Technology adoption under hidden information

We consider a firm where workers have pre-contractual private information regarding their cost of production. Before contracting takes place, the owner of the firm can adopt a new technology that reduces production costs for each type of worker. We show that technology adoption may have an adverse rent effect that counteracts the cost-reducing effect. This is the case whenever the new technology reduces the costs of more efficient types more strongly. Nevertheless, if the owner contracts directly with a worker (two-tier hierarchy), the cost-reducing effect always dominates. By contrast, if the firm has more hierarchical tiers such that contracting with the worker is delegated to a manager, the rent effect may prevail. Then, the owner does not adopt the new technology, even if it is costlessly available.     

Networks and the Decision to Persist with Underperforming R&D Projects

Drawing on aspiration level theory and the networks literature, this paper develops a model toward decision makers' persistence with underperforming R&D projects based on the perceived properties of their personal network. The assumption is that positive feedback from network partners motivates persistence, and that this effect is multiplied when the decision makers' network is larger and denser, when network ties are predominantly strong, and when communication frequency within the network is high. The model is tested by a field experiment and conjoint methodology. Analysis of 1632 persistence decisions nested within 51 scientists responsible for R&D projects reveals that more positive feedback enhances persistence of underperforming R&D projects, and that this effect becomes stronger with increasing network size, network density, and communication frequency. These findings extend the project management literature by focusing on the social environment of the decision maker as one so far neglected factor in empirical studies on persistence decisions. Moreover, this study is among the first to investigate contingency relationships between feedback received from network partners and network structure. Finally, while most studies have emphasized that individuals and organizations can profit from their engagements in social networks, this paper suggests a potential dark side of networks by showing that networks can encourage decision makers to persist with their investment in an underperforming—and potentially failing—project. These results can help project managers involved in networking activities to better understand the effects of these activities on their decision policies, and thus draw better and more accurate decisions. Second, this study provides insights into how organizational strategy with respect to dissemination of R&D results and involvement of the organization's R&D managers in the scientific community influences the persistence of underperforming R&D projects, and thereby the organization's R&D expenditures. This can assist top managers to design financial controls and allocate financial resources to managers of underperforming R&D projects in line with the organization's networking strategy.     

Antidumping as Strategic Trade Policy under Asymmetric Information

Trade liberalization under GATT/World Trade Organization (WTO) has been partly offset by an increase in antidumping protection, possibly due to the inclusion of sales below cost in the definition of dumping. This article investigates the domestic government's antidumping duty choice in an asymmetric information framework, in which the foreign firm's cost is observed by the domestic firm, but not by the government. We show that by designing a tariff schedule contingent on firms' cost reports and accompanied by a threat to collect additional information for report verification, the domestic government may not only be able to extract the true cost information, but also succeed in implementing the full‐information, governmental welfare‐maximizing duty. The antidumping framework within GATT/WTO may thus not only offer the means to pursue strategic trade policy disguised as fair trade policy, but it also helps overcome informational problems with regard to correctly determining the optimal strategic trade policy.     

Preliminary ruling on discriminatory advertising

Finland has no special marketing regulations for dealing with sex discrimination. The paper reports on a recent decision of the Market Court according to which the general clause about good practice of the Consumer Protection Act can be applied to discriminatory advertising. But the Finnish Consumer Ombudsman believes that discriminatory advertising should be regulated separately by a special provision entered either into the Act on Equality between Men and Women or into the Consumer Protection Act.

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Zusammenfassung VorlÄufige Regelung diskriminierender Werbung in Finnland Finnland hat keine speziellen rechtlichen Regelungen gegen Geschlechterdiskriminierung in der Werbung. Der Beitrag berichtet über eine neuere Entscheidung des finnischen Marktgerichtshofes, nach der allgemeinere Regelungen des Verbraucherschutzgesetzes auf geschlechtsdiskriminierende Werbung angewendet werden können. Allerdings ist die finnische Verbraucher-Ombudsbehörde der Meinung, da\ diskriminierende Werbung durch eine eigene Bestimmung geregelt werden sollte, die entweder in das Gesetz über die Gleichstellung von Mann und Frau oder in das Verbraucherschutzgesetz eingefügt werden sollte.