Co-optimization of enhanced oil recovery and carbon sequestration

In this paper, we present an economic analysis of CO₂-enhanced oil recovery (EOR). This technique entails injection of CO₂ into mature oil fields in a manner that reduces the oil's viscosity, thereby enhancing the rate of extraction. As part of this process, significant quantities of CO₂ remain sequestered in the reservoir. If CO₂ emissions are regulated, oil producers using EOR should therefore be able to earn revenues from sequestration as well as from oil production. We develop a theoretical framework that analyzes the dynamic co-optimization of oil extraction and CO₂ sequestration, through the producer's choice of the fraction of CO₂ in the injection stream at each moment. We find that the optimal fraction of CO₂ is likely to decline monotonically over time, and reach zero before the optimal termination time. Numerical simulations, based on an ongoing EOR project in Wyoming, confirm this result. We also find that cumulative sequestration is less responsive to the carbon tax than to the oil price. Only at very high taxes does a tradeoff between revenues from oil output and sequestration arise.     

Does the Delphi process lead to increased accuracy in group-based judgmental forecasts or does it simply induce consensus amongst judgmental forecasters?

We investigate the relative impact of internal Delphi process factors - including panelists' degree of confidence, expertise, majority/minority positioning - and an external factor, richness of feedback - on opinion change and subsequent accuracy of judgmental forecasts. We found that panelists who had low confidence in their judgmental forecast and/or who were in a minority were more likely to change their opinion than those who were more confident and/or in a majority. The addition of rationales, or reasons, to the numeric feedback had little impact upon panelists' final forecasts, despite the quality of panelists' rationales being significantly positively correlated with accurate forecasts and thus of potential use to aid forecast improvement over Delphi rounds. Rather, the effect of rationales was similar to that of confidence: to pull panelists towards the majority opinion regardless of its correctness. We conclude that majority opinion is the strongest influence on panelists' opinion change in both the ‘standard’ Delphi, and Delphi-with-reasons. We make some suggestions for improved variants of the Delphi-with-reasons technique that should help reduce majority influence and thereby permit reasoned arguments to exert their proper pull on opinion change, resulting in forecast accuracy improvements over Delphi rounds.     

Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies

We study a contracting model with unforeseen contingencies inwhich the court is an active player. Ex ante, the contractingparties cannot include the risky unforeseen contingencies inthe contract they draw up. Ex post, the court observes whetheran unforeseen contingency occurred and decides whether to voidor uphold the contract. If the contract is voided by the court,the parties can renegotiate a new agreement ex post. There aretwo effects of a court that voids contracts. The parties' incentivesto undertake relationship-specific investment are reduced, andthe parties enjoy greater insurance against the unforeseen contingenciesthat the ex ante contract cannot account for. In this context,we fully characterize the optimal decision rule for the court.The behavior of the optimal court is determined by the trade-offbetween the need for incentives and the gains from insurancethat voiding in some circumstances offers to the agents.     

CUTTING CARBON EMISSIONS AT A PROFIT (PART II): IMPACTS ON U.S. COMPETITIVENESS AND JOBS

This article examines how an integrated least-cost implementation of the Kyoto Protocol in the United States would affect U.S. competitiveness and jobs. Drawing on previous work, the authors analyze integrated emission reduction strategies based on a $50/ton carbon tax (including border tax adjustments), a payroll tax cut, energy-productivity–oriented market reforms, and international flexibility mechanisms. This policy portfolios is compared to conventional approaches that omit market and fiscal reforms.
Input-output data are used to estimate the impact on export prices of goods and services produced in the United States. Similar data are used to translate changes in GDP and energy production into employment impacts in energy and nonenergy sectors. The costs of providing transitional assistance for workers in the coal industry are compared to the GDP benefits of a profitable Kyoto strategy.
The analysis shows that relative to purchasing international emission rights, productivity-raising domestic market, institutional, and fiscal reforms offer much broader advantages for tradE-exposed U.S. industries. Though allowance purchases alone increase export prices of U.S. manufactured goods and services, an integrated no-regrets strategy reduces export prices for the large majority of U.S. industries and limits the impact of climate protection policies on the few most energy-intensive basic materials industries to very small levels. Relative to the baseline, an integrated least-cost implementation of the Kyoto target increases economy-wide employment levels by several hundred thousand jobs in 2010.     

Estimating state-industry employment,with an application to industrial localization

We describe a method to construct an industry-by-state repeated cross-section of employment at the most disaggregated level publicly available, covering 1963–2012. Nondisclosed data are estimated with a procedure using the hierarchical information structure. To illustrate the usefulness of the procedure, the resulting estimated data are tested to determine if industrial localization of the processed food sector has changed over the last 50 years in the United States. Our findings suggest it has not changed systemically despite variation in levels of localization within industries.     

Bias-corrected estimates of reduction of post-surgery length of stay and corresponding cost savings through the widespread national implementation of fast-tracking after liver transplantation: a quasi-experimental study

Background: Fast-tracking is an approach adopted by Mayo Clinic in Florida’s (MCF) liver transplant (LT) program, which consists of early tracheal extubation and transfer of patients to surgical ward, eliminating a stay in the intensive care unit in select patients. Since adopting this approach in 2002, MCF has successfully fast-tracked 54.3% of patients undergoing LT.

Objectives: This study evaluated the reduction in post-operative length of stay (LOS) that resulted from the fast-tracking protocol and assessed the potential cost saving in the case of nationwide implementation.

Methods: A propensity score for fast-tracking was generated based on MCF liver transplant databases during 2011–2013. Various propensity score matching algorithms were used to form control groups from the United Network of Organ Sharing Standard Analysis and Research (STAR) file that had comparable demographic characteristics and health status to the treatment group identified in MCF. Multiple regression and matching estimators were employed for evaluation of the post-surgery LOS. The algorithm generated from the analysis was also applied to the STAR data to determine the proportion of patients in the US who could potentially be candidates for fast-tracking, and the potential savings.

Results: The effect of the fast-tracking on the post-transplant LOS was estimated at approximately from 2.5 (p-value?=?0.001) to 3.2 (p-value?Conclusion: The fast-track program was found to be effective in reducing post-transplant LOS, although the reduction appeared to be less than previously reported. Nationwide implementation of fast-tracking could result in substantial cost savings without compromising the patient outcome.     

Nobelity and novelty: Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott’s contributions viewed from Vienna

The awarding of the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2004 to Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott represents an opportunity to evaluate their contributions in light of Austrian economics. We lay out the basics of their contributions—the general equilibrium approach to economic fluctuations and the game theoretic approach to policy—and argue that they have tenets similar to those of Austrianism. We argue that their methodology parallels Austrian methodology in several significant ways that have gone unnoticed. We conclude that Kydland and Prescott’s Nobel Prize suggests Austrian approaches can have a more prominent impact than they have had in the past.     

Does One Size Fit All? A currency union with asymmetric transmissions and a stability pact

The theory of optimal currency areas stresses that a single currency zone should have symmetry across shocks and structures. What happens if the monetary transmission mechanisms differ so that a common monetary policy has different effects in different places? Using a fully specified econometric model, we find that such asymmetries are likely to destabilise the business cycle and put countries out of phase with each other in a way that cannot be corrected by deficit-constrained national fiscal policies. Market discipline, however, could achieve this. Hence, the question is whether the markets would create sufficient discipline on their own.     

Exchange Rate Regimes and Foreign Direct Investment Flows to Developing Countries

Drawing on recent advances in exchange rate regime classifications, the paper examines empirically the effect of exchange rate regimes on foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to developing countries. Using system generalized methods of moments estimation on a panel of 70 developing countries for the period 1985–2004, we find that developing countries adopting de facto fixed or intermediate regimes significantly outperform those opting for a flexible exchange rate system in attracting FDI flows. No statistically significant differences in the FDI‐inducing properties of fixes, intermediates and floats are found using the International Monetary Fund official classification.     

Network architecture, cooperation and punishment in public good experiments

Following Fehr and G?echter (Am Econ Rev 90(4):980–994, 2000), a large and growing number of experiments show that public goods can be provided at high levels when mutual monitoring and costly punishment are allowed. Nearly all experiments, however, study monitoring and punishment in a complete network where all subjects can monitor and punish each other. The architecture of social networks becomes important when subjects can only monitor and punish the other subjects to whom they are connected by the network. We study several incomplete networks and find that they give rise to their own distinctive patterns of behavior. Nevertheless, a number of simple, yet fundamental, properties in graph theory allow us to interpret the variation in the patterns of behavior that arise in the laboratory and to explain the impact of network architecture on the efficiency and dynamics of the experimental outcomes.