Can social spending cushion the inequality effect of globalization?

This paper examines whether social spending cushions the effect of globalization on within‐country inequality. Using information on disposable and market income inequality and data on overall social spending, and health and education spending from the ILO and the World Bank/WHO, we analyze whether social spending moderates the association between economic globalization and inequality. The results confirm that economic globalization—especially economic flows—associates with higher income inequality, an effect driven by non‐OECD countries. Health spending is strongly associated with lower inequality, but we find no robust evidence that any kind of social spending negatively moderates the association between economic globalization and inequality.     

Incumbents’ defense strategies: a comparison of deterrence and shakeout strategy based on evolutionary game theory

This paper addresses the question of how an established firm can successfully defend its market against current and future competitors. Previous studies on this issue are surprisingly scarce and typically concentrate on only a single generic defense strategy. Thus, little is known about the degree and the manner in which different generic defense strategies, such as a deterrence strategy (pursued before competitor market entry) and a shakeout strategy (pursued after competitor market entry), differ in effectiveness and efficiency and about the corresponding role of product and market conditions. As these strategies tend to be costly, an established firm must decide which of these strategies to focus its scarce resources on. Drawing on evolutionary game theory and an empirical calibration and validation study, this paper seeks to fill these research gaps. While both strategies turn out to be viable options for market defense, the authors find that in general, a shakeout strategy tends to be superior to a deterrence strategy. However, the authors also identify product and market conditions under which an established firm is better off focusing on a deterrence strategy. In methodological respects, the paper contributes to the marketing discipline by introducing evolutionary game theory, which has not been used previously for analyzing marketing issues, as well as an evolutionary approach to research on market defense.     

Economic development by the creation of new sectors

The basic theme underlying this paper is qualitative change taking place during economic development. These changes in the composition of the economic system should become one of the most important variables in models of economic growth and development. Our knowledge of the relationship between economic development and qualitative change, however, is still very limited. This paper attempts to shed light on some important aspects of the role played by qualitative change in economic development, by laying the foundations of a model in which changes in the composition of the economic system are endogenously generated by the evolution of the system itself and, in turn, affect its future development. The model has a strong Schumpeterian flavour in that the first entrepreneur entering a market enjoys a temporary monopoly. This temporary monopoly is eroded by the entry of imitators, that gradually increases the intensity of competition. The saturation is reinforced as the demand for what was a new product comes to be satisfied. In this way the adjustment gap initially created by the innovation is eliminated transforming a niche into a mature market, which becomes one of the routines of the economic system. As soon as a sector becomes saturated there is an increasing inducement for incumbent firms to exit and to create a new niche, where once more they will have a temporary monopoly. To put it in another, slightly different, form, we can say that economic development is a process in which new activities emerge, old ones disappear, the weight of all economic activities and their patterns of interaction change.JEL Classification: O0, O12; O30Correspondence to: Pier Paolo Saviotti     

MONETARY POLICY,FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS,AND REDISTRIBUTION

This article examines how financial constraints affect redistribution via monetary policy. We explore a novel mechanism of monetary nonneutrality, which is based on debt limits imposed in nominal terms. Specifically, when debt is constrained by current income, monetary policy can alter the real terms of borrowing. Changes in inflation exert ambiguous effects, depending on the initial debt/wealth position and the willingness to borrow. We show analytically that borrowers can benefit from increased debt limits under lower inflation rates. This novel effect can dominate conventional debt deflation effects. We find that particularly less indebted borrowers as well as potential future borrowers gain and that aggregate welfare can be enhanced under a permanent reduction in inflation.     

Political cycles in Greece’s municipal employment

We consider the politically motivated fluctuations in Greece’s municipal employment, constructing a data-set from primary data and focusing on the composition of municipal employment in terms of employment relationship forms. Our analysis produces strong evidence of pre-electoral manipulation through increases in the number of contract employees. Considering a number of control variables and robustness checks does not affect the key results. Such variables include whether mayors run for reelection, incumbents’ political alignment with central government, partisan shifts, general elections, mayors’ turnover rate, and timing patterns. Our evidence provides insights into Greece’s political economy in the run-up to the current economic crisis.     

A new definition of and role for preferences in positive economics

Positive economic models aim to provide truthful explanations of significant (aspects of) economic phenomena. While the notion of ‘preferences’ figures prominently in micro-economic models, it suffers from a remarkable lack of conceptual clarity and rigor. After distinguishing narrow homo economicus models (self-interest maximization) from broader ones (preference satisfaction) and rehearsing the criticisms both have met, I go into the most promising attempt to date at addressing them, developed by Hausman. However, his definition of preferences as ‘total comparative evaluations’, I argue, plays into the general disregard that economists have for human psychology. My alternative definition of preferences as ‘overall comparative evaluations’ – and hence as one of the many factors that influence people’s behavior – allows for more adequate causal explanations of people’s dutiful, committed, and norm-guided actions. Against Hausman but in agreement with Sen, it also allows for (motivated) counterpreferential choice.     

Herding,contrarianism and delay in financial market trading

Herding and contrarian behaviour are often-cited features of real-world financial markets. Theoretical models of continuous trading that study herding and contrarianism, however, usually do not allow traders to choose when to trade or to trade more than once. We present a large-scale experiment to explore these features within a tightly controlled laboratory environment. Herding and contrarianism are more pronounced than in comparable studies that do not allow traders to time their decisions. Traders with extreme information tend to trade earliest, followed by those with information conducive to contrarianism, while those with the theoretical potential to herd delay the most. A sizeable fraction of trades is clustered in time.     

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