MONETARY POLICY,FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS,AND REDISTRIBUTION

This article examines how financial constraints affect redistribution via monetary policy. We explore a novel mechanism of monetary nonneutrality, which is based on debt limits imposed in nominal terms. Specifically, when debt is constrained by current income, monetary policy can alter the real terms of borrowing. Changes in inflation exert ambiguous effects, depending on the initial debt/wealth position and the willingness to borrow. We show analytically that borrowers can benefit from increased debt limits under lower inflation rates. This novel effect can dominate conventional debt deflation effects. We find that particularly less indebted borrowers as well as potential future borrowers gain and that aggregate welfare can be enhanced under a permanent reduction in inflation.     

Political cycles in Greece’s municipal employment

We consider the politically motivated fluctuations in Greece’s municipal employment, constructing a data-set from primary data and focusing on the composition of municipal employment in terms of employment relationship forms. Our analysis produces strong evidence of pre-electoral manipulation through increases in the number of contract employees. Considering a number of control variables and robustness checks does not affect the key results. Such variables include whether mayors run for reelection, incumbents’ political alignment with central government, partisan shifts, general elections, mayors’ turnover rate, and timing patterns. Our evidence provides insights into Greece’s political economy in the run-up to the current economic crisis.     

Herding,contrarianism and delay in financial market trading

Herding and contrarian behaviour are often-cited features of real-world financial markets. Theoretical models of continuous trading that study herding and contrarianism, however, usually do not allow traders to choose when to trade or to trade more than once. We present a large-scale experiment to explore these features within a tightly controlled laboratory environment. Herding and contrarianism are more pronounced than in comparable studies that do not allow traders to time their decisions. Traders with extreme information tend to trade earliest, followed by those with information conducive to contrarianism, while those with the theoretical potential to herd delay the most. A sizeable fraction of trades is clustered in time.     

Internal and external suppliers in manufacturing networks—An empirical analysis

The purpose of the paper is to explore the way manufacturing firms use internal and external suppliers in the design and management of manufacturing networks. The main area of interest is to explore the similarities and differences between internal and external suppliers, with respect to their roles and the reasons for choosing a certain type of supplier. We base our analysis on data from 104 Swedish manufacturing plants and their corresponding manufacturing networks of internal and external suppliers. The results of the study show that there are significant differences between the criteria that are influential in choosing a certain type of supplier. The choice of an internal supplier is largely based on a single corporate decision, while an external supplier has to perform well on a number of criteria (primarily quality, cost, and delivery dependability). When comparing the selection criteria with competitive priorities and plant performance, we find that the criteria for selecting external suppliers has a better match than those for selecting internal suppliers. The sample contained plants having only external suppliers as well as plants having both internal and external suppliers, but the selection criteria for external suppliers are the same for both groups and not dependent upon the presence or absence of internal suppliers.     

Who is Who

NEWS

Who is Who     

Extremism, campaigning and ambiguity

This paper studies a model of how political parties use resources for campaigning to inform voters. Each party has a predetermined ideology drawn from some distribution. Parties choose a platform and campaign to inform voters about the platform. We find that, the farther away parties are from each other (on average), the less resources are spent on campaigning (on average). Thus, if parties are extreme, less information is supplied than if parties are moderate. We also show that if a public subsidy is introduced, we have policy convergence, given some mild technical restrictions on the public subsidy.     

Determinants of corporate hedging: A (statistical) meta-analysis

While literature provides several hedging theories, evidence on the corporate incentives to hedge remains ambiguous. We synthesize data of empirical studies via statistical meta-analysis to test different hedging hypotheses. To our knowledge, this constitutes the first application of such a methodology in financial economics. Our results imply that financial distress costs induce firms to hedge. We find weak evidence that the underinvestment problem and the dependence on costly external financing influence hedging behavior. Taxes and agency conflicts do not show explanatory power. Because statistical and narrative reviews yield different outcomes, we see various other application possibilities for meta-analysis in financial economics.     

The Impact of Equity-preferences on the Stability of International Environmental Agreements

This paper uses a coalition formation model to explore how equity considerations affect countries’ cooperation on global environmental issues, e.g. on climate change. When developing countries are exempted from obligations to reduce their emissions, I find that opening them for abatement projects financed by industrialized countries changes the incentives to cooperate in a way which can increase emissions and decrease welfare. Equity- concerns in industrialized countries regarding the difference between their per capita emission levels and those of developing countries lead to increased abatement but do not qualitatively change the incentives to cooperate. Inequality-aversion with respect to differences to abatement targets across industrialized countries generally induces larger coalition sizes and stricter abatement. Here, the inclusion of developing countries improves upon the prospects of cooperation.     

Notes and Comments: Measures of risk attitude: correspondences between mean-variance and expected-utility approaches

Abstract The expected-utility (EU) approach brings great richness to the study of decision making in a large variety of stochastic environments. Research in the EU paradigm often starts from plausible assumptions on risk preferences or optimal responses to changes in the risk structure, and then investigates how such assumptions are reflected by properties of the von-Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) utility functions underlying the EU concept. Building on Pratt’s (1964) analysis of risk aversion, several measures for risk attitude have been analyzed, including absolute prudence and temperance (Kimball (1990), Eeckhoudt, Goiller and Schlesinger (1996)), their relative and partial relative counterparts (Choi, Kim and Snow (2001), Honda (1985)) as well as extensions such as mixed risk aversion (Caballé and Pomansky (1996)). Mathematics Subject Classification (2000): 91B16, 91B06 Journal of Economic Literature Classification: D81, D82