I complain for your good? Re-examining consumer advocacy

Marketplace helping behavior such as opinion leadership, market maven, and purchase pals that benefit others has been extensively studied. A diverse but similar to other marketplace helping behaviors is the concept of consumer advocacy. Extant review of literature reveals that customer advocacy and consumer advocacy are conceptually different. The former is an organization level construct, and the latter is an individual consumer's ‘generalized tendency to share market information’. It is argued that a following dissatisfactory service encounter, consumer advocates would indulge in market placing helping behavior such as negative word of mouth to prevent other consumers' from having similar marketplace disappointments. Hence, prior studies link consumer advocacy to ‘altruistic tendencies’. On the basis of self-construal theory, this study investigates the motivations for consumer advocacy. Using a scenario-based experimentation implemented in survey method; we establish that consumer advocacy is motivated by an amalgamation of altruism and self-interest. We also operationalize third-party complaint construct and empirically test whether consumer advocacy is a predictor.     

Robustness of sunspot equilibria

Summary. A sunspot equilibrium (SSE) is based on some extrinsic randomizing device (RD). We analyze the robustness of SSE. (1) We say that an SSE allocation is robust to refinements if it is also an SSE allocation based on any refinement of its RD. (2) We introduce two core concepts for analyzing the robustness of SSE in the face of cooperative-coalition formation. In the first, the blocking allocations are based on the RD that defines the SSE. In the second (stronger) core concept, coalitions select their own RDs. For the convex economy with restricted market participation, SSE allocations are robust under each of the definitions and the cores converge on replication of the economy to the set of SSE allocations. For the economy with an indivisible good, SSE allocations are not always robust. We provide examples of each of the following: (i) an SSE allocation that is not robust to refinement, (ii) an SSE allocation that is in neither core, (iii) an SSE allocation that is in the first core, but not in the second, and (iv) a core that does not converge upon replication to the set of SSE allocations. Received: July 31, 1995; revised version August 30, 1996     

Heterogeneity,leveling the playing field,and affirmative action in contests

The heterogeneous abilities of players in various competitive contexts often lead to undesirable outcomes such as low effort provision, a lack of diversity, and inequality. A range of policies is implemented to mitigate such issues by enforcing competitive balance, that is, by leveling the playing field. Some of those policies, known as affirmative action (AA) policies, are practiced in ethical response to historical discrimination against particular social groups, and are also aimed at increasing competition. This survey summarizes the rapidly growing literature on contest theory regarding AA and other policies that level the playing field. Using a general theoretical structure, we outline the theoretical, experimental, and empirical research findings on contest outcomes under a multitude of policy mechanisms, and in doing so, we touch upon some of the common debates in the AA literature.     

Women self-help groups and intra-household decision-making in agriculture

This study examines the effect of women-centric agricultural self-help groups (SHGs) on intra-household decision-making in agriculture. Using data collected from an intra-household survey of 815 households, we analyze the effect of women's membership in different types of SHGs on 14 decisions related to farms and households. Specifically, we investigate the discord in decision-making, which is the difference in the perceived decision-making roles of spouses within a household. Our results show that women's participation in SHGs has increased their role in decision-making by 8–13%. However, the effects vary according to the type of intervention and the decision. We found fewer discords in intra-household decision-making in seed SHGs than in micro-finance SHGs. In conclusion, our study suggests that women's engagement in agriculture-based SHG interventions can encourage joint decision-making, but the magnitude of this effect depends on the type of SHG. Development agencies can use this information to design interventions targeted at empowering women through the improvement of the agricultural value chain.