A theory of social license when regulatory pressure is jointly produced by an EPA and an NGO

We develop a model in which social pressure on a firm to behave well is jointly produced by a state regulator (EPA) and an NGO. The EPA and NGO differ in how they trade-off business versus environmental interests and also have access to different instruments in pursuit of their objectives. In particular, while the EPA will typically have the tools for detecting misbehaviour, the NGO can influence the intensity of social hostility directed towards those found to have misbehaved. EPA and NGO efforts may be strategic complements or substitutes, depending upon circumstances. We present a taxonomy of outcomes in the game between EPA and NGO in the spirit of Fudenberg and Tiroles’s (Am Econ Rev Pap Proc 74(2):361–366, 1984) classic taxonomy of business strategies. We also consider strategic delegation from NGO supporters to an NGO that has tastes over environmental and business interests different to their own.     

MEASURING RICHNESS AND POVERTY: A MICRO DATA APPLICATION TO EUROPE AND GERMANY

In this paper, we define a new class of richness measures. In contrast to the often used headcount, these new measures are sensitive to changes in rich individuals' incomes and, therefore, allow for a more sophisticated analysis of richness. We demonstrate the application of these new measures in analyzing the development of poverty and richness over time in Germany. Moreover, we compare Germany to many other European countries and investigate the impact of tax reforms on poverty and richness. Using these examples, we show the importance of taking the intensity of changes into account and not only the number of people beyond a given richness line (headcount). We propose to use the new measures in addition to the headcount index for a more comprehensive analysis of richness.     

Reassessing Moral Legitimacy in Times of Instability

The presence of conflicting cues about what is legitimate provided by various stakeholders, begs the question of how the legitimacy of contested institutionalized practices is justified. Recent critique of tax minimization strategies exemplifies this difficulty: on one hand, practitioners need to increase shareholders' profits; on the other, a growing number of stakeholders push for ‘fairer’ corporate tax payments. Conducted during a time of public criticism of Australian corporate tax strategies, our study draws on justifications of corporate tax minimization strategies by senior tax practitioners and corporate submissions to a Senate Inquiry on corporate tax avoidance. The study explores how legitimacy judgements come under pressure by conflicting cues. Through the application of Boltanski and Thévenot's (2006) Economies of Worth (EW) framework, we advance legitimacy scholarship by clarifying what constitutes situated judgements in times of instability. Our work puts forward the concept of perceived forecasted consensus as a guide for individuals in making situated legitimacy judgements in times of instability.     

Cost data quality considerations for eco-efficiency measures

Cost data are a central aspect of eco-efficiency measures, either as means to assess value of production, or, more directly, as one dimension of the efficiency ratio. Several aspects may affect the quality of cost data, among them definitions, time and space, and confidentiality issues. Somewhat surprisingly, cost data quality has received little attention in the field of sustainability and eco-efficiency so far. Even worse, perhaps, is the lack of tools suitable for a cost data quality assessment and management.This paper discusses parameters that affect cost data quality, and will then propose a pedigree matrix as a tool designed for managing cost data quality issues. The application of the matrix is described, also in combination with a previously proposed, and broadly used, pedigree matrix for environmental data quality management.     

When prices hardly matter: Incomplete insurance contracts and markets for repair goods

This paper looks at markets characterized by the fact that the demand side is insured. In these markets, a consumer purchases a good to compensate consequences of unfavorable events, such as an accident or an illness. Insurance policies in most lines of insurance base indemnity on the insured's actual expenses, i.e., the insured would be partially or completely reimbursed when purchasing certain goods. In this setting, we discuss the interaction between insurance and repair markets by focusing, on one hand, upon the development of prices and the structure of markets with insured consumers, and, on the other hand, the resulting backlash on optimal insurance contracting. We show that even in the absence of ex post moral hazard the extension of insurance coverage will lead to an increase in prices as well as to a socially undesirable increase in the number of repair service suppliers if repair markets are imperfect.     

Does the reliability of institutions affect public good contributions? Evidence from a laboratory experiment

Reliable institutions, i.e., institutions that live up to the norms that agents expect them to keep foster cooperative behavior. We experimentally confirm this hypothesis in a public goods game with a salient norm that cooperation was socially demanded and corruption ought not to occur. When nevertheless corruption attempts came up, groups that were told that ‘the system’ had fended off the attempts made considerably higher contributions to the public good than groups that learned that attempts only did not affect their payoffs or that were not exposed to corruption at all.     

WILL GERMAN BANKS EARN THEIR COST OF CAPITAL?

In recent years, the German banking sector has overcome major challenges such as the global financial crisis and the European debt crisis. This paper analyzes a recent development as a particular determinant of the future outlook for the German banking sector. Interest rates are at historically low levels and may remain at these levels for a considerable period of time. Such levels pose a specific challenge to banks which are heavily dependent on interest income, as is the case for most German banks. We consider different interest rate scenarios and analyze the extent to which they cause a further narrowing of the interest rate margin. Our results indicate that a projected decline in this margin will result in no more than 20% of German banks earning a cost of capital of 8% by the end of this decade. However, we show that this decline is alleviated by the fact that German banks can apply a special feature of German accounting standards by using hidden and open reserves. We discuss how these income smoothing tools will provide a cushion that supports short‐ and medium‐term adjustments through a buffer effect. (JEL G21, G28)     

On the self-interested use of equity in international climate negotiations

We discuss self-interested uses of equity arguments in international climate negotiations. Using unique data from a world-wide survey of agents involved in international climate policy, we show that the perceived support of different equity rules by regions may be explained by the ranking of their economic costs. Despite being self-interested, equity arguments may be perceived as being used for different reasons, for example, out of fairness considerations or in order to facilitate negotiations. Consistent with experimental and behavioral studies on fairness perceptions, we find that individuals are more likely to state reasons with positive attributes if they evaluate their own region or regions that support the individual's personally preferred equity rule. Negotiators perceive the use of equity by regions as less influenced by pressure from interest groups.     

Macroeconomic Fluctuations and Bank Lending: Evidence for Germany and the Euro Area

Abstract. This paper analyzes the dynamic response of loans to the private sector and of economic activity to aggregate supply, demand and monetary policy shocks in Germany and the euro area based on a standard macroeconomic VAR using sign restrictions to identify the structural shocks. The main results of this analysis are that (i) with the exception of the response to the supply shock in Germany, the response of loans to the three macroeconomic shocks is rather weak and in most cases insignificant; (ii) the 2000–05 credit slowdown and weak economic performance in Germany were primarily driven by adverse supply shocks; and (iii) the marked slowdown in credit creation in Germany over this period actually represents a realignment of the outstanding stock of loans with its deterministic level. In order to assess the role of bank lending in the transmission of macroeconomic shocks, we further perform counterfactual simulations and analyze the dynamic responses of German loan subaggregates in order to test the distributional implications of potential credit market frictions. These exercises do not indicate that credit market frictions play an amplifying role in the transmission of macroeconomic fluctuations.     

RENOVATIO MONETAE: WHEN GESELL TAXES WORKED

Gesell taxes on money have recently received attention as a way of alleviating the zero lower bound on interest rates. Less known is that such taxes generated seigniorage in medieval Europe for around two centuries. When a Gesell tax was levied, current coins ceased to be legal and had to be exchanged into new coins for a fee. Using a cash-in-advance model, we analyze under what conditions agents exchange coins and the tax generates revenues. A low exchange fee, high punishments for using old coins, and a long time period between re-mintings induce people to use new coins.