Product Differentiation for Software-as-a-Service Providers

The market for the new provisioning type Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) has reached a significant size and still shows enormous growth rates. By varying size of SaaS products, providers can improve their market position and profits by successfully acting in the tension area of customer acquisition, pricing and costs. We first elaborate differences concerning product differentiation between classic software provisioning models and SaaS. Then, we introduce a micro-economic based decision model to maximize the return of a provider by finding an optimal granularity, i.e. by varying the size of services. This paper makes two contributions in this context: (1) it provides a conceptual foundation for product differentiation within the scope of SaaS and (2) it presents the first implementation of variable reproduction costs for web based software offers. The model is illustrated by a real world case with data from a SaaS provider.     

Computer capacity utilisation – a multilevel perspective on decades of decline

This article uses a multilevel perspective to explain why there has been a dramatic decline in the utilisation of computer-processing power during the last two to three decades. It identifies that computers have been used in two different ways – either as single-user systems where each users received his or her own computer or as time-sharing systems where each computer was shared by several users. It finds that the time-sharing systems made considerably better use of the computers' resources than the single-user systems and that the utilisation of computer-processing power began to decline as single-user microcomputers began to replace time-shared minicomputers and mainframes. The article argues that this development contradicts much of the recent research on capacity utilisation, but argues that this contradiction can be explained by analysing this development as a transition process with multiple levels of interaction.     

Inadequate Bivariate Measures of Health Inequality: The Impact of Income Distribution*

Bivariate measures of health inequality are influenced by changes in two variables: health and a socioeconomic variable, such as income. For these measures, what is reported as an increase in health inequality might just as well be a reduction in income inequality. In particular, several papers have found that socioeconomic health inequalities in Nordic countries are no less than in other European countries. The correct interpretation could just be that income inequality is no higher in Nordic countries than in the rest of Europe. The problem is especially profound when the causality is running from health to income.     

Moral hazard,competition and contract design: empirical evidence from managerial,franchised and entrepreneurial businesses in Norway

Agency theory emphasizes the role of ownership, control and incentives in encouraging managers to improve efficiency. Owners often tie managers to contracts that reduce conflict of interest between owners and managers. The differences between alternative business ownership structures have been investigated. According to theory, we expect managers with an outcome-dependent dealer contract to be more efficient than managers with a more integrated and less performance based employee dealer contract. We also analyse how competitive pressure might reduce the moral hazard problem and therefore affect contract design. Berle and Means (The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Macmillan, New York, 1932) long ago stated that the market mechanism could constrain the agency problem. Even so, this problem has scarcely been investigated empirically. This paper also considers the contractual effect of potential monitoring costs, education and relationship age in a model tested on data from 175 dealer contracts in a multinational oil company.     

Risk capital allocation for RORAC optimization

This paper considers the financial optimization problem of a firm with several sub-businesses striving for its optimal RORAC. An insightful example shows that the implementation of classical gradient capital allocation can be suboptimal if division managers are allowed to venture into all business whose marginal RORAC exceeds the firm’s RORAC. The marginal RORAC requirements are refined by adding a risk correction term that takes into account the interdependencies of the risks of different lines of business. It is shown that under certain stationarity conditions this approach can guarantee that the optimal RORAC will eventually be achieved.     

Governance structures in the hotel industry

This study investigates alternative governance forms in the hotel industry. Agency theory maintains that the need for control over service quality, financial risk, and the market environment affect the choice of governance form. Prior agency research emphasizes alternative governance structures that principals employ, given local market conditions, agent incentives, and risk preferences. The study augments the established principal-agent perspective with a discussion of entrepreneurial motivations to join hotel alliances. The study analyzes the choice between independent ownership and affiliation with a voluntary chain as well as the choice between integration and franchising. Data analyses from 650 hotels indicate that the hotel size, amenities, population, and distance to headquarters influence governance.