Constructing Historical Euro-zone Data

Existing methods of reconstructing historical Euro-zone data by aggregation of the individual countries' aggregate data raises numerous difficulties, especially due to past exchange rate changes. The approach proposed here is designed to avoid such distortions, and aggregate exactly when exchange rates are fixed. We first compute growth rates within states, aggregate these, then cumulate this Euro-zone growth rate to obtain the aggregated levels variables. The aggregate of the implicit-deflator price index coincides with the implicit deflator of our aggregate nominal and real data. We apply the method to Euro-zone M3, GDP and prices over the previous two decades.     

Lobbying against environmental regulation vs. lobbying for loopholes

We analyze the determinants of environmental policy when two industry lobbies can seek a laxer policy that would apply to both industries and loophole lobbying that provides benefits specific to one industry. We determine the properties of the lobbying equilibrium, including the resulting emissions level. In many cases, higher effectiveness of loophole lobbying is detrimental for industries and beneficial for environmental quality, as it exacerbates the free-rider problem in the provision of general lobbying by inducing industries to turn towards loophole lobbying.     

See no evil,hear no evil,speak no evil: a study of defensive organizational behavior towards customer complaints

Despite substantial benefits of an effective complaint management for companies, there is ample evidence that many firms do not handle customer complaints appropriately. This paper aims at providing a theoretical explanation for this surprising phenomenon. Drawing on psychological and organizational theory, the authors introduce the concept of defensive organizational behavior towards customer complaints as well as provide a rich conceptualization and operationalization of this phenomenon. Moreover, in an empirical study, they systematically analyze how defensive organizational behavior towards customer complaints is driven by organizational antecedents and, based on a dyadic data set, how it affects customer post-complaint reactions.

From short-term to long-term orientation—political economy of the policy reform process

Despite the fact that policymakers often have a short-term horizon and prefer discretionary over rule-bound policy, one can observe policy reform with a focus on rules and long-term orientation. Sometimes reforms are driven by crisis, sometimes they are pursued in times of relative prosperity. The paper analyzes reform processes theoretically under the assumption of imperfect knowledge. After the introduction, the second section of the paper shows that rule-bound policy encourages a long-term orientation of policymakers, resulting in higher economic dynamics and growth as compared with discretionary policy. In the third section, the political economy of the reform process, i.e. replacing discretionary by more rule-bound policy, is analyzed in an evolutionary setting. The basic hypothesis is that a policy reform is triggered by three key factors: (1) a worsening economic situation, (2) increasing knowledge of policymakers and the public with respect to the effectiveness of policy paradigms and (3) external, in particular international support. In a fourth section, we present a case study. Finally, we draw conclusions.

Does tax competition make mobile firms more footloose?

We examine a two‐period regional model with evolving economic geography, potentially creating incentives for firm relocation between periods. We argue that tax competition makes firms more footloose, but that this increases efficiency relative to the laissez‐faire outcome. We establish that: (i) tax competition leads to efficient investment outcomes and (ii) firm mobility is greater with tax competition than with a laissez‐faire regime. When relocation is costly, there can be too little mobility over time, as firms do not take into account the impact of FDI on social welfare in each country. With lump‐sum taxes or transfers, firms capture these benefits and internalize them, such that tax competition leads to the efficient outcomes. When more time periods are examined, tax competition induces firm relocation sooner than in its absence.