level, abnormal returns for pre-LBO shareholders are larger in countries with a poor protection of minority shareholders. On a firm level, companies with a high pre-LBO free float and comparatively weak monitoring by shareholders tend to show high abnormal returns. Furthermore, companies that are undervalued with respect to an industry peer-group exhibit higher announcement returns, indicating that agency conflicts and/or market inefficiencies can serve as an explanation.

The Competition Policy Approach in the New Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications. Comments on Koski and Kretschmer

Koski and Kretschmer have presented a large review of the recent literature on network industries, particularly on market structure, firm strategies and public policies. They provide a very useful summary of the main papers and highlight some important conclusions, in particular in the context of the policy debate. My objective in this paper is to provide short and limited comments on the first two parts, on market structures and firm strategies, and to discuss more the last section, on public policy issues, in particular on the basis of the competition policy aspects of the new regulatory framework for electronic communications.