Product innovation and contestability

Summary This article deals with the introduction of product innovation in a contestable market model. Investment contestability describes a benchmark case of competition by introducing sunk entry-deterring investment in a free entry framework. Aside from careful price setting, suppliers adopt investment in product quality in order to deter entry. Zero-profit pricing and increased quality point to a partial second-best outcome of market behaviour.The author is very grateful for the support of Professor W.J. Baumol, The C.V. Starr Center for Research in Applied Economics at New York University, The Dutch Organisation of Scientific Research and an anonymous referee. Of course, the usual disclaimer applies.     

A Communication‐Based Theory of the Choice Between Greenfield and Acquisition Entry

This paper develops a communication‐based theory of the choice by multinational enterprises (MNEs) between greenfield and acquisition entry. It argues that MNE parents communicate with their subsidiaries for reasons of knowledge exchange, coordination, monitoring, and socialization. The expected communication costs arising from these activities are argued to increase with the verbal communication barriers existing between a prospective subsidiary and its parent, but this increase is argued to be larger for acquisitions because they require more extensive parent–subsidiary communication than greenfields. I therefore hypothesize that verbal communication barriers have positive effects on the likelihood that MNEs choose greenfield over acquisition entry. I also hypothesize that these effects are weaker for prospective subsidiaries that will have more autonomy or local co‐owners. An analysis of 231 entries by Dutch MNEs into 48 countries lends substantial support to these hypotheses, indicating that geographic and linguistic barriers to verbal communication play important roles in MNEs' establishment mode decisions.     

Mergers and acquisitions in the global food processing industry in 1986–2006

Food systems around the world experienced increased merger and acquisition (M&A) activity over the past decades. Based on a sample of 13,911M&A attempts worldwide during 1986–2006, this study provides an analysis of major determinants of M&A completion in the food processing industry. Friendly attitude, cash payment and experience with M&As emerge as strong deal facilitators. Bidding competition, pursuit of parallel transactions, target subsidiary status and acquirer public status are the most important deal breakers. Unlike the lenient antitrust approach of the Reagan administration, the 1998 UK Competition Act and various directives and regulations on food safety and quality associated with the completion of the internal European market in 1992 facilitated M&A completion. In contrast, the beginning of the Economic and Monetary Union, as marked by the introduction of the Euro in 1999, had a strong negative effect on completion likelihood. This study identifies substantial regional differences. Completion of M&As that involve Asian firms depends on distinct factors. Results for NAFTA are mostly in line with predictions derived from general economic theory, compared to other regions.     

Cultural distance in international business and management: from mean-based to variance-based measures

Extant practice in international management is to measure cultural distance as a nation-to-nation comparison of country means on cultural values, thereby ignoring the cultural variation that exists within countries. We argue that these traditional mean-based measures of cultural distance should take within-country cultural variation into account. Therefore, we propose the use of variance-based measures of cultural distance. To illustrate our argument, we examine total US foreign affiliate sales in more than 40 host countries over the 1983–2008 period, complemented with data from the World Values Survey. We analyze the effects of three cultural distance measures: the Kogut and Singh (1988 Kogut, B., and Singh, H. (1988), ‘The Effect of National Culture on the Choice of Entry Mode,’ Journal of International Business Studies, 19, 411–432.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) mean-based index of cultural distance, the Kogut and Singh (1988 Kogut, B., and Singh, H. (1988), ‘The Effect of National Culture on the Choice of Entry Mode,’ Journal of International Business Studies, 19, 411–432.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) index conditioned by host-country cultural variation and a variance-based measure that takes into account both home- and host-country cultural variation. Our findings indicate that, when within-country cultural variation is taken into account, the explanatory power of the Kogut and Singh (1988 Kogut, B., and Singh, H. (1988), ‘The Effect of National Culture on the Choice of Entry Mode,’ Journal of International Business Studies, 19, 411–432.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) index is substantially decreased. In addition, our variance-based measure of cultural distance outperforms the Kogut and Singh (1988 Kogut, B., and Singh, H. (1988), ‘The Effect of National Culture on the Choice of Entry Mode,’ Journal of International Business Studies, 19, 411–432.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) measure in the explanation of foreign US sales. We therefore suggest to move from mean-based to variance-based measures of cultural distance, thereby taking the cultural variation within countries into account.     

Bargaining over managerial contracts in delegation games: managerial power,contract disclosure and cartel behavior

Modern corporate governance codes include clauses requiring the disclosure of managerial compensation. Such codes have been installed to protect shareholders' interests. In this paper, we explore the impact of such disclosure on consumer welfare. We consider two‐stage delegation games in which owner‐shareholders negotiate about compensation with their managers in the game's first stage. At the end of the first stage, the managerial compensation contract outcomes of the bargaining process are publicly announced. In the second stage, Cournot competition evolves. We prove that sales delegation generates equilibria radically different from relative performance delegation. Using classical Cournot as the benchmark, contractual bargaining over sales compensation gives tougher product market competition—and hence higher consumer surplus. The opposite holds true for relative performance delegation. Then, cartel behavior is promoted, reducing consumer surplus. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Towards a Democratic New Normal? Investor Reactions to Interim-Regime Dominance during Violent Events

Although interim regimes in former autocracies are generally tasked with initiating a democratic ‘new normal’, they may privately intend to become their country’s new autocratic rulers. We argue that, to cope with the uncertainty stemming from this possibility, investors infer an interim regime’s intentions from the dominance displayed by the regime during government-related violence, as reflected in the share of civilian fatalities. Specifically, we propose that investors interpret higher interim-regime dominance as a signal of weaker democratic intentions and associate such weaker intentions with a gloomier political outlook for local firms. We therefore hypothesize that investors react more negatively to violent events characterized by higher interim-regime dominance. We also hypothesize a less negative effect of such dominance for firms with larger foreign footprints, lower indebtedness, or more concentrated ownership, since investors will likely consider such firms more resilient to political deterioration. Applying event study methodology to 94 spells of violence in Egypt during the Arab Spring, we find substantial support for our hypotheses, thus contributing to management research on investor decision-making, violence, and political uncertainty.     

Ceo Locus of Control and Small Firm Performance: an Integrative Framework and Empirical Test*

Previous research on the impact of chief executive officer (CEO) locus of control is mainly based on simple and partial mappings of bivariate associations between CEO locus of control and organizational outcomes. In addition, distinct substreams have emerged in which intricately related phenomena are studied separately. to overcome this fragmentation and polarization, we provide and empirically test an integrative framework based on previously tested hypotheses on the impact of CEO locus of control. Our approach differs from prior research in two ways. First, it simultaneously takes account of strategic choice and firm performance in order to assess the extent to which strategy mediates the relationship between CEO locus of control and organizational performance. Second, we consider the CEO to be both a formulator and implementor of organizational strategies. Besides the observation that CEO locus of control seems to matter a lot in terms of explaining organizational performance in the present sample, our results demonstrate that an integrative approach increases our insight into the impact of CEO locus of control by revealing why some CEOs achieve higher organizational performance than others.     

Human resource management in relation to generic strategies: a comparison of chemical and food&drink companies in the Netherlands and Great Britain

In this paper, specific personnel policies and their relationship to generic strategies are examined in the light of the concept of human resource management (HRM). Since data from twelve Dutch and eight British companies in the food&drink and chemical industries reveal that the implementation of HRM components is subject to a societal effect–and thus HRM has a different meaning in Dutch companies than in their British counterparts–a typology of HRM at a more strategic level is proposed to facilitate the analysis of the relationship between HRM and generic strategies. Although in the majority of cases the HRM policy supports the generic strategy pursued, many problems and paradoxes remain in the analysis of an HRM–strategy fit.     

On the impact of managerial bonus systems on firm profit and market competition: the cases of pure profit,sales, market share and relative profits compared

By designing remuneration schemes based on a bonus rewarding specific firm‐level outcomes, the owners/shareholders of a firm can manipulate the behavior of their managers. In practice, different bonus anchors take center stage: some are profit‐based, others use sales as the key yardstick and still different ones focus on relative performance vis‐à‐vis a peer group. In this paper, we focus on the impact of remuneration schemes on firm‐level profitability. The profit effect is investigated for (all possible combinations of) four bonus systems using delegation games. In the context of a linear Cournot model for two or three firms, we model a two‐ or three‐stage decision structure where, in the first stage (or first two stages), an owner decides on the bonus system for his manager and where, in the final stage, the manager takes the daily output decision for her firm. It appears that the bonus system based on relative (profits) performance is superior throughout. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.